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A B S T R A C T
A number of factors contributed to the rise of 
political parties in the Sudan. Firstly, there was the 
discord in nationalist circles concerning the means most 
suitable for the quickest realization of the Sudan's 
independence. Some nationalists advocated a militant 
approach, even overt opposition to the Condominium 
Administration if need be; others sought to achieve the 
desired objective through co-operation with the 
Government. In due course, the militants gained the 
upper hand, a conflict with the Government developed 
and they turned to Egypt for support. The accompanying 
disagreement on the Sudan's political relation to Egypt 
exacerbated further the divisions in the nationalist 
movement.
Secondly, the economic hardships prevalent in the 
Sudan during the war had generated considerable discontent 
among various sections of the population. The militants 
exploited the situation to mobilize political support 
for their demand for an immediate and effective 
participation by Sudanese in the government of their 
country.
Thirdly, the rivalry between the two major religious 
orders served as another channel through which the
nationalist struggle spread to the population in the 
countryside. Unlike the head of the Khatmiyya sect,
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman al-Mahdi cherished definite political 
ambitions. In the light of the growing debate on the 
Sudanis relation to Egypt, the political issues 
inevitably became intertwined with sectarian interests.
Fourthly, British and Egyptian attitudes to the 
political future of the Sudan influenced nationalist 
commitments. British attitudes conveyed the impression 
that they were not intending to grant independence to the 
Sudan but rather prolong the lifetime of the Condominium. 
The Egyptians, on the other hand, spoke of a free and 
united Kile Valley, with the Sudan having its own internal 
administration. Sudanese nationalists were accordingly 
divided on whether or not union with Egypt was the 
shortest path to independence. Political parties thus 
emerged as organizations primarily dedicated to the 
realization of independence through the one or the 
other means.
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iNOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
In the transliteration of the Arabic characters,
I have in general followed the system adopted by the 
Editors of Sudan Notes and Records* This system has not, 
however, been applied to geographical names, for which 
the conventional spelling used by the Sudan Government 
Survey Department has been adopted. In the pronunciation 
of personal and party names, I have followed the 
Sudanese practice rather than the classical forms of 
literary Arabic.
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C H A P T E R  O N E  
THE HERITAGE OF SUDANESE NATIONALISM
The Condominium Administration in the Sudan.
The reconquest of the Sudan in 1899 created a number 
of legal and diplomatic problems for the British Government. 
Although the regained territories were for all technical 
purposes former possessions of the khedive, the simple 
restoration of Egyptian rule over the Sudan was rejected 
by the British out of hand. So was also the extension of 
the privileged status which Europeans had acquired in 
Egypt. At the same time, however, the apparent alternative 
of creating an undisguised British colonial administration 
was not feasible, for Egypt*s historical claims had in 
fact been used as a convenient pretext by the British to 
justify, to rival European powers, the extension of their 
domination over the country.1
The result of all these considerations, embodied in 
the Anglo-Egyptian Conventions of 1899 (usually known as
1. For a fuller account, cf. MuddathircAbd al-Rahim, 
Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan. Clarendon 
Press (Oxford 1969)> ch* I; also, P.M. Holt,
A Modern History of the Sudan. Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson (London 1967)> ch. VIII.
2the Condominium Agreement), was to confer on the Sudan a
separate political status from that of Egypt, The link
between the two countries was however formally preserved
by associating the Egyptian with the British government
in a joint sovereignty over the Sudan, The khedivial
claims were further recognized by the provisions that
both the Egyptian and British flags should fly together
in the country; that the appointment and removal of the
governor-general should be by khedivial decree (but only
on the recommendations of the British government); and
that the proclamations of the governor-general, having
the force of law, should be notified to the president
of the Egyptian council of ministers, as well as to
1
the British agent in Cairo,
These stipulations apart, the Agreement deliberately 
excluded Egyptian authority from the Sudan. All supreme 
military and civil command was vested in the governor- 
general who, as a nominee of the British government, 
invariably turned out to be a British national. In 
addition to full executive powers, the governor-general 
was also given complete authority to legislate by 
proclamation, and Egyptian legislation was not to apply 
to the Sudan unless specifically proclaimed by him. 
British officials occupied all the senior posts in
1, P.M. Holt, on. cit.. p. 155 ff.
3in the administrative machinery while Egyptians were 
given subordinate ranks* Thus, by reserving almost 
complete autonomy to an official nominated by the 
British government, the Agreement did not create a 
true condominium but merely gave a nominal recognition 
to the historical claims of the khedive.
The Egyptians were never satisfied with the terms of 
the Agreement and they felt, with a sullen resentment, 
that they had been jockeyed out of their rights. Once 
Egypt had passed from under British control, the 
artificiality of the Condominium could no longer be 
concealed and, from the end of the First World War 
onwards, it became increasingly an embarrassment both 
to successive British cabinets and to the British 
administration in the Sudan.
The Sudanese Awakening.
The cradle of Sudanese nationalism lay in Khartoum 
and Omdurman, and it was the result of the politicization 
of Sudanese who had been educated at Gordon Memorial 
College for service in the administration of the country. 
Before 1915, these "graduates" were mostly interested in 
the Islamic literary heritage, and their activities were 
confined to organising literary festivals and to eulogising
41the Muslim past.
The aftermath of the war, however, witnessed a 
profound re-orientation in Sudanese political interest. As 
in other Muslim countries, the revolt against the Ottoman 
caliphate created an ideological crisis for the 
sophisticated Sudanese, and the question of legitimising 
political authority began to pre-occupy their thinking 
more intensely. Partly out of interest and partly by force 
of circumstances, their attention was drawn to the study 
of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which were then 
being widely discussed in the Egyptian newspapers and 
which were very freely commented upon by the Egyptian 
community in Khartoum and Qmdurman. The widely-drawn 
conclusion in these circles was that the British would, 
evacuate Egypt completely after the war. The general 
effect of all this on the Sudanese was to make them 
realise that a British withdrawal from Egypt inevitably 
implied a withdrawal from the Sudan as well. With 
recollections of an independent pre-condominium state 
still lingering in their mind, Sudanese graduates began 
to feel pleasantly restless at this renewed prospect of 
independence. Their conception of a modern Sudanese
1. G.M.A. Bakheit, British Administration and Sudanese 
Nationalism. 1919-1959, Ph.D. Thesis (Cambridge 
University, 1965), p. 67.
nation-state was not at that stage fully developed, and 
in their efforts to define it more clearly they were 
to he inevitably influenced, whether in a positive 
or negative respect, by the turbulence of Egyptian 
nationalism.
At the time the intelligentsia were stirring, 
the country's religious leadership was proceeding along 
parallel, though not coincidental, lines of thought. 
Before the outbreak of the war, Sayyid *Ali al-Mirghani* 
had stood alone as the only religious leader in whom the
British placed confidence, whereas Sayyid cAbd al-Hahman
2 - - 3al-Mahdi and Sharif Yusif al-Hindi were ever kept
under the eye of suspicion. The war with the Turks,
however, dictated a modification in the government's
policy toward the latter leaders, especially Sayyid
cAbd al-RaJunan. The main factor that occasioned these
1. Sayyid*Ali al-Mirghani: head of a sufi sect in the 
Sudan, known as the Khatmiyya; grew up in exile in 
Egypt during the Mahdiyya rule in the Sudan and 
returned after the reconquest of the country in 1899; 
solid supporter of the British administration until 
the late 1930*s and strong opponent of Mahdist 
influence and ascendancy.
2. Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman al-Mahdi: posthumous son of the 
Mahdi, and recognized leader of the Ansar sect.
3. Sharif Yusif al-Hindi: head of a third, and smaller, 
religious order (the Hindiyya).
6modifications was Wingate's'1’ intense anxiety to counteract 
the Pan-Islamic propaganda of the Central powers, Sayyid 
cAbd al-Rahman was thus allowed, for the first time, to 
visit and live on Aba island, from where his father's 
revolt had started and which was generally considered to 
be the cradle of Mahdism. The tight restrictions which 
had hitherto been ruthlessly imposed on the Ansar were 
gradually relaxed.
Following this somewhat official recognition of their
influence and position, both Sayyid eAbd al-Rahman and
Sharif Yusif al-Hindi set about to consolidate their new
standing in the country. They courted Sayyid cAli and
explored with him the possibility of promoting a policy
by which all the religious orders would have one acknowledged
head, who would correspond to the Shavkh Mashaykh al-Turuq 
2
in Egypt. Though a formal agreement on these lines did 
not eventually materialize, the regular contacts 
accompanying these discussions had the effect of bringing 
these dignitaries closer together and thereby establishing 
an informal triumvirate of political leadership. Like 
their other compatriots, these sectarian leaders as well
1. Sir Reginald Wingate: Governor-General of the Sudan 
1899-1916; British High Commissioner in Egypt 1916- 
1919.
2. Stack to Symes, XI.9.1917, PRO, FO.141/479 (file 2217).
7detected in Wilson’s Fourteen Points the promise of
independent statehood for the Sudan and they groomed
themselves to assume the positions of political power
in the country.
Egyptian nationalist agitation, however, scandalized
Sudanese nationalism and confused the British reaction to
it. Egyptian speculation about the outcome of the Peace.
Conference at Versailles reached the Sudanese in a more
garbled form, involving the substitution of Turkish
officials in the higher positions to take the place of
British officials; retaliation on pro-British notables for
expressing loyal sentiments; and a general calling to
account of those who had displeased the Egyptians in
any way.1 In the light of such disturbing rumours,
2the sectarian triumvirate urged Stack to take a stronger 
line than was then being taken "to emphasize the fact that 
the Sudan is under the British Empire and that its future
1. Stack to Wingate, 22.12.1913, DURHAM, Wingate Papers,
Box 204/1; also, PRO, 10.571/5711.
2. Sir Lee Stack: Joined Sudan Government 1904; Private 
Secretary to Wingate (Governor-General) 1904-7; Sudan 
Agent in Cairo 1908-14; Civil Secretary 1914; Governor- 
General and Sirdar 1919-1924; assassinated in Cairo 1924.
8•i
is identified with British control". Sayyid cAli in
particular spoke of his ambition to see the Sudanese
become, under the guidance of Britain, "a united people
with their own laws, customs and administration, capable
of both governing and fighting for them selves'*. The three
leaders admitted that the bulk of the people were not yet
conscious of any national ambition of this kind, but they
were definitely convinced that the idea was latent and that
it only required education to bring it out. For this
purpose they asked "to be allowed to institute among their
followers a kind of propaganda which will endeavour to
foster loyalty and co-operation with the British Imperial
idea, with the ultimate object of cultivating a spirit of
2national unity among the Sudanese."
Although the suggestion was then rejected by Stack, 
the sectarian leaders continued to be deeply concerned 
about the future of the Sudan. In March 1919, Zaghlul 
Pasha demanded the termination of British occupation not 
only in Egypt but also in the Sudan, and he re-asserted 
Egypt's historic claim to possession of the country. 
Believing thatZaghlul would take the Egyptian case to 
the Peace Conference, principal Sudanese notables became
1. Stack, "Note on the Growth of National Aspirations in 
the Sudan", 25.2.1919, DURHAM, Wingate Papers, Box 204/1.
2. Ibid.
9more determined to have their own say in the matter and 
they despatched two letters to Stack, in which they 
disassociated themselves entirely from the Egyptian 
nationalists and rejected any Egyptian claims to speak 
for the Sudanese, Sharif Yusif al-Hindi was the more 
explicit. The Sudan, he declared, had been finally 
separated from Egypt since the reconquest and had become 
capable of "bearing its own expenses and of carrying out 
its own independence under the protection of Great 
Britain.
Whatever might have been the expectations of Sudanese 
nationalists, the Peace Conference at Versailles did not 
even discuss, let alone decide, the political future of 
the Sudan. Instead, the Sudan question was to become the 
subject of protracted negotiations between Egypt and 
Britain. The intense propaganda, both British and Egyptian, 
that inevitably accompanied such negotiations had the 
overall effect of retarding, if not actually deforming, the 
growth of Sudanese nationalism. The political status of 
the Sudan was not finally settled until 1953. But, in 1919, 
this fact could not be foreseen by any of the participants, 
especially the Sudanese. Under the impact of Egyptian 
propaganda, they had formed the erroneous impression that
1. Sharif Yusif al-Hindi to Lee Stack, 21.4.1919» and
Sayyid cAli al-Mirghani (et als) to Lee Stack, 23-4.1919, 
DUBHA&, Wingate Papers, Box 204/1*
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the then on-going Anglo-Egyptian negotiations would
actually result in the withdrawal of the British from both
Egypt and the Sudan, In the light of this impending
independence, budding Sudanese nationalists found themselves
confronted with serious, and in some respects disturbing,
problems of nationhood: There was not that widespread sense
of national consciousness which was necessary for the
maintenance of unity and stable government in the country;
and, at the same time, there were hardly any qualified
Sudanese who could be called upon to replace British and
Egyptian officials in running the country's administration
effectively. Some Sudanese graduates, particularly the 
- 1muwalladdin, were highly influenced by their close connection 
with Egyptian culture and they tended to visualize the 
Sudan as an administrative part of Egypt. Others, including 
the influential religious leaders, were uneasy at the 
prospect of a repetition of Egyptian maladministration, 
as in the previous century, and they tended to adopt the 
view that the Sudan would be better off if it developed 
along its own separate lines under the trusteeship of 
Bri tain.
Between 1919 and 1924, these two nationalist outlooks 
became increasingly polarized. The events and debates
1. The term muwalladdin referred to those born of mixed 
Egyptian and Sudanese parentage.
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of this period may be summarized briefly. In 1919,
Egyptian nationalist propaganda sought to impress the then
visiting Milner Mission that the Sudan's future lay in
unity with Egypt. In response, Husayn Sharif'*' (editor of
al-Hadara and mouthpiece of the anti-unity school of
thought) publicly challenged the logic of Egyptian claims
and propagated instead the alternative policy of preserving
"the Sudan for the Sudanese". He called for an end to
the condominium with Egypt over the Sudan, and the
continuation in its place of sole British trusteeship
until the country was ready to stand on its own feet as
2
an independent state. The pro-unity advocates, in their 
turn, became understandably disturbed. They saw in these 
articles the hand of British conspiracy designed to rob 
the Sudan of its immediate independence, and they
1. Son of Khalifa Sharif (cousin of the Mahdi); educated at 
Gordon College, worked for a time as a_teacher and
then edited the literary magazine al-Raid in 1917; in 
1919, he edited al-Hadara as a literary paper, and he 
continued in his post when it was bought over by the 
three Sayyids in June 1920. He was highly respected 
among the graduates, even by his political opponents.
Died in 1928.
2. These views were expressed in a series of four articles 
published in al-Hadara on 7, 14, 21, and 28 August 1920. 
Eor a more elaborate summary, cf. MuddathircAbd al-Rahim, 
on. cit.f p. 101. Muddathir mistakenly identifies the 
author of these articles^as having been Sayyid 
Muhammad al-Khallfa Sharif (a nephew of SayyidcAbd 
al-Rahman).
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responded by organizing the distribution of political 
leaflets, in which they attacked vehemently both the 
British administration and its anti-unity collaborators.
In February 1922, despairing of reaching any agreement 
with the Egyptians, the British Government unilaterally 
terminated their protectorate over Egypt and reserved the 
Sudan question for future settlement. In the Sudan itself, 
this declaration drove the pro-unity group into adopting 
more militant forms of political action. The White Flag 
League was formed and political activity henceforth spread 
from the distribution of anti-British leaflets to the 
organization of public demonstrations in support of the 
ideal of a united Nile Valley, free from the British and 
under the Egyptian crown. The League received more or 
less covert support from Egyptian political circles, 
both within and outside the Sudan; and this factor, 
together with its slogan of unity, led the British 
authorities to look upon it as a mere agency of Egyptian
i
agitators. As the disaffection spread to Sudanese 
military units, and when the British ordered the evacuation 
of Egyptian army units from the Sudan following the 
assassination of Stack, these units mutinied. The
1. P.M. Holt, op. cit.. p. 1?0.
disturbance was suppressed and the Egyptian share in the 
Condominium administration was effectively, though 
temporarily, abolished.**"
The Politics of British Reaction.
As a result of the 1924 disturbances, British 
administrative policy in the Sudan developed along 
different lines than those actively pursued in the post­
war years. During that period, British policy directly or 
indirectly aimed at de-Egyptianizing the government by 
associating the Sudanese more closely with the administration 
of the country. They sought to realize this objective by 
conferring minor executive powers on tribal shaykhs and 
notables, and also by widening the opportunities for 
western-educated Sudanese to be employed in government 
service. In this respect, special courses were introduced 
in 1919 to train Sudanese for the post of mamur and sub-mamur. 
and within five years there were 102 of them as against 35 
Egyptians. Sudanese were also trained in greater numbers 
as medical assistants, engineers, agriculturalists and 
telegraphists. In the three capital towns, a consultative 
municipal council was constituted in 1921 with a number of
1. Bor a more detailed study of this period, cf. 
G.M.A. Bakheit, on. cit.. Part II, Chapter III.
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Sudanese as nominated members; and, in a similar municipal
council constituted at Port Sudan, one third of the members
were Sudanese.'1'
This limited experiment in "Sudanisation”, however,
suffered a severe setback after 1924. The events of that
year produced a crisis of confidence between the British
administration and the Sudanese intelligentsia. While
the government had rightly perceived that active opposition
had been confined to a small minority, it nevertheless
reacted as if the intelligentsia as a whole was "its
inveterate enemy, to be checked and circumscribed in the
2
interest of political stability.1 British policy was
henceforth directed at reducing the power and need of
Sudanese junior officials in central government service.
Entrance to government posts was made more difficult by
the imposition of harder examinations. The powers of
Sudanese mamurs and sub-mamurs were greatly reduced and
3their recruitment ceased altogether by 1927.
While the role of educated Sudanese in the country1s 
administration was being progressively reduced, that of 
tribal authorities was correspondingly increased. Since
1. Muddathir cAbd al-Rahim, op. cit., p. 64#
2. P.M. Holt, op. cit., p. 133#
3. G.M.A. Bakheit, op. cit.. pp. 134-5.
1917* Stack had gradually drawn traditional tribal
authorities into local administration and he regarded this
policy of "Native Administration" as complementary to that
of training educated Sudanese for service in the hierarchy
of the central government. The paramount consideration
in both cases was to replace Egyptian officials by
Sudanese. After 1924, however, and under the influence of 
1Maffey , Native Administration came to be looked upon as
an alternative to the employment of educated Sudanese in
the civil service, and ordinances were accordingly enacted
which considerably enhanced the status and power of tribal
authorities. This policy of one-sided administrative
development continued until 1934 when it was reviewed by
2
Maffeyfs more liberal successor, Sir Stewart Symes. But 
by then, the psychological damage had already been done.
The crisis of confidence between the intelligentsia and 
the British gradually engulfed the tribal authorities as 
well and turned the nationalist sons against their political
1. Sir John Maffey: Chief Commissioner N.W. frontier 
Province of India to 1926; Governor-General of Sudan 
1926-34; later Permanent Under-Secretary in the Colonial 
Office and H.M. Ambassador to Ireland.
2. Sir Stewart Symes: Served in the Egyptian Army and was 
seconded to the Sudan in 1906-1916; served with 
Wingate in Cairo 1917—1920; Palestine 1920-8;
Aden 1928-30; Governor Tanganyika 1931-4; Governor- 
General of Sudan 1934-40.
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fathers. The demand for “Sudanisation” in the 1930*s and 
1940's thus came to mean not only the replacement of 
British by Sudanese officials, but also the total 
subordination (if not abolition) of "native administration" 
to the primacy of the nationalist intelligentsia.
The Behabilitation of Nationalism.
In the aftermath of the 1924 disturbances, the 
Sudanese intelligentsia underwent a crucial phase of soul- 
searching and readjustment. They were sternly shaken by the 
drastic actions of the British administration, and they 
bitterly regretted the departure of the Egyptians, whom 
they had come to regard as sympathetic allies. They were 
furthermore distressed at the confirmation of their 
earlier suspicions that, without an Egyptian counter­
presence, the British would be completely free to enforce
1any policy they desired in the Sudan.
As the more militant proponents of "a united Nile 
Valley” subsided into political inactivity and despair, 
not to re-emerge until the mid-1940ls, the bulk of the 
intelligentsia continued to explore privately ways and 
means by which they could drag the Sudan along the path to
1. “Political History of the Sudan; 1924-1931"> CRO, 
SECURITY 7/1/1.
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independence. Their motto was "the Sudan for the 
Sudanese", and they had discerned in the British 
acceptance of it not only an implied denial of Egyptian 
claims, But also a tacit theoretical admission to the 
Sudanis ultimate independence. They accepted the 
temporary need for Britain1s guardianship while the
1Sudanese qualified to "Become a self-governing nation".
But, at the same time, they saw in this guardianship a 
risk of the Sudan drifting into a status of a British 
colony, and they had consequently wanted to obtain a 
British commitment to a fixed time limit for the 
achievement of Sudanese independence. The assassination 
of Stack, however, roBBed them of the opportunity: The
consequent expulsion of the Egyptians inevitably relieved 
the pressure on the British of making such a commitment.
The subsequent turn of events in Egypt dismayed the 
Sudanese intelligentsia even more. They had hoped that 
the Egyptian nationalists would quickly resume their share 
in the Sudan administration and thus re-apply a Brake 
on British imperialist designs. Instead, they were 
increasingly frustrated to observe that the Wafd was unable
1. Petition by Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman al-Mahdi and others 
to the Governor-General, 10 ^une 1924, quoted in 
G.M.A. Bakheit, on. cit., p. 80 ff.
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to keep itself in power, or to even demolish the 
"dictatorial1 government of Muhammad Mahmud Pasha. Rightly 
or wrongly, they looked upon the latter as an instrument 
of British imperialism, or at least as a friend of England 
who was prepared to give her what she wanted and play her 
game in combating the Wafd in return for being kept in power. 
In this respect, the Mahmud regime and its alliance with 
Lord Lloyd (High Commissioner in Cairo) were seen as a 
severe blow to nationalist aspirations both in Egypt and 
the Sudan. When Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were started 
again in 1929, the Sudanese intelligentsia silently wished 
for a return of the Egyptians and they were somewhat 
disappointed when these negotiations finally ended in 
failure. The dismissal of Mahhas Pasha, and his replacement 
by Sidqi Pasha as Prime Minister, created a widespread 
impression that the British Government, annoyed with the 
Wafd for not having accepted the treaty terms on the Sudan, 
had let Hahhas down by advising King Fucad to accept his 
resignation and to institute another "dictatorial*1 regime.
The Wafd's failure to bring down Sidqi disappointed again 
the Sudanese intelligentsia who, as a result, became 
henceforth increasingly disenchanted with Nahhas*s verbal 
heroics. By 1931, therefore, the Sudanese nationalists had 
come to believe that Egypt would never be given her old 
status in the Sudan, and they decided instead to take
19
their destiny into their own hands.
The timing was coincidentally most propitious. For
some time past, the intelligentsia had come to believe that
the failure of 1924 was primarily due to lack of knowledge
and general political maturity on the part both of its
leaders and rank and file. In order to educate the masses
and groom the leaders for proper execution of their duties,
they had deemed it necessary to direct all efforts to
extensive learning and serious thinking. This type of
education, however, was not formally available in the Sudan
at that time, and the intelligentsia had sought to attain
cultural maturity by resorting to the usual means of
personal enlightment. Small study circles emerged as
a result in which graduates drawn from similar professional
or residential background debated the subject matter of
imported newspapers and literary works. At first, they
were attracted by anything and everything, but in due
course they became more selective and narrowed down their
pre-occupation to the study of international politics and
1the history of other nationalist movements. Meeting in 
private houses to avoid the eyes and ears of government 
spies, these groups had evolved their individual 
authoritative leaders and had cultivated strong bonds of
1, Ahmad Khayr, Kifah ill, (Cairo 1948), f. 58 ff.
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loyalty between them and the other members. The majority
of these literary societies did not survive, but those that
did produced in due course recognizable types of political
and social attitudes which characterized some of the
political parties that were to emerge in later years.^
In the early 1930’s, however, these literary groups
served as scaffolding for the rehabilitation of the
nationalist movement. An apparently minor yet significant
incident in 1931 marked a turning point along this process.
In response to the effects of the world economic depression,
the British administration had adopted stringent economic
measures, one of which involved the reduction of the number
and starting salaries of Sudanese employees in the civil
service. This decision became the subject of stormy
2discussions in the Graduates* Club at Omdurman. and 
eventually ten members were elected with a mandate to 
petition the Government in the interests of the graduate 
class. In their petition, the Committee of Ten suggested 
that instead of retrenchment the British Government and 
financing institutions in London should be pressed to 
suspend their demands for re-payment of loans advanced 
for the Gezira scheme in the Sudan. They also urged that
1. Muddathir cAbd al-Rahim, op. cit.. p. 112.
2. Established in 1918 as a centre of graduate 
activities in the capital.
no Sudanese should be discharged from service and that the
starting salary of Gordon College graduates should not be
reduced, as was proposed, but kept in its original level.
Unwilling to recognize that the Committee had any right of
representation in the matter, Maffey talked to some of its
members individually and agreed to readjust slightly the
reduced rates of pay, on the condition that the Committee
refrained from further collective action.1
The outcome and nature of these individual
consultations generated a conflict within the graduate
class. The government measures of retrenchment had united
the intelligentsia in condemning the financial regime which
led to this debacle. The trouble, in their view, started 
2
with Schuster who had increased the cadre of British
officials, giving them at the same time other improved
3
allowances at Sudanese expense. If any reduction in 
number or salaries was to be applied this was expected to 
cover the foreign staff and not the Sudanese officials.
1. For a detailed account, cf. CSO, CIVSEC 1/58/165 and 
SECURITY 12/2/10.
2. G. Schuster: Financial Secretary in the Sudan in 
the 1920’s.
3. "Note by Controller, Public Security Intelligence, and 
Intelligence Officer on Conversations with Native 
Officers and Officials regarding Economic Proposals", 
5.1.1931» CRO, CIVSEC 20/28/138.
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Within such a perspective, therefore, the acquiescence of 
the interviewed Committee members to a partial reduction in 
the starting salaries for Sudanese solicited strong 
criticism in nationalist circles. The younger members of 
the intelligentsia, who were of course the ones most 
directly affected by these measures, felt particularly 
resentful. They had placed all their hopes in the 
Committee of Ten and they felt betrayed by the individual 
acquiescence of some of its members. The fact that all 
of those interviewed by Maffey were Khatmiyya adherents 
eventually added a sectarian colour to the overall 
resentment. As a result, the graduates in the club divided 
into "Filist" and "Shawqist” factions, which soon forgot 
the original issue in the heat of their personal feud.1
In the years that followed, the Filist-Shawqist feud 
dominated intelligentsia politics and signalled the 
growing infiltration of sectarianism into graduate 
activities. Since 1926, SayyidcAbd al-Rahman al-Mahdi 
had sought to gain recognition as a national leader from 
the graduate class in general, or at least from its non- 
Khatmiyya members who composed the greater part of it. 
Accordingly, he had never failed to associate himself at
1. The factions were so called after the names of their 
respective leaders, Shaykh Ahmad al—Sayyid al—Fil and 
MuhammadcAli Shawqi.
23
an early stage with every movement, political or
commercial, of the urhan intelligentsia, which seemed to
him to have a "national" aspect or to foreshadow a demand
1for a "national" figure-head. Ee shared their opposition 
to the policy of Native Administration and the resulting 
increase in the authority of local trihal chiefs, both of 
which he regarded as a threat to his own position and to 
that of his khulafa* in the provinces. He further 
consolidated his position by making donations to eharity 
funds, patronising schools and adopting orphanages 
organized or founded by members of the graduate class.
His first real opportunity, however, presented itself in 
November 1931* When Gordon College students, despairing 
of any effective action by the Committee of Ten, went on 
strike in protest against the retrenchment measures, 
SayyidcAbd al-Rahman lost no time in profiting by the 
circumstances to assume a leading role. Instigated probably 
by influential graduates who feared that Maffey might close 
down the College altogether, he volunteered to speak to 
the students and the Government agreed. He headed a 
deputation of parents in an attempt to induce the students 
to return to their classes but failed to do so. He later
1. General Note on Mahdism and on Sayed Sir Abd HI Rahman 
El Mahdi. 1926 to .1932. CRO, CIVSEC (I) 56/2/19.
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held a succession of meetings in his Omdurman house at 
which, though expressing great sympathy with the students* 
grievances, he consistently advocated the unconditional 
ending of the student strike on the assurance that no 
reprisals would be taken against them. In taking the line 
he did, SayyidcAbd al-Rahman was definitely opposing the 
opinions held by the majority of the graduate class, and 
in this respect he ran some risk of prejudicing his 
ambitions to "lead*1 the intelligentsia. But he realized 
that the strike must eventually fail and he calculated 
that he would be amply rewarded for any temporary 
inconvenience of unpopularity he might have had to suffer. 
In due course, he succeeded in persuading the students to 
return to school and thus gained considerable prominence 
for the mediating role he had played. In particular, he 
won the support and allegiance of two influential Sudanese
officials in the Legal Department, MuhammadcAli Shawqi
-  -  2and Muhammad Salih al-Shinqiti , who were to stimulate
1, Muhammad*Ali Shawqi: Engineer, appointed to Legal 
Department in 1914; was active in Graduates' Club and 
later in the Graduates' Congress; nominated to Advisory 
Council in 1944-7; member of the Administrative 
Conference in 1946,
2. Muhammad Salih al-Shinqlti: Born 1896; he graduated 
from Gordon College and joined the Legal Department 
in 1918; became sub-mamur in 1920; district judge in 
Omdurman, 1922; eventually became Province judge; 
member of the Administrative Conference 1946;
Speaker of Legislative Assembly 1948-53*
considerably his increasing involvement in the nationalist 
movement.
At the time of the students* strike, SayyidcAli was 
on leave in Egypt. On his return, he was greatly dismayed 
to find that Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, whom he regarded as a 
rival since their relationship broke up in 1930, had stolen 
a march on him and occupied a position which definitely 
relegated him to second place in the regard of the 
intelligentsia. The Filist~Shawqist feud provided him 
with an opportunity to strike back. Muhammad cAli Shawqi 
had been, since 1928, repeatedly elected as Vice-President 
of the Graduates' Club, and his faction's ascendancy on 
its Committee had already began to cause some irritation 
among his rivals. The club was then emerging as a focus 
of enlightened public opinion vis-a-vis the government 
and the election of the Committee of Ten had greatly 
enhanced its importance and role. Shaykh Ahmad al-Sayyid 
al-Fll1 had been elected President of this Committee and, 
when it was dissolved, he and his friends feared that 
Shawqi, as Vice-President of the club, might be looked 
upon instead as leader of organized graduate opinion. The
1. Shaykh Ahmad al-Sayyid al-Fll: Graduated 1906; appointed 
to Legal*Department; became Inspector of Sharica eourts, 
and later Mufti. He was an influential liaison between 
the British and Sayyid cAli al-Mirghani.
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Filists henceforth repeatedly tried to wrest the Vice- 
Presidency from Shawqi hut failed.1 With Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman supporting the Shawqists, Sayyid cAli threw his 
weight behind the Pilists, and intelligentsia politics 
began to be increasingly interwoven with sectarian rivalry.
The intensification of this rivalry coincided with 
the beginning of a resurgence of nationalist consciousness. 
Maffey had gone and Symes had succeeded him as Governor- 
General of the Sudan. In the aftermath of the world 
economic depression, Symes had come to regard economic 
growth and social education as the first tasks of colonial 
administration, and in this connection he had little use 
for a system of indirect rule. His main aim was to give 
the Sudanese intelligentsia an effective share in the 
administration of their country and, to qualify them for 
this role, he decided to intensify European education, 
particularly at post-secondary level. He lifted the 
censorship on the press, and he allowed Sudanese editors
2
to. publish whatever they wished on their own responsibility. 
In the new circumstances, the intelligentsia crept out of 
their political bunkers into a more overt and positive
1. J.C. Penney, "Note on the Elections of the Graduates* 
Club Omdurman", 9*3.1933, CRQ, PORT SUDAN 2/12/79.
2. For a fuller account, of conditions in the Sudan under 
Symes, cf. G.M.A. Bakheit, on. cit.. Part III.
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involvement in national affairs. The timing was indeed 
critical. For, a year later, with the balance of power 
in north-east Africa changing as a result of the Italian 
conquest of Abyssinia, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1936 ended the virtual exclusion of the Egyptians 
from the Sudan.
C H A P T E R  T W O  
THE GENESIS OF THE GRADUATES' GENERAL CONGRESS
Reactions to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.
The prospect of deciding the future political status 
of the Sudan in bilateral negotiations between Britain 
and Egypt alarmed the intelligentsia, particularly those 
committed to a policy of an independent "Sudan for the 
Sudanese”. One such leading group consisted of persons 
closely associated with Al-Fa.ir magazine, a group of young 
intellectuals who had established themselves as the
1nucleus of a modernist, cultural and secular movement. 
Sensing the opportunity to influence the outcome of the 
negotiations, Al-Fa.ir launched a campaign to induce the
1. The Fa.ir group was first organized about May 1934. 
Their primary objective was "to promote a movement 
of intellectual advancement and social reform, and 
to create on this basis an enlightened national 
consciousness transcending tribes, parties and 
personal motives". By 1935, the Fair group developed 
an acute political consciousness, and they agitated 
"to see the young enlightened generation taking an 
active part in the affairs of this country, certainly 
not in the notorious, facile, negative and 
irresponsible way, but in a truly civil temper and 
with real responsibility." Prominent among the 
members were cArafat Muhammad •Abdallah, Muhammad Ahmad 
Mahgub, Muhammad cAshri*al-Siddlq, Yusif ai-Tinay, * and 
Mu’cawiya Muhammad Nur. Cf* PSI Monthly Letter,
May 1934, para 31c, CRO, NORTHERN 1/20/188; and PSI 
Monthly Letter. April 1935, para 252, CRO,
HORTHERN i7i7/110.
contracting powers to allow the Sudanese voice to he heard 
in the forthcoming negotiations.
The Egyptian response to this appeal, however, was
ironically evasive. Egypt, it was argued, heartily agreed
that the Sudanese voice should he heart on the question of
the Sudan's fate in the negotiations. But by what means
could Sudanese public opinion be made known? Through
general elections in Sudan? Gr through the formation of
a Chamber of Deputies to whom questions could be submitted?
Or could it be made known by means of a plebiscite? If so,
who would supervise such a plebiscite, the British Government,
a Sudanese body, an Anglo-Egyptian body or the League of
Nations? Finally, what precisely was the plebiscite to be
taken on, the Condominium Agreement of 1899, the status-
quo- ante 1924, the existing fait accomply, or on new 
1proposals? The Egyptians had suspected that the appeal 
for consultation of the Sudanese was basically a plot of 
the Sudan Government, designed to gain for it a say in the 
negotiations. The questions they raised were thus designed 
to debar the Sudan Government from any claims to represent, 
or speak on behalf of, the Sudanese.
These questions, however, invoked deep concern among 
the Sudanese intelligentsia. They were upset that the
1. SM1S. No. 27, March 1936, para 629, PRO, FO.141/598 
(file 181).
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level of the country*s constitutional development did 
not enable them to express their opinions effectively on 
the determination of their own political future, but they 
were also not prepared to lose the opportunity of improving 
their political condition. In the absence of a National 
Advisory Council, they used the local vernacular press to 
express their views on the treaty negotiations, and 
they appealed to the contracting powers to regard these 
expressions as representative of public opinion in the 
Sudan.
The reaction of the Sudanese in general to the prospect 
of an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, however, was by no means 
unanimous, and it was in many respects dictated by 
individual and personal pre-occupations.^ On the one side, 
there were the government officials and commercial 
employees. Believing that the standard of the education 
they had acquired in the Sudan schools was not of a 
sufficiently high quality, they opposed the possible return 
of Egyptian officials, for fear of being competitively 
ousted from their posts. On the other side, there were the 
students and unemployed ex-students who assumed that the 
re-association of Egypt with the government of the Sudan
1. J.C. Penney, 1 feeling in the Sudan Regarding the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty", 27*7*1936, CRO,
fOHT SUDAN 2/28/176; also, NORTHERN 1/17/108.
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would lead to an era of political and economic 
advancement for all.
The bulk of intelligentsia opinion, however, was 
basically nationalistic. Suspicious of the objectives of 
the Southern Policy, they wanted the unity of the Sudan
i
preserved and argued against any partition of the country. 
They thought of themselves first as Sudanese, with an 
independent political future somewhere ahead of them, a 
future which they did not want to see prejudiced by any 
two-party agreement in which they had no voice. Of their 
ultimate objective they had no doubt, and they were then 
only concerned with the question of the right approach to 
its attainment. They denounced firmly the old Wafdist 
theories of annexation to Egypt. They were quite prepared 
for a treaty, but they were suspicious of attempts at a 
"final" solution which someday they might have to 
challenge. They discussed possible alternatives, such as 
a League of Nations mandate or a Dominion status, but even 
here they regarded these as temporary administrative 
expedients.
1. On the subject of the Southern Policy, cf. G.M.A. 
Bakheit, on. cit., Ch. VI; Muddathir cAbd al-Rahim, 
The Development of British Polic.v in the Southern 
Sudan. 1899-1947% School of Extra-Mural Studies 
(Khartoum 1968); and Mohamed Qmer Beshir, The 
Southern Sudan; Background to Conflict. Hurst, 
(London 1968).
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The merchant class held a more pragmatic view. They
were on the whole in favour of a treaty, particularly those
who had Cairo connections. They believed that the
stabilisation of the political relations between the Sudan
and Egypt must encourage greater mutual economic prosperity,
and might even lead to the investment of Egyptian capital
in the country. An association with Egypt "might also
strengthen their hand in approaching the Sudan Government
over the various alleged grievances which from time to time
1
agitated the Sudan Chamber of Commerce."
The attitude of the two main sectarian leaders was 
essentially identical, though for quite different motives. 
Both opposed the restoration of any effective Egyptian 
influence in the administration of the Sudan; Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman al-Mahdi, because of his hereditary opposition 
to Egyptian rule and his current support of the status quo: 
Sayyid *Ali al-Mirghani,- because of his fear that the 
return of Egyptian influence would drive the intelligentsia 
into the Mahdist camp, and thereby strengthen the political 
leadership of his more modern and realistic rival, whom he 
considered better equipped "to extract personal advantage
2 cfrom Egyptian intervention in Sudan affairs.” Sayyid Ali
1. J.C. Penney, "Peeling in the Sudan Regarding the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty", 27.7.1936, loc. cit.
2. Ibid.
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believed that the Sudan itself could derive no possible 
advantage, economic or otherwise, from a closer 
association with Egypt, and that very few merchants would 
actually benefit from any improved economic relations.
Provincial tribal opinion, in so far as it existed 
al all, favoured the status quo. Traditionally conservative, 
its horizon was completely limited by local interests. It 
viewed the Sudan Government as a British Government and the 
theory of Egyptian partnership as a more or less meaningless 
political fiction. It would not be disturbed by the actual 
conclusion of a treaty, provided the existing effective 
system of administration remained unchanged. In the Northern 
Province, due to their contact with Egypt, the sedentary 
agricultural and commercial population astride the 
railway and the river had developed a feeling not 
antipathetic to Egyptian partnership, provided that it did 
not involve partition or prejudice their own material 
interests.
In general terms, therefore, there were apparently two 
camps. In the one camp, there were those who favoured some 
closer association with Egypt —  the merchants and some of 
the younger intelligentsia. In the other camp, there were 
those who opposed such an association —  the two Sayyids, 
the bulk of the intelligentsia and tribal authorities.
After more than four months of protracted negotiations,
34
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was finally signed in London on
28 August 1936.1 The main terms of the Treaty concerning
the Sudan were in Article 11* The question of sovereignty
over the Sudan was shelved, and the Condominium
Administration was to continue, with the governor-general
exercising power on behalf of the two countries. It was
vaguely provided that the primary aim of the administration
2
“must be the welfare of the Sudanese." In addition to 
Sudanese and British troops, Egyptian troops were now 
placed at the disposal of the governor-general "for the 
defence of the Sudan," Egyptian immigration into the 
country was to be unrestricted, "except for reasons of 
public order or health." There was to be no discrimination 
in the Sudan between British and Egyptians in matters of 
commerce, immigration or the possession of property.
Finally, it was agreed that British and Egyptian officials 
would only be selected for appointment to posts for which 
qualified Sudanese were not available.
The conclusion of the Treaty met with a varied response 
in the Sudan. Provincial opinion, particularly in the 
western and central Sudan, was initially nervous about the
1. For a detailed account of the negotiations, cf.
Hasan Ahmed Ibrahim, The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, 
Ph.D. Thesis (University of London, 1970).
2. P.M. Holt, on. cit.. p. 139*
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possibility of the return of Egyptian officials, a feeling
that subsequently subsided after assurances to the contrary
1
were provided by the British authorities. The commercial
classes were generally pleased at the restored association
with Egypt, and so were also some of the younger elements
of the intelligentsia.
On the whole, however, the majority of Sudanese
nationalists were undoubtedly disappointed with the new
Egyptian attitude towards the Sudan as revealed in the
Treaty. From demanding independence for the whole Nile
Valley, "one and indivisible", the Egyptian patriots had
changed into willing partners with the British, demanding
the perpetuation of Condominium rule and obtaining, in
theory at least, an equal share in the rights of
sovereignty over the Sudan. The Egyptian "brother" and
fellow-nationalist had thus become a ruler, and many of the
educated Sudanese looked with disfavour on his re-appearance
in this guise. The return of the Egyptian troops, "a
second army of occupation" as many of them called them,
2evoked littled enthusiasm among them. In the strict
1. "Opening Meeting held at the Palace on Sunday 29th
November 1936", Minutes of Northern Governors1 Meeting 
(19%). CRO, NORTHERN 1/16/100; also, DARFUR 1/13/72.
2. SMTH. Ho. 64, June 1939, para 1302, PRO, BO.407/224 
(No. 4); also, Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, Democracy on 
Trial (London 1974), p. 39.
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political sense, the Egyptian was to the Sudanese as much
1
a foreigner as the British. As a sleeping partner in a
condominium, the Egyptian was one thing* as an "active"
principal, he was quite another. This possibility of
Egyptian penetration prejudicing the Sudanese claim to
eventual political independence created in the minds of
2the intelligentsia a very definite uneasiness. They had
regarded the Condominium Agreement as obsolete,
"drawn up by a British conservative at a 
time when the policy of colonisation ignored 
the interests of the native; and was accepted 
and signed by the other party. The 
Condominium did not provide for the third 
party, the people of the country, and even 
it did not specify the development of the 
country. A Treaty which was concluded in 
1899 and under those very unfavourable 
circumstances should not be reinforced and 
applied in the year 1936. The country has 
changed, the people have made their way 
through the roads of education and have 
founded their political ideals towards 
which they are aspiring, and the world 
around them is ever changing. The policy 
of colonisation has taken a different
1, A distinction must here be made on the status of the 
Egyptian in the Sudan. Before 1922, Egypt herself was 
under British rule, so that in Sudanese eyes the 
Egyptian "partners" were rather fellow-subjects with the 
Sudanese than co-rulers with the British. In 1936, 
however, the Egyptians, independent and allies of the 
British on a footing of equality, appear to the 
Sudanese in quite a different light.
2. "Bote on Intelligentsia Treaty Reactions in the Sudan, 
September 1936", SMIS. No. 33, September 1936,
Appendix I, CRO, PORT SUDAN 2/28/176; also, PRO,
EO.407/219 (No. 157).
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aspect, and may well tend towards 
friendship and co-operation, because  ^
world affairs necessitate such a policy."
In the light of such beliefs, the intelligentsia naturally
resented the manner in which their fate had been decided
without any reference to their views. They had no
alternative but to grant negative approval to the
Condominium regime as confirmed by the Treaty, t!at least
for the present and until the resources of the country and
the status of its people would warrant the institution of
2
a constitutional indigenous Government."
All was not lost, however. The nationalists derived 
some consolation from the fact that the question of 
sovereignty over the Sudan had not been "finally” settled 
by any agreement arrived at between the two negotiating 
parties. That question would remain in abeyance for 
future settlement, and any immediate changes affected by 
the Treaty would be merely superficial and not substantial. 
"Until the time comes when our words are listened to and 
consideration is given to our opinions on the affairs of 
our own country, let us be logical and be neither
1, "Translation of an article on the Treaty and Education 
which appeared recently in 'El Nil'", SMIS. Nos. 31 & 
32, duly-August 1936, Appendix III, PRO, PO.141/598 
(file 181)
2. Ibid.
unnecessarily hopeful nor pessimistic about the results of 
the present negotiations.1,1 In the meantime, the 
intelligentsia would have to develop and declare, within 
the framework of the Condominium administration, an 
autonomous Sudanese identity, capable of formulating and 
expressing a collective point of view which the 
Condominium partners would have to take into account.
There was still another cause for consolation. The 
Treaty "safe-guarding" clauses had asserted that the 
educated Sudanese would have prior claim to government 
appointments and that the primary aim of the administration 
would be the welfare of the Sudanese. These clauses were 
received with equanimity by the majority of the 
intelligentsia, the general feeling being that, if the 
pledges contained in these clauses were honoured, the 
Sudan would have come off reasonably well.
There was some apprehension, however, in regard to the 
clause dealing with the priority of Sudanese claim to 
government posts. This clause was vague in two vital 
respects, firstly, it did not specify criteria whereby 
the "qualification" of educated Sudanese candidates could 
be measured; secondly, it did not specify clearly which
1. "Appreciation of Local Reactions to the Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty", 3KIS, Nos. 31 & 32, July-August 1936,
Appendix II, PRO, K).141/598 (file 181).
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posts would be open to "qualified" Sudanese* It was the 
belief of the intelligentsia that these vital points 
should have been clearly defined in the text of the Treaty 
and not left to the sole discretion of the Sudan 
Government.1
The Need for a Nationalist Organisation.
By the beginning of October 1936, the initial fears of 
an invasion by Egyptian officials had been laid to rest, and 
the intelligentsia were becoming more intensely pre-occupied 
with the whole question of the future of the Sudanese 
official. They began to formulate their own ideas as to 
what line the implementation of the treaty provisions 
should take. They believed that two specifically 
co-related policies would have to be adopted. Firstly, 
higher education would have to be introduced at its full 
force, and a wider base of secondary, intermediate and 
elementary education would have to be provided. Secondly, 
government posts of District Commissioners and upwards 
would have to be open to qualified Sudanese. In this 
connection, they felt that it would also be necessary to 
cancel all Sudan Government regulations dealing with
1. "Translation of an article on the Treaty and 
Education which appeared recently in 1 El Nil'", 
loc. cit.,
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careers and cadres, which were inconsistent with the 
undertaking embodied in the agreed minute accompanying 
the Treaty, that "the promotion and advancement of members 
of the Sudan service shall be, irrespective of nationality, 
up to any rank by selection in accordance with individual 
merits-" To the intelligentsia this undertaking meant the 
recasting of the report of the 1934 Establishment 
Committee; the framing of a single cadre for all Sudan 
Government officials, whether indigenous or foreign; and 
the disappearance of a number of irritating, career anomalies 
which operated unfavourably against the Sudanese.'*'
A need naturally grew for the formation of an 
association which would promote the interests of the 
graduates along the lines indicated. As early as August 
1936, before the terms of the Treaty were published, a 
number of senior officials held a meeting, in Omdurman, 
under the presidency of Shaykh Ahmad al-Sayyid al-Eil 
(the mufti). and discussed the formation of an 
Advisory Council, on the lines of the 1931 MCommitte 
of Ten", whose duty it would have been to interpret
1. "JSote on Intelligentsia Treaty Reactions in the 
Sudan, September 1936", loc- cit.
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Sudanese feeling on the treaty clauses to the Government.3* 
The authorities indirectly tried to discourage such a 
movement, but the demand for a voice in the settlement of 
Sudan affairs gained momentum, more so as a result of 
the Treaty provisions.
1. "Appreciation of Local Reactions to the Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty”, loc. cit. The idea of advisory councils had a 
historical background. T'rom 1826 onwards, governors- 
general of the Sudan appear to have convened from time 
to time assemblies composed of representatives of 
public opinion to advise on matters of public policy, 
taxation and so forth. In the period immediately 
preceeding the Mahdiyya, two such bodies were 
established: One, a permanent council of eight (of 
whom some were senior government officials and some 
leading notables and merchants), sitting in Khartoum 
with general advisory and quasi-legal functions; the 
other an annual assembly of tribal leaders summoned 
to Khartoum to be consulted on administrative matters 
concerning their tribes. The practice then fell into 
disuse until August 1924, when a meeting of senior 
graduates and merchants held in Sayyid IsmacIl 
al-Azhari*s house in Omdurman advocated the 
appointment of indigenous members to the Governor- 
Generalfs Council. A few weeks later, a similar 
meeting, led by Husayn Sharif, considered the 
appointment of Native Advisory Council desirable.
This desire was communicated to the Government by 
influential notables, who presented it as one of the 
surest means of counteracting the eause of the then 
existing agitation against the government. There are 
no details on record as to the projected composition 
or scope of such a .council, but apparently the 
Government took no measures to establish one. From 
then onwards, the subject had been always present in 
the minds of the intelligentsia leaders, albeit in a 
passive sense. The financial crisis of 1951 was the 
occasion for a grand demonstration of the graduates* 
desire to have their interests adequately represented 
to the Government. The Committee of Ten was avowedly 
a temporary body entrusted with a specific mission, 
but several of its members (as well as outsiders) 
raised at the time the question of permanent or 
periodic representation. Cf. "Note on Advisory Councils”, 
25.11.1956, Minutes of Northern Governors* Meeting 
£12261, CRO, DARFUR 1/13/72.
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This demand was given a more concrete expression
in a scheme informally proposed by Shaykh AhmadcUthman 
- 1al-Qadi to the British authorities. Briefly, this
scheme contemplated the election, by the intelligentsia
only, of some representative Sudanese body, composed of
distinguished notables and leaders of public opinion,
whose functions would be to advise the government on
matters of general welfare. This body should come into
existence modestly as a Committee, elected by the
graduates, to administer a fund to be raised for educating
Sudanese boys at foreign university. Having been elected
as such, it should then receive some sort of government
recognition and should be invited in due course to express
opinions on an extended range of subjects. This
representative body would also be primarily concerned with
the task of organising a "Sudanese front0, independent of
local sectarian leadership, to protect the country against
Egyptian political penetration, and to promote instead the
2
policy of the "Sudan for the Sudanese".
1. Shaykh AhmadcUthman al-Qadi: Graduated 1909 from 
Gordon College and joined the Education Department as 
a teacher; became editor of al-Hadara 1931-8; Sudanese 
Relations Officer in the Civil Secretariat 1942; member 
of the Advisory Council 1944-47.
2. "Note on Intelligentsia Treaty Reactions in the Sudan, 
September 1936", loc. cit.: also, "Addendum to Note 
on Advisory Councils", Minutes of Northern Governors1 
Meeting (1936), loc. cit.
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The agitation for some form of Sudanese representation
1
in government confronted Gillan with vital questions of 
policy. Should the Government make some gesture of 
appeasement, and if so in what manner? Or should it 
ignore the agitation altogether? Gillan1s position was 
a difficult one. In either case, the agitation would 
undoubtedly grow in dimentions sooner or later. In that 
eventuality, and if a policy of appeasement was adopted, 
would the government be prepared to grant the growing 
demands of the movement? If, on the other hand, the 
Government decided to ignore this agitation, would it 
be prepared later to suppress it forcibly if it grew 
to threatening dimensions?
Gillan was generally in favour of some gesture of 
appeasement, not so much aimed at establishing a national 
Advisory Council, but rather aimed at defusing the 
agitation itself by channelling it into a different course. 
He was clearly opposed to any form of a “one class'* 
council arrogating to itself advisory functions in matters 
of general policy affecting the country as a whole. “This 
unfortunately is, in essentials, just what the most vocal 
section of the 'progressive* party want. They might
1. Sir John Angus Gillan: District service 1906-21; Deputy 
Acting Governor Huba Mountains 1921-28; Governor Kordofan 
1928-32; Assistant Civil Secretary 1932-34; Civil 
Secretary 1934-39; left the Sudan in 1939.
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admit the inclusion of a few elderly figureheads of the 
old school, but their whole thesis is that the voice to 
be heard in the direction of affairs is that of younger 
educated Sudanese, who in the present conditions of the 
country are 90$ Government officials."
At the same time, the establishment of a truly 
national Advisory Council was considered to be an impractical 
proposition. In view of the "backwardness" of the 
southern Sudan population, such a Council would 
necessarily have to be limited to the northern part of the 
country, and it would have to include a fair proportion of 
tribal leaders, who represented the greater majority of 
the taxpayers. In Gillan1s view, however, there was no 
desire among the tribal leaders for such a Council. They 
would have much preferred to discuss their own problems 
with their Governors and District Commissioners, with an 
occasional informal talk with the Governor-General. The 
same, it was believed, largely applied to most of the 
urban notables.
In the circumstances, Gillan felt that the obviously 
appropriate policy to follow at the time was to provide 
training in local government —  municipal and rural.
1. J.A. Gillan, "Preliminary Note on Native
Representation", Minutes of Northern Governors1 
Meeting (1936), loc. cit.
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In the provinces, there was no immediate problem. Local 
councils, advisory o,r executive, formal or informal, existed 
all over the country. They were believed to be doing useful 
work and were slowly arousing the interest and securing 
the co-operation of the more educated local people. Could 
the same process of training be applied to the Khartoum 
intelligentsia, to enable them to let off steam, arouse 
their interest and provide them with experience in 
public service?
While still retaining his resolute opposition to any
form of quasi-national representation by one small class,
Gillan nonetheless thought that the Government could still
benefit from the "institution of some form of organisation
to advise on, and in some cases direct, welfare work,
charity organisation, non-government education (perhaps
government education in an advisory capacity) and such like 
1
services.” In this regard, he felt that the scheme 
proposed by Shaykh A^ imadcUthman al-Qadi contained some 
commendable aspects, in spite of the difficulty in the 
faction-ridden Sudanese community of getting the best 
people for the right places. But then, assuming that 
such an organisation was established, how would its
1. d.A. Gillan, "Preliminary Note on Native
Representation”, Minutes of Northern Governors* 
Meeting (1956), on. cit.
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activities be related with those of the municipal council?
Could it function as an unofficial body without
overlapping or interfering with the council? Or could it
function under the council on sub-committee lines? The
latter was constitutionally preferable to Gillan, but it
would have understandably failed to meet the aspirations
of those concerned, to whom municipal administration held
little appeal. A study of the question had to be made
first before any appropriate government policy could be 
1
formulated. But in the meantime, one thing was certain: 
The movement for the establishment of an Advisory Council, 
on the lines proposed by the intelligentsia, had to be 
definitely discouraged.
It was against this background that the movement to 
form a nationalist organisation was to unfold. The 
obstacles were considerable. The intelligentsia were 
beset by divisions in political temperament and sectarian 
loyalties, and a compromise capable of uniting every 
faction under one umbrella had still to be hammered out.
1. At the request of Gillan, the Governor of Khartoum 
Province, Mr. C. L. Armstrong, submitted some 
proposals for associating the intelligentsia with 
municipality affairs in the capital. These proposals 
envisaged for the intelligentsia a role more in line 
with that of unofficial "technical” advisors to 
sub-committees dealing with specialised matters. In 
any event, no action was apparently taken on those 
proposals at the time. Bor a precis of the proposals, 
cf. Minutes of Northern Governors* Meeting (1936),
loc. cit.
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Shaykh Ahmad cUthman al-Qadi's scheme envisaged an 
organisation free from sectarian influences, and this 
objective was generally shared by the younger members of 
the intelligentsia who were getting tired, and even 
ashamed, of what they referred to as "faki partisanship11. 
The same objective was also shared by Mirghanist elements, 
albeit for different reasons and in a negative sense.
They thought that an organisation, so instituted, would not 
easily fall under the control of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman and 
would also limit his political influence and leadership 
which, at that time, was quite high and rising. The 
Mahdist elements were equally interested in the 
institution of such a nationalist organisation, cherishing 
the thought of bringing it, sooner or later, under their 
control. While still desirous that this nationalist 
organisation should be free of sectarian partisanship, the 
intelligentsia had nevertheless become convinced that the 
passive support of both the Mahdist and Mirghanist 
elements was indispensable for the success of the movement. 
Otherwise, it would be split into two factions, neither of 
which could claim with any justification to speak in the 
name of the Sudan.
The nationalists were, therefore, confronted with 
major political and organisational problems. How was the 
institution of this organisation to be initiated without
causing a backlash from any side? Members of the
Graduates' Club in Omdurman hesitated to take the
initiative, fearful that such a move might provoke
government opposition, as it did in September 1936*1
Besides, an attempt to set up a Graduates* Representative
Committee, similar to the 1931 "Committee of Ten", would
probably have met with strong opposition from the
Mirghanist camp. Shawqist (and thereby Mahdist) influence
was still dominating the club, despite the fact that some
2
neutral elements formed part of its Committee.
Similarly, an initiative on the part of Shaykh Ahmad 
al-Sayyid al-Fll or Shaykh AhmadcUthman al-Qadi to set up 
such a Representative Committee outside the Omdurman Club 
would have also met with equal opposition from the 
Shawqist-Mahdist camp. As a result of this absence of a 
truly neutral political leadership able to command the 
support of the majority of the intelligentsia, the early 
endeavours to initiate the institution of a nationalist
1. At that time, a group from the younger elements of the 
intelligentsia were planning to organise at the 
Omdurman Club a meeting, open to the public, to discuss 
the Treaty clauses relating to the Sudan, and to 
formulate certain demands of their own for presentation 
to the Government. The authorities, however, were not 
prepared to allow the use of the club for a political 
meeting open to all the Omdurman "riff-raff", and a 
firm disapproval was accordingly conveyed to the 
club*s Vice-President, cf. SMIS. Mo. 33, September 
1936, para 810, loc. cit.
2. SMIS, Mo. 27, March 1936, para 621, PRO, PO.141/598 
(file 181).
49
organisation were locked in a stalemate*
The situation, however, began to take a different
turn with the publication in Al-Fa.ir. in Hay 1937* of a
1
lecture delivered by Ahmad Muhammad Khayr at the
2Graduates* Club in Wad Medani. The lecture was 
essentially an appeal for the re-orientation and 
re-organisation of the graduate class which, in his view, 
had become a mere "association without existence", beset 
by "diverse opinions and antagonistic tastes"* He 
attributed the main cause for this deplorable state to the 
absence of a "vanguard leadership" among the intelligentsia* 
He believed that political conditions in the Sudan, after 
the Treaty, had placed the burden of the political struggle 
squarely on the graduate class. He disagreed with the view 
that all sectors of the commuhity were equally qualified 
for the struggle, and he argued instead that a distinction 
had to be made on the basis of intelligence and ability.
In his view, there were two types of nationalists: The
first type, exercising physical ability, was more suitable
1. Ahmad Muhammad Khayr: Born 1905; after graduation from 
Gordon College he joined the Irrigation Department in 
Wad Medani as a translator; influential member of Wad 
Medani Literary Society; joined Gordon College again
as a law student in 1940; a founder and leader of the 
Graduates* Congress. Subsequently became a lawyer.
2. "Our Political Duty - The Graduates' Congress",
Al-Fair, Vol. Ill, No. 6, 16 May 1937, pp. 181-184.
so
to lead the struggle on the forefront of the battle lines; 
the second type, exercising intellectual ability, was 
more suitable for a role in central leadership and the 
execution of policies. Ahmad Khayr identified the 
graduate class, which he also labelled "the enlightened 
class”, with the latter type, and he maintained that, in 
this initial stage of its life, Sudanese nationalism 
basically required the organisation of, and proper planning 
by, this ”enlightened class" for the fulfilment of 
national objectives. He called on the graduate class, 
therefore, to liberate themselves from divisive influences 
and to form "an association or a congress or a union", 
characterised by strong bonds of solidarity and a unity of 
thought, which would enable them to draw up an agreed 
nationalist programme and to become the source of national 
guidance and leadership. The organisation structure of 
this "Congress", he suggested, could be founded on the 
graduates* clubs throughout the country, using the 
respective clubs as its organisational units and the 
Omdurman Club in particular as the organisational 
headquarters. The "Congress" would elect "a group of 
leaders from amongst" its members, who would serve as
the only official link between the graduates and 
the government.1
Ahmad Khayr* s lecture became the subject of widespread 
discussion and controversy not only for what it stated but 
also for what it omitted to state. His scheme certainly 
contained some guidelines for organising the graduates 
into a united front, but at the same time it left many 
essential questions unanswered. For example, he assumed 
rather naively that the graduates would heed his call and 
organise the "Congress", but he failed to explain how this 
could happen when the graduate class was already beset 
"by diverse opinions and antagonistic tastes". He probably 
expected that the graduates would be induced to adopt the 
proper political attitudes. But how and by whom? Did 
his veiled distinction, in the same lecture, between the 
"enlightened" and the "educated" suggest that the 
"Congress" should be organised on an elitist basis, with
1. Contrary to some interpretations, Ahmad Khayr did not 
actually call for a graduates* conference to set up 
the "Congress". Rather, he called for the 
establishment of a political organisation, by 
transforming the graduates* clubs into a "Congress". 
The actual call for a graduates' conference did not 
come until much later, and from Al-Fa.ir.
%z
1the “enlightened” assuming the role of leadership? 
Furthermore, Ahmad Khayr*s restriction of the “Congress" 
membership to the graduate class necessarily excluded the 
greater part of influential notables and merchants, who 
undoubtedly carried significant political weight with the 
Government- Could such a "Congress", therefore, speak 
with equally valid authority on matters affecting these 
other sectors of the community? Finally, Ahmad Khayr 
had suggested that the graduate clubs be gradually 
transformed into a political "Congress"* But from where 
would that initiative originate and what would the 
nature of that initiative be?
The idea of a "Graduates* Congress" found widespread 
support among the intelligentsia, although there was 
significant disagreement as to the nature of this 
"Congress" and the means whereby it could be inaugurated. 
The Shawqist-Filist feud was still having an effect on 
the graduate class- A faint-hearted attempt was made
1. In connection with the political duties of the 
graduates, Ahmad Khayr state: "Our first duty is 
to achieve unity of thought ...(by which) I mean 
the organisation of the enlightened class —  
and X do not say the educated —  into a 
well-organised body that will exploit the 
sources of power..." Op. cit., p. 183-
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— Xby Ismacil al-Azhari to remedy the situation by calling
on the graduates to form a new club, animated by a new
spirit, but apparently his appeal met with little or no 
2response.
The Graduates* General Conference.
The explicit call for a graduates* conference was 
not actually made until mid-August 1937, and it was 
largely a reaction to Mahdist activities at that time. 
Sayyid cAbd al-Hahman al-Mahdi had for a number of years 
been considering another visit to England as a tourist 
and, in the aftermath of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, he 
thought that the time was then most opportune to derive 
some political benefits as well from such a visit.
He had followed closely the evolution of political 
tendencies among the intelligentsia, and he thought that 
the time was ripe to make a bid for undisputed political
1. Ismacil al-Azhari: Born 1902; educated at the American 
University in Beirut; served in Education Department 
1921-1946; resigned to engage in politics full-time; 
Secretary of Graduates1 Congress 193B and 1939; 
President of Congress 1940,1943> 1945 and after; 
President of Ashiqqa* party 1944-52; President of the 
National Unionist Party 1952 onwards; Prime Minister 
of the Self-Governing Sudan 1954; declared independence 
1955; resigned 1956; appointed President of the 
Republic 1964-69. Died 1971.
2. Hadarat al-Sudan. 2.8.1937. IsmacIl al-Azhari was then 
Vice-President of the Graduates’ Club in Omdurman.
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leadership in the country. He worked out a scheme which 
would exploit British fears of renewed Egyptian 
influence. According to this scheme, he would point 
out to the Government that Egyptian propaganda was 
affecting the intelligentsia once again, and that it 
was imperative that something should be done to preserve 
the separate political identity of the Sudan. He would 
then express his readiness to assist the Government, as 
he had done in 1924, to counteract the dangers of Egyptian 
penetration but that, in his view, the best plan would 
be for the Government to allow him, and a committee of 
representative Sudanese working with him, to formulate and 
define the position and the aspirations of the Sudanese 
under the new regime.^ To obtain the Government’s 
concurrence to this scheme, however, he felt that he would 
have to argue convincingly that he was the only man with 
sufficient influence to achieve the desired objectives.
A warm reception by the governments of Britain and Egypt 
would go a. long way to enhance his prestige, particularly 
among the intelligentsia.
In mid-June 1937, therefore, SayyidcAbd al-Rahman
1. In fact, some suggestions along these lines were_ 
subsequently voiced by one of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahmants 
lieutenants, Muhammad al-Khalifa Sharif, in 
August 1937. Gf.‘SHIS. No. 43, August 1937, para 
1059, PRO, FO.141/534 (file 227).
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expressed to the Government his wish to visit England and
pay his respects to the King.^  Symes was not basically
opposed to such a visit. He had come to believe that
the first step towards a successful solution of the
Mahdist problem must be the maintenance of a "correct,
consistent and reasoned attitude" towards Sayyid cAbd 
-  2al-Rahman. In view of previous visits to England by 
other official and unofficial Sudanese missions, Sayyid 
cAbd al-Rahman* s desire to visit England was seen as quite 
reasonable, provided he did not advertise himselve too 
ostantatiously. One aspect of the visit, however, worried 
Symes: Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman's desire to have an audience
with the King of England. Such an audience would arouse 
grave Mirghanist suspicions, and Mahdist prestige would 
at the same time rise very sharply. The policy adopted, 
therefore, was that the British Government should avoid 
too much publicity for the visit, and should not arrange 
for a special audience with the King. At the same time, 
in partial satisfaction of the wishes of Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman, the British Government would arrange to get
1. "Extracts from Note by J.C. Penney on an interview 
with Sayed Abdel Rahman on 16.6.1937", PRO,
EO'. 141/710 (file 444/4/37); also, EO.371/20919 
(J3330/3133/16).
2. J.C. Penney .(Euhlic Security) to M.S. Lush (Sudan 
Agent Cairo), 28.6.1937, Ibid.
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him an invitation to a royal garden tea party, in the
course of which he would be presented to the King*1
In spite of these measures, the trip did in fact
provide an opportunity for significant publicity of
Mahdist influence. Sayyid cAbd al-Rahmanfs reception
at Port Said, on his way to England, was well advertised
in the Egyptian press, with strong implications that, on
his return journey through Egypt, he would meet with a
2
far better reception. As it turned out, however, this 
grand reception did not materialize; British pressure on 
the Sayyid to avoid ‘’undue advertisement" of himself 
induced him to turn down a number of important invitations. 
But considerable publicity was neverthless given to his 
visit by the Egyptian press, in which he was invariably 
referred to as Kal-Mahdi".^ Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman himself 
did not miss the opportunity to publicise, in the course 
of an interview with AI-Kuqattain newspaper in Cairo, 
elaborate details of his visit to England, particularly 
of his meeting with the King in the garden tea party.
In the Sudan itself, the Mahdist headquarters spread 
rumours to the effect that Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman had gone
1. Sir Stewart Symes to Secretary of Foreign Office, 
12.7.1937, PRO, EO.141/710 (file 444/4/37).
2. Sir Miles Lampson to Mr Anthony Eden, 15.7.1937, Ibid.
3. SMIS. So. 43, August 1937, para 1054, loc. bit.
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to England, at the express request of the King, to
discuss the vexed question of the future sovereignty of
the Sudan, and that he would he offered the post of Emir
or Viceroy of Sudan.^
These Mahdist activities offended the sensitivities
of the modernist and secular sections of the intelligentsia,
as well as supporters of the Mirghanist sect. The
modernists responded swiftly. In an editorial of an issue
published in August, Al-Pa.ir argued that the Government
could ascertain the needs and demands of the people only
through the enlightened class. The editorial went on to
call once again for the formation of a body which "will
be given authority by the enlightened class to speak for
them, to express their hopes and ideals and to defend
their case socially and politically. Such a body must
gain the support of all the graduates or at least the
majority... And here we face a difficulty: How will this
body be organised, and of whom will it consist?" The
editorial then made, for the first time, an explicit call
for a graduates* general conference, to be organised at
the Graduates* Club in Omdurman:
"Despite all that happened in the past, 
the Sudan Schools1 Club remains the centre 
for the enlightened class and it forms the
1. d.C. Penney to M.S. Lush, 10.7.1939, PRO, PQ.141/710 
(file 444/4/37).
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connecting link that hinds the 
graduates together. So the first step 
towards the formation of this body is 
to call all graduates to come to the club 
and so they will form a united front.
Their activity will begin by holding a 
general conference, to be attended by 
the largest number of graduates possible, 
who will elect a representative body that 
will speak on their behalf.
Once the body of representatives is formed, 
the Congress will be called upon to put 
down the programme and principles of the 
enlightened class and the functions of 
the elected body.., The day in which 
the graduates will hold their congress 
and elect their representatives, will 
be the day in which we will be able 
to say that the club has started to 
play its important part in the history 
of the Sudan and that the Sudan ^
has made the first step towards prosperity."
The object of the Fa.ir group was, inter alia, to set
up in opposition to Sayyid cAbd al-Rahmanfcs attempts an
organised and independent body of graduates to act as
2
leaders and representatives of the Sudanese people.
This initiative came at a time when Mahdist influence was 
beginning to decline among the intelligentsia. One of the 
main causes of this decline was the fiasco that resulted 
from Mahdist attempts to capture the leadership of the 
Sudanese Club in Cairo. Since the foundation of this
1. "The Enlightened Class and the Prosperity of the 
Sudan", Al-Fa.ir. Vol. Ill, No. 12, p. 355.
2. SMIS. No. 43, August 1937, para 1070, loc. cit.
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club in April 1935, cAli al-Birayr1, a prominent Mirghanist,
had been its President. Prom July 1935 onwards, the
Mahdists had been trying to displace him, but without
success. cAli al-Birayr, whatever his shortcomings, was
popular with the majority of the members, and the club
continued to flourish. The Mahdists, however, persisted
in their attempts to remove him.
In April 1957, the Mahdists escalated their attacks on
cAli al-Birayr. They began to publish articles in an
Egyptian magazine (Al-Radiu). attacking him and gibing at
the Mirghanists. At the same time, Al-Nil in Khartoum
2
belittled the club and called for a new President.
When visiting Egypt in August 1937, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman 
had an excellent opportunity to remedy the situation. 
Instead, he rejected an invitation to a reception at the 
Sudanese Club, thereby giving offence to al-Birayr and his 
Committee.
By the beginning of September 1937, the Cairo feud 
had become heated, and what started as an offshoot of 
the main Mirghanist-Mahdist contest was in turn
1. cAli al-Birayr: Influential Sudanese animal trader and 
merchant, resident in Egypt; President of Sudanese 
Club in Cairo for many years; editor of Al-Sudan 
magazine 1944; appointed member of the Board of 
Directors of Egyptian Chamber of Commerce 1945.
2. SMIS. No. 44, September 1937, para 1088, PRO, PO.141/534 
(file 227).
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aggravating the situation in Khartoum* In a series of
articles in Al-Nil. the Mahdists repeatedly called for
al-Birayr's retirement. The latter responded Toy
ridiculing Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman in the Egyptian press.
An abusive duel then began between the two factions*
The virulent articles by al-Birayr did considerable
damage to Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman's prestige. Under
headlines such as "The Simple-Minded Exploited" and
"Slavery in the name of Religion", al-Birayr rattled the
bones of every skeleton in the Mahdist cupboard. Sayyid
cAbd al-Rahman, it was argued, was lifting himself to
leadership "on the foundation of blood and death
inherited from a destructive and ruinous revolt"; and
his wealth was allegedly derived from a wood contract
completed by labourers who were collected from "the
remainder of his father's ignorant and simple-minded
followers1*, who were paid "ten square metres of paradise
1for every cubic metre of wood". The last blow to
Mahdist prestige came in the latter part of September,
when cAli al-Birayr managed to arrange for free education
2for forty-four Sudanese students at Egyptian schools.
The declining influence of the Mahdist faction
1. SMISt No. 44, September 1937, para 1088, loc. cit.
2. Ibid, para 1090.
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and the declared support of the Fa.ir group were two 
factors which encouraged members of the Graduates1 Club 
Committee to take positive measures towards the 
organisation of a Graduates* Congress. In October 1957, 
a general meeting of all Club members was called, at 
which it was decided to convene a general conference, 
in the sense of an extraordinary Annual General Meeting 
of the Club, to inaugurate the Congress organisation and 
to draw up its programme. The date was set for 12 
February 1938. In the meantime, the existing Club 
Committee was to act as a Preparatory Committee, 
responsible for making all the necessary arrangements for 
convening the conference and also for drawing up an 
agenda for its discussion. The foundation stone for the 
organisation of the Graduates* General Congress had 
firmly been laid.
For the next three months, the graduate class was 
pre-occupied with the preparations for the conference. 
First of all, the Club Committee needed to acquaint itself 
with the opinions of the graduates, whether members of 
the Club or not, who resided in the capital and in the 
provinces. Accordingly, the Club Committee requested 
a number of prominent graduates, representing various 
opinions and generations, to submit their suggestions 
for the programme of the Congress and the work which it
6 2
should undertake* In this connection, it organised
these graduates into groups of four speakers each of
whom, in a series of meetings to he held at the Club
premises in Omdurman, would expound their views on the
Congress proposal and make suggestions for the agenda.
At the same time, the Committee requested clubs in the
provinces to do likewise, and it also encouraged other
1
graduates to submit their individual views directly.
The first of these meetings was held on 25 November, 
the first speaker being Shaykh AhmadctJthman al-Qadi.
The other speakers were Muhammad cUthman Mirghani^ Yahya
3 4al-Eadli and Jamal Muhammad Ahmad. The meeting was
well attended, but the audience consisted chiefly of
1. Makki Shibayka (Secretary) in Al-Sudan. 23 November
1937.
2. MuhammadcUthman Mirghani: Educationalist, graduate of 
the University of Beirut and teacher at Gordon 
College.
3. Yahya al-Eadli: Born 1912 (of Egyptian father and 
Sudanese mother); educated at Gordon College and joined 
the Einance Department; resigned in 1942 and became a 
merchant; a founder of the Graduates* Congress and a 
very active nationalist, nicknamed by his colleagues
"al-dinamu*1; founder and leader of the Ashiqqa* 
party, and later of the National Unionist Party.
4. Jamal Muhammad Ahmad: Born 1917; educated at Gordon 
College and subsequently at Exeter and Oxford; President, 
Debating Society, Gordon College 1936; Secretary, Sudan 
Cultural Centre 1948-56; Sudanese Ambassador to Arab 
countries, United Kingdom and the United Nations; 
Permanent Under-Secretary Ministry of Eoreign Affairs, 
retired 1970. He wrote several books, including his 
well-known Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism.
6 3
the younger graduates, although few of the older ones 
were also present*'*'
In his opening speech, Shaykh Ahmad insisted that the 
chief objective of the Congress should be to establish 
unity and combat partisanship among the graduates, and that 
Congress should concern itself with matters of general 
interest and should avoid setting itself up as a body 
representing (and attempting to secure material advantages 
for) the graduates as a class at the expense of the rest 
of the community* His speech was well received,
2particularly his remarks attacking partisanship.
The second meeting in the series was held at the 
club premises on 2 December* The principal speaker was 
cAli al-Birayr. The speeches made did not contain 
anything of special political interest, but it was at 
this meeting that the first attempts were made to widen 
the membership of the conference* A proposal was 
forwarded bycAbd al-Majid Ahmad , supported by Shaykh 
A£madcUthman al-Qadi, requesting that graduates should
1* SMLISt No. 46, November 1937, para 1163, PHO^
PO.141/534 (file 227); also, Hadarat al-Sudan*
2 December 1937*
2. The views of most of the speakers in this series of 
discussions will be presented in a summarised form 
later on.
3. tfAbd al-Majid Ahmad: Prominent Mirghanist, graduate of 
Gordon College*and government official; later 
transferred to the War Supply Department 1940-45.
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not be compelled to become members of the Graduates* Club 
in Omdurman in order to qualify for participation in the 
conference. Instead, all the graduates, whether members of 
the Club or not, should be invited to attend the general 
conference in February 1938. The object of the proposal
was to enable people like Shaykh Ahmad al-Sayyid al-Fll,
" 1  2 Dardiri MuhammadcUthman , Mirghani Hamza and others
(who as a result of the old Club dispute found it difficult
to join it again as members) to participate in founding
the Congress. A general meeting, of the Club was
accordingly convened for 15 December to decide on
this point.
1. Dardiri Muhammad cUthm an; Prominent Khatmi and strong 
critic of the British administration; graduated from 
Gordon College in 1914 and joined the Legal Department; 
was the first Sudanese to be selected as a judge in 
civil courts and the first Sudanese to be promoted to 
Judgeship in the High Court; member of the 
Constitutional Commission 1951; elected by 
Parliament in 1956 as a member of the Supreme 
Commission, which acted as Head of State; his interest 
in Club activities dated back to 1918, when he served 
on its first Executive Committee.
2. Mirghani Hamza: Born 1897; graduated from Gordon 
College as an engineer in 1914; Public Works 
Department 1916-1951; later took up private practice 
as an architect; a founder of the Graduates* Congress 
1938; member of its Executive Committees 1938-42; 
member of the Advisory Council 1944-7; leader of the 
Khatmiyya group 1955; “ > Minister 1956.
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A second proposal, forwarded by Khidir Hamad"1', 
requested that a special ad hoc committee, consisting 
of three members of the existing Club Committee and three 
members from outside it., should be set up to take charge 
of organising the conference, replacing the ordinary 
Club Committee which was then discharging this task. 
Considering the political predilection of Khidr Hamad, 
the object of this proposal apparently was to introduce 
militant elements into the Preparatory Committee. The 
suggestion was resented by the Club Committee as implying 
a lack of confidence in it, and no decision was taken at 
the time. This proposal was, however, to re-appear at 
the general meeting of the Club on 15 December.
The third meeting in the series was held on 
9 December. The principal speakers were cAbd al-Majid 
Ahmad and Ahmad Muhammad Khayr, two influential 
nationalists of opposite political disposition, the former 
a moderate and the latter a militant. Ahmad Khayr 
denounced the tendency among some graduates to make of 
the Congress "a mere advisory body to beg and entreat 
the Government1 and demanded instead "a Congress to
1. Khidir Hamad; Born 1910; graduated from Gordon College
and’joined the finance Department; resigned in 1946 
and joined the finance Department of the Arab League; 
a leader of militant nationalists; eventually became 
Secretary-General of the National Unionist Party.
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represent Sudanese nationalism, on the model of the
x
Wafd and the National Assembly of Ankara." Muhammad 
- 2Ahmad Mahjub , irritated by the thought that the Congress 
might act as a "begging body", condemned such a tendency 
in somewhat strong language. There was no question, he 
said, of begging the government for favours. The 
Congress must "demand" the national rights of the 
Sudanese, and^if the government refused to allow its 
officials to demand such rights, ten or fifteen persons 
of the graduate class could easily be found who would be 
prepared to resign from government service in order to 
devote themselves to this task.
To this outburst, Jamal Muhammad Ahmad replied in 
a speech which severely criticised Mahjub and Khayr 
for advocating a militancy that would inevitably bring 
the Congress into a conflict with the government. There 
could be no question of such a conflict, he argued. The 
basic principle of the Congress must be co-operation with 
the government, and it was merely idle to talk of government
Al-Nil, 12 December 1937.
2. Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub; Born 1908; graduated from Gordon 
College as*a civii engineer and later as a lawyer; 
District judge until 1946 when he retired to engage in 
political activity; Secretary-General of Independent 
Front 1946-7; member of the Legislative Assembly 
1948-53; Foreign Minister 1957-8; Prime Minister 
1965-6 and 1967-9; died 1976.
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officials resigning to strive for national aspirations.
The Congress must realise that what it proposed must be 
achieved through the Government, and not against it.
The speech was warmly applauded by the audience, an 
indication that the greater majority of those present 
agreed with this moderate approach.
The general meeting of the Club, convened on 
15 December, was marked by heated discussions. There were 
two issues for consideration; Firstly, if it was advisable 
to invite all the graduates, whether members of the Club 
or not, to participate in the conference; and secondly, 
whether additional members should be appointed to the 
existing Committee for the purpose of organising the said 
conference. Opinion on both issues was divided. Some 
believed that unless all the graduates were represented, 
and that unless the Preparatory Committee was authorized 
to speak in the name of all, the efforts then being made 
to organise the Congress would be doomed to failure.
Others held the view that participants to the general 
conference must necessarily be members of the Club. The 
determination of this issue was crucial to the other issue 
regarding the appointment of additional members to the 
Preparatory Committee. For if it was decided that the 
graduates who were not members of the Club could 
participate in the general conference, then it would have
been almost impossible to defeat a motion to appoint 
their representatives on the Preparatory Committee. 
Accordingly, the existing Club Committee threatened to 
resign en masse if the decisions, taken previously by the 
general meeting in October, were altered. A deadlock 
developed and Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, seeing that a decision 
could not be forced on these issues without damaging 
consequences, proposed that the status quo be maintained, 
and that both issues should be re-examined at the first 
meeting of the Congress in February 1938.1 Mahjub*s 
proposal was finally agreed to .
The demand for open participation by all the
graduates, however, continued to gain momentum, and
increasing pressure was put on the Club Committee to
change their decision. In a conciliatory move, fourteen
members of the Club called personally on some senior
graduates, who were not members, and requested them to
forget the old misunderstanding and to join the Club
2for the sake of the nation and the Congress. There is 
no record of the outcome of this conciliatory move, but 
it appears that a face-saving compromise was agreed to 
The older graduates would rejoin the Club, provided that
1. Al-Nil, 18 December 1937.
2. Al-Nll. 6 January 1938.
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the Club Committee retracted its stand on the outstanding
issues. Accordingly, in the course of a general meeting
held at the Club on 19 January 1938, it was decided to
elect a special new Preparatory Committee, and to allow
all graduates, whether members of the Club or not, to
participate in the founding conference*1
These decisions marked the start of an extensive
campaign by all club committees, in the capital and in the
provinces, to register prospective participants to the
conference. By 9 February, the number of registered
participants reached 1500 and it was expected to top 2000
2
before the opening of the conference.
The participants had been influenced to a considerable 
degree by the views expressed by leading graduates in club 
discussions and in the local press so that, on the eve of 
the founding conference, graduate opinion was already 
formulated along some general lines.
In regard to the scope of Congress activities, opinion
Al-Mil. 23 January 1938. The members of the new
Preparatory Committee were^Isma6il al-Azhari, Makki
Shibayka, Isma6ilcUthman Salih,.Ahmad Euhammad Yasin,
6Ali Muhammad A£mad, A£madcUthman al-Qadi, Hasan *Ali 
Karrar, ‘Abd al-Majid Ahmad, Macani Muhammad Hasan, 
Muhammad Hithman Mirghani, Ibrahim Ahmad Ibrahim,
HJthman Shandi, cAbdallah Mirghani, Xahya al-Fadli, 
and Jamal Muhammad Ahmad. Cf. Mohamed Qmer Beshir, 
Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan. (London 1974), 
p. 135.
2. Al-Nil. 9 February 1938.
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was divided into two main schools of thought-. On the 
one hand, there were those who believed that the activities 
of Congress should be limited mainly to the immediate 
interests of the graduates (such as strengthening their 
unity and solidarity by the formation of public opinion 
among them) and to the improvement of their conditions, 
whether as government officials, merchants or artisans.1 
On the other hand, there were those who held that Congress 
activities should have a broader scope. The primary 
concern of the Congress would certainly be to obtain a 
cancellation of the Government regulations enacted during 
the retrenchment period (i.e. the Pensions Ordinance, 
the Personnel Regulations, and the Transport and Leave
p
Regulations). But that would not be all. Congress would
have to concern itself with questions of national interest,
3both of a political and social nature. On the political 
front, the primary objective of the Congress should be
1. Ahmad Mutwakil al-^ Atabani, Al-Nil. 14 December 1937; 
also, Muhammad Salih al-Shinqlti, Al-Nil.
21 December 1937.
2. Shaykh cAbdallah fAbd al-Rafrman, Al-Nil. 13 December 1937; 
Ibrahim Yusif Sulavman._Al-Nil. 14 December 1937;
and Isma<Il Pawzi, Al-Nil. 16 December 1937.
3. Muhammad*Umar Muhammad, Al-Nil. 17 November 1937;
Ibrahim Yusif Sulayman, Al-Nil. 14 December 1937;
Dr Muhammad Amin al-Sayyid, Al-Nil. 29 December 1937; 
Muhammad Ahmad fUmarz Al-Nil. 9 January 1936; and 
Bashir *Abd al-Rahman, Hadarat al-Sudan. 20 January 
1938.
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to mould and to enlighten nationalist opinion among the 
graduates throughout the country.^ " The Congress should 
also work for the eradication of tribalism and its
2
replacement by a sense of nationalism among the population. 
With reference to Sudan Government policies, Congress 
should press for the faithful implementation of the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty clauses affecting the Sudan, for 
the institution of municipal councils in every town, and 
for the formation of an Advisory Council which would include 
Sudanese members as well. On the social front, the 
Congress was expected to play an active role in providing 
free education for the poor, in arranging for Sudanese 
students to go abroad for higher education, and in 
encouraging foreign residents in the Sudan to open new
4
schools in the country. In the economic sphere,
1. Yahya al-Eadli, Hadarat al-Sudan. 9 December 1937; 
Ahmad Mutwakil al-4Atabani and Ibrahim Yusif Sulayman, 
Ai-Nil, 14 December 1937.
2. Jamal_Mubammad Ahmad^ Al-Nil, 9.December 1927;
Al-Amin al-Tum, Al-Nil, 24 December 1937.
3. Ibrahim Yusif Sulayman, Al-Nil. 14 December 1937; and 
Bashir fAbd al-Rahman, Had&rat al-Sudan. 20 January 
1938.
4. MuhammadcUmar Muhammad, Al-Nil. 17 November 1937; 
Jamal Muhammad Ahmad, Al-Nil, 9 December 1937; and 
Bashir *Abd al-Rahman, Hadarat al-Sudan. 20 January
1938.
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Congress should work for the gradual transformation
of the Sudan into an industrial country, either "by
persuading wealthy Sudanese to establish factories which
would provide employment for Sudanese artisans, or by
undertaking itself to establish such industries through
public collections and in agreement with the government
1
to support them by annual subsidies* The institution of
a special bureau to examine workers' conditions and to
2
combat unemployment was also suggested. Finally, Congress
would have to undertake publication of a magazine on a
regular basis, as an instrument for moulding and fostering
nationalist consciousness, as well as a means of informing
3its members of its activities. The funds for maintaining
the publication of such a magazine, as well as some other
schemes of the Congress, would have to be provided in the
form of regular subscriptions exacted from its membership,
and by contributions solicited from the public supporters
4
of the Congress.
1. Jamal Muhammad Ahmad, Al-Nil^ 9 December 1937; 
MuhammadvUmar Muhammad, Al-Nil. 17 November 1937.
2. Bashir cAbd al-Rahman, Hadarat al-Sudan. 20 January
3. Muhammad*Umar Muhammad, Al-Nil. 17 November 1937;
Jamal Muhammad Ahmad, Al-Nll.~9 December 1937; and 
Xahya al-Fadli, Hadarat al-Sudan. 9 December 1937.
4. MuhammadcUmar Muhammad, Al-Nil, 17 November 1937;
Ahmad Muhammad Khayr,_Al-Nil, 9 December 1937; and
*uihman ai-Umrabi, Hadarat al-Sudan, 20 January 1938.
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In regard to the relation between Congress and the
Government, there were again two main schools of thought.
On the one hand, there were the more militant younger
members of the intelligentsia who viewed Congress as a
nationalist body struggling for the political progress of
the Sudanese, and they recommended the adoption of
militant political action, irrespective of whether
1
government co-operation was forthcoming or not. On the
other hand, there were those who advocated a more moderate
approach. The proposed programme of the Congress, they
argued, consisted of two parts: The first involved matters
of direct interest to the graduate class only; the second
part involved matters of interest to the nation as a whole,
and as such they would have to be examined in consultation
2with the whole nation. In this sense, most if not all of 
the objectives of the Congress required contact with the 
government, whether in a representative or a consultative 
capacity. In order to achieve its objectives, Congress 
would have to encourage a sympathetic understanding 
between it and the Government with whom, unavoidably, 
policies which were inconsistent with the interests of
1. Ahmad Muhammad Khayr, Al-Nil, 12 December 1937;
Muhammad*Ahmad Mahjub, SM1S, No. 46, November 1937, 
para 1163.*loc. cit.
2. Jamal Muhammad Ahmad, Al-Nil. 8 December 1937; and 
Muhammad*Salih ai-Shinqiti, Al-Nil. 21 December 1937*
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the Sudanese would have to he discussed. The general
tenor of Congress's activities must, therefore, he
"co-operation with the Government".1 Such an attitude
would dissipate the old atmosphere of reserve and fear
which used to prevail and would rather tend to develop
bonds of confidence and friendship between the
2
intelligentsia and the Government. It was pointed out by 
some that the Government had significantly so far not 
opposed these initiatives to set up the Congress, probably 
because they wanted to see what the thoughts and demands 
of the intelligentsia would be. If the Government 
considered these demands sensible and within the limits of 
their political aims, they might carry them out. If, on 
the contrary, they found these demands extremist and
3unreasonable, they would certainly disperse the Congress.
In order to lay a sound foundation for co-operation, it 
was recommended that the Preparatory Committee should 
contact the authorities and determine to what extent 
Congress would be recognized by the Government and what
1. Jamal Muhammad Ahmad, Al-Nil, 8 December 1937; Yahya 
al-PadliJ Hadarat al-Sudan. 9 December 1937; and 
Muhammad Sllih al-Shinqiti, Al-Nil. 21 December 1937.
2. Shaykh 6Abdallah tfAbd al-Rahman, Al-Nil. 13 December 1937.
3. Muhammad Farid Rashid, Al-Nil. 21 December 1937.
• ""
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the limits of its activities should be.^
In regard to the organisational structure of the
Congress, there seems to have been a general agreement.
Membership would be restricted to the graduate class only,
from whom the Congress would derive its authority to make
representations to the Government. Congress would have
a Central Committee, sited in Omdurman, with Branch
2
Committees in the provinces and the districts. The
Central Committee would be responsible for drawing up the
programme of the Congress, which would then be entrusted,
together with a few recommendations on the best way of
carrying it out, to the Branch Committees in the provinces
for its execution. Special bye-laws for the election of the
Central Committee would have to be drawn up and approved
4by a general assembly of the Congress members. It was 
also suggested that these bye-laws should provide for 
Congress members in the provinces to elect the Central 
Committee by means of a secret ballot which would be
1. Ismacil F a w z i Al-Nil, 16 December 1937;
Dr Muhammad Amin al-Sayyid, Al-Nil. 29 December 1937.
2. Ahmad Muhammad Khayr, Al-Nil. 12 December 1937;
Ahmad Mutwakil al-Atabani, Al-Nil, 14 December 1937; 
T&ha Salih, Al-Nil, 3 January 1938.
3. Al-Amln al-Ium, Al-Nil, 28 December 1937.
4. Jamal Muhammad Ahmad, Al-Nil, 8 December 1937.* 0 « ' ' *
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certified by the local Branch Committee.^ Once formed,
the Central Committee would be divided into sub-committees,
each of which would be entrusted with the examination of
2
a determined number of questions. The Central Committee
would be headed by a President, who would be elected for a
specified period of time, and who would be expected to
devote his time entirely to Congress matters, sustained
3by an adequate salary, Finally, the Central Committee 
would become a two-way link between the Congress and the
4
Government on matters of particular and general interest.
The graduates* general conference was held at the 
Sudan Schools' Club in Omdurman on 12 February 1938, with 
1180 graduates participating in the deliberations. An 
introductory speech was delivered by Isma6il al-Azhari, 
the President of the Preparatory Committee, in which he 
described the origins and development of the idea of the 
Congress, and expounded its objectives and the results 
which should be expected. The aims of the Congress, 
he maintained, were to formulate and express a collective
1. Hasan Nuri, Al-Nil. 3 January 1938.
2. Jamal Muhammad Ahmad, Al-Nil. 8 December 1937; Abu 
Bakr al-Malik, Hadarat al-Sudan. 17 January 1938.
3. Taha Salih, Al-Nil. 3 January 1938;
Mirghanicfrthman Salih, Al-Nil. 3 February 1938.
4. Ahmad Mutwakil al-Atabani, Al-Nil. 14 December 1937; 
Muhammad Salih al-Shinqiti, Al-Nil. 21 December 1937*
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point of view representing graduate opinion; to promote 
a national consciousness by combating partisanship and 
tribalism; and to lay the foundation of a sound 
national life by carrying out a programme of social 
reform. 4Abd al-Majid Ahmad dwelled on the subject of the 
Congress*s finances and explained that the funds for 
national schemes would have to be raised through regular 
subscriptions by the members and contributions by the 
public. Shaykh Ahmad4Uthman al-Qadi stressed the 
necessity of publishing a magazine as the mouthpiece of 
the Congress. Finally, Makki Shibayka1 submitted to the 
general conference a draft which, he suggested, could 
form the constitution of the Congress. According to this 
draft, the aim of the Graduates' General Congress, as the 
new organisation was to be called, would be to "serve 
the general interests of the country and of the graduates". 
Membership would be open to "all the graduates of 
Sudanese schools (above the elementary level) who were 
eighteen years old, against a registration fee of fifty 
milliemmes and an annual subscription of thirty piasters". 
The Congress would hold its general meetings annually 
"on the second day of Qurban Bayram, to hear reports and
1. Makki Shibayka: Educationalist, teacher at Gordon 
College and presently Professor of History at the 
University of Khartoum.
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to elect a new Committee of Sixty" which in its turn would 
meet on the following day "to discuss and approve the 
work of the Congress and to elect a Committee of Fifteen 
from amongst its members, who would be called the 
Executive Committee of the Congress". An amendment to the 
rules of the Congress would be made only with "the 
approval of two-thirds of Congress members.
The draft was approved, and the Congress then 
proceeded to elect the members of the proposed supervisory 
Committee of Sixty which, in turn, convened on 13 February 
and elected the Executive Committee of Fifteen. In its 
first meeting, held on 14 February, the Executive Committee 
decided against the rule of electing a permanent President 
on an annual basis and adopted instead the principle of 
rotating the office among its members every month. The 
decision was probably motivated by the desire to defuse 
the personality conflicts that had accompanied the 
Filist-Shawqist feud. A Bureau was established to attend 
to the routine affairs of the Congress, and Isma^il 
al-Azhari (who had secured the highest number of votes)
2
was appointed General Secretary, with 'Abdallah Mirghani
1. Al-Nil, 15 February 1933.
2. eAbdallah Mirghani; Employed in the Finance Department; 
member of the Congress Executive Committee 1938-42;
a founder_of the Ittihadiyyln party 1944; editor of 
Sawt al-Sudan 1944-5.*
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1
as Assistant Secretary, Dardiri al-Nuqud as Treasurer
2 3and Hamad Tawfiq as Accountant.
The Committee spent some time drafting a constitution,
and on 12 March 1958 it submitted an official copy to the
4Governor of Khartoum. The Graduates* General Congress 
was finally born.
1. Dardiri al-Nuqud: Prominent Mahdist and clerk in the 
Finance Department.
2. $amad Tawfiq Hamad: Born 1904; joined Finance 
Department as accountant; a founder of the Graduates* 
Congress; Secretary of National Front 1946; member
of the Executive Committee of National Unionist Party; 
Minister of Finance 1954.
3. Al-Nil. 16 February 1938.
4, J.A. Gillan, 1 Note on the Graduates* Congress", 
PHO, FO.371/21999 (J2919/220/16).
C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
THE GROWING CONFLICT BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE GOVERNMENT.
The Politics of British Tolerance.
The movement for the establishment of the Graduates* 
Congress had coincided with, and in some respects even 
caused, a modification in the Government’s policy towards the 
educated class. Symes and Gillan were convinced that the 
graduates had finally grown tired of sectarian rivalry, 
and they regarded the intelligentsia’s desire to form a 
moderate but influential nucleus (to which they could 
attach themselves without surrendering either their 
independence or their identity) as both natural and 
politically healthy. At the start, therefore, the 
Government’s response to the general idea of the Congress 
was basically sympathetic.
At the same time, however, Gillan considered the 
movement as a new departure which could not be viewed 
without some concern, particularly at its early stages when 
political ends and means were still not yet clearly 
defined. In such a fluid situation, he regarded even
81
the outcome of the graduates1 conference as basically 
uncertain.
“The Congress may be a fiasco; it may 
be sabotaged by sectarian interests; the 
promoters themselves may lose their heads 
and formulate demands; indiscreet speeches 
may be delivered on prohibited subjects; 
the anti-partisan campaign might be 
carried too far. All we can say today 
is that as things are going now 
(the promoters are behaving with particular 
good sense), we have no cause for 
apprehension. But it would be interesting 
to hear how provincial invites are 
reacting to the congress idea. Much may 
happen in the next six or seven weeks /until 
the conference is held7* We may have to 
intervene. In the meantime we are 
*on the fence1, maintaining a neutral 
attitude of general interest by no ^
means hostile, but not too sympathetic.”
In the event, the activites of the graduates in the 
process of organising the Congress did not finally 
necessitate Government intervention. Instead, the opinions 
expressed during this period stimulated further reforms 
in regard to the Government's attitude towards the 
graduate class. An important initiative along this line 
came from the Department of Education in a minute which 
openly blamed the British administration for the absence 
of satisfactory relations between British and Sudanese 
officials. It was pointed out that the old belief of
1. SMIS, No. 46, November 1937, para 1165, PKO, 
EG.141/534 (file 227).
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the 1920's, that "the Gordon College was the root of all
evil", had inevitably influenced British officials to
look askance upon, and to deliberately decry, the
educated class, with the unfortunate result that it
grew up in a atmosphere of professional neglect. Although
times had changed, this old attitude of mind still persisted
in many British officials, and the spirit of fellowship and
co-operation had not become widespread*
It was therefore considered essential that Government
policy should be amended to allow a "freer admission of
Sudanese to the council chamber" and "a greater enterprise
and confidence in the delegation of substantial authority
and responsibility to the educated section of the 
1
community," To be able to achieve this, British officials 
in the Sudan had to undergo "a change of heart and outlook", 
which would lead them to entertain "a higher conception of 
their duty towards the Sudanese". In this regard, British 
officials had to be reminded that one of their defined 
duties was to so administer to the well-being of the 
Sudanese as to carry them further along the road of progress 
and enlightment, leading to an enhanced responsibility and
1. Minute by C.W. Williams (Assistant Director of Education) 
on "Cultural Contact Problems", 8*1*1938, Minutes of the 
Northern Governors' Meeting (1938), CRO,
NORTHERN l/lBAOlT and DARFUR 1/13/73.
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an ever-growing share in the administration of the affairs 
of their own country. It was emphatically argued that 
the way to win the respect of the Sudanese in this common 
task was to treat them in a frank and natural manner as 
ordinary human beings, eschewing any air of conscious or 
unconscious superiority. In other words, it was not so 
much the action that counted as the spirit, prompting and 
underlying that action.
In addition to the question of attitudes, the minute 
also raised the question of consultation on matters of 
departmental policy and administration. 1116 general 
practice was for these matters to be decided entirely by the 
British officials, sitting behind closed doors and 
legislating in secret for the common weal. The Sudanese, 
it was pointed out, preferred to be consulted and to have 
their say. They did not mind so much whether their advice 
was taken or not as long as they were afforded the 
opportunity to offer it and to put forward their views.
In this connection, the Government was accused of having 
been excessively cautious, lest matters got out of hand, 
and it was strongly pointed out that unless and until the 
Government changed its attitude there could be no real 
progress in the integration of Sudanese officials in the 
administration of their country. Mistakes by these 
officials were bound to occur, but such prospects should
84
not be allowed to fog the political development of the 
Sudan. "The Sudanese must learn by their mistakes, yet 
they cannot do so unless we give them the chance.**
Copies of this minute were eventually circulated by
Gillan to all the Governors and Heads of Department, and it
formed the central matter of discussion at the Northern
Governors* Meeting in February 1938. Gillan emphasized
that the issue had become very acute, particularly in the
capital, where there was a high concentration of Sudanese
intelligentsia and British officials. He supported the
motion to "educate the British official up to his duties
of contact**, and in this connection he proposed to establish
a cultural centre where the British and Sudanese could meet
2
on neutral ground.
Opinion among the Governors, however, was divided on 
the nature and emphasis of such contacts. One school of 
thought held that the problem could best be tackled by 
encouraging a more personal contact between British and 
Sudanese officials in the capital, and they supported the
1. Minute by C.W. Williams (Assistant Director of Education) 
on "Cultural Contact Problems”, 8.1.1938> Minutes of the 
Northern Governors* Meeting (1938). loc. cit.
2. "Opening meeting held at the Palace on Thursday,
February 3rd, 1938", Ibid.
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proposal for the establishment of a cultural centre for 
such a purpose. Their belief was that the lack of such 
personal contacts was peculiar to the capital and, to a 
lesser degree, to some major provincial towns, but that 
no such problem actually existed in the provinces. In these 
rural areas, the intelligentsia were believed to be 
generally contented, and it was only when they were 
transferred to the capital that they were drawn into the 
agitation for cultural o,r political objectives.^
The other school of thought held the view that too 
much emphasis was unnecessarily put on personal contact and 
too little on cultural development. Social contact, it was 
argued, would not satisfy the Sudanese intelligentsia, the 
majority of whom sought after real culture and would not 
be content with efforts designed to give them merely 
a "pleasant Sunday afternoon". What they really aimed at 
was an education and a culture that would put them in a 
position to rule and occupy higher posts in the government. 
"Western education is revolutionary and, once imbued with it, 
some at least of the intelligentsia are bound to turn their
1, "Opening meeting held at the Palace on Thursday,
Eebruary 3rd, 1938”> loc. cit. Supporters of this view 
comprised J.A. Gillan (Civil Secretary), E. Campbell 
(Deputy Civil Secretary), J.A. Reid (Personal Assistant 
to the Civil Secretary), D. Newbold (Governor Kordofan),
B. Kennedy-Cooke (Governor Kassala), C*I». Armstrong 
(Governor Khartoum), and R.C. Mayall (Governor Blue Nile).
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knowledge to political ends."'*'
Despite the divergence in emphasis between these two
viewpoints, it was generally agreed that the aims of the
intelligentsia were political at bottom, and that it would
therefore be better for the Government to encourage the
existing, nationalist tendencies to develop rather than to
leave things alone, "since if we do not take the chance,
2 ~
someone else will". This meant that the Government 
should actively guide, restrain and enlighten such tendencies 
wherever possible in order to prevent them from evolving 
along undesirable lines. Such objectives naturally favoured 
the adoption of a policy that would encourage more personal 
contact between British and Sudanese officials, as well as 
provide further opportunities for the educational and 
cultural development of the educated class.
Within this perspective, therefore, and with the 
inauguration of the Congress, Gillan circulated a note 
defining the Government’s policy towards the Congress.
He pointed out that the Sudanese intelligentsia was 
motivated by a genuine desire "to co-operate with 
Government in furthering what it sincerely imagines to be
1. Ibid. Supporters of this view comprised J.C. Penney 
(Director of Public Security), C.W. Cox (Director of 
Education), and J.P. Gorman (Legal Secretary).
2. Ibid.
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the best interests of the Sudan as a whole." He 
emphasized that what they basically wanted was to be taken 
further into the confidence of the Government. In this 
sense, he viewed their aspirations as genuinely patriotic 
and the natural result of a growing feeling of nationalism, 
which was no new thing in the Sudan and which, subject to 
proper direction, was not necessarily a bad thing either.
Gillan believed that the Congress presented the
Government with a two-fold problem. On the one hand,
there was the more general "political" aspect regarding
the role of Congress in the Sudanese community. Legitimate
intelligentsia aspirations, he believed, had "a way of
becoming obscured by personal or party interests; of being
distorted by misdirection and misunderstanding; or by being
translated by unbalanced enthusiasts into precipitate
demands for as yet unmerited privileges. These dangers
we may here also have to face in the future. Today, however,
the Congress movement is in the hands of the more balanced
2
members of the graduate class." This class was nonetheless 
numerically an inconsiderable minority, and its attempts to 
assert itself beyond its limits would most certainly be
1. Gillan to All Governors and Heads of Department, 
28.3.1938, CHO, DAKH1IA (X) 1/10/26.
2. Ibid.
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criticised, or even resented, by tribal notables or other
elements in the country. Gillan, therefore, considered it
necessary to discourage the Congress from making
extravagant demands which might bring it into a conflict
with other political elements.
On the other hand, there was the more particular problem
involved in the fact that the Congress membership was
practically identical with the. class of government officials.
Gillan believed that these officials were confronted
with a difficult problem of behaviour: they had obligations
to the Government as civil servants and, at the same time,
they naturally felt an obligation to their own country.
They were therefore experiencing great difficulty in
reconciling these loyalties, when and if they opposed
each other. It was primarily because of this difficulty
that the Government had relaxed in 1936 the existing
Administrative Regulations in a way to provide a reasonable
outlet for constructive political and press activities by
1
Sudanese officials. ‘Sot exactly the same reason, Gillan 
was now prepared to accept the establishment of the 
Congress provided proper safeguards were also imposed to
1, Ibid. The Government had in 1936 allowed Sudanese 
officials to write articles in the local press, but 
with one important restriction: They could write
only on internal matters (i.e* municipality affairs, 
education policy, etc) and they were barred from 
writing on external affairs (i.e. Anglo-Egyptian 
relations, the future of the Sudan, etc.).
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discourage "unbalanced" enthusiasm. The best way to do 
this, he argued, was "to re-state, in the form of 
amendments to the Administrative Regulations, the 
principles which should govern the conduct of our civil 
servants in their relation, to the public generally, and 
particularly in their relation to politics and the press." 
According to the amendments subsequently brought into 
force, Sudanese officials were barred from writing 
articles in the press which were defamatory of the 
Government's internal or external policy; nor were they to 
act as editors of newspapers or take part in the 
management of a newspaper, without the explicit consent 
of the Civil Secretary. Civil servants were also barred 
from taking part in any public demonstration organised 
for party or political purposes. In particular, officials 
of the Police and Legal Departments were categorically 
barred from engaging in any public controversy or political 
activity whatsoever. In order to avoid misinterpretation 
of these amendments, Gillan issued an explanatory note 
to all Sudanese officials, expressing his sympathy with 
their difficulty and stressing that the amendments aimed at 
a reasonable compromise, "ensuring on the one hand the 
maintenance and development of a sound civil service
1. Gillan to All Governors and Heads of Departments, 
28,3.1938, loc. cit.
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tradition and on the other a reasonable latitude to the 
Sudanese official class for serving their country in 
legitimate and constructive public activities*"
Tfespite this precautionary measure, the intelligentsia 
interpreted the amendments as moves that were basically 
designed to obstruct the programme of the Congress, and they
p
were consequently faced with a major problem of policy.
On the one hand, they could not assume for Congress the 
role of a political organisation without simultaneously 
being confronted with massive, though involuntary, 
resignations by officials from Congress membership. On 
the other hand, they could not very well deny to the 
Congress the political role they earnestly expected it to 
play in the political development of the country. A 
satisfactory compromise had to be devised, and quickly.
As a first step, and in an effort to placate the 
apprehensions of Congress members, the Executive Committee 
held a meeting on 11 April 1938, in which it was decided 
to announce that the responsibility of government officials 
as members of the Congress did not in fact conflict with 
their official duties as civil servants.
1. Ibid.
2. Al-Nil. 5 April 1938; and Al-Sudan. 12 April 1938.
3. Al-Nil, 13 April 1938.
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The second step was for the Executive Committee to 
stabilize the situation by formalising the relationship 
between Congress and the Government. After lengthy 
deliberation, and not without some trepidation, the Committee 
sent a letter to Gillan, on 2 May 1938, in which they 
formally declared the objectives and methods of the Congress. 
In this document, Isma^Il al-Azhari eschewed any intention 
of embarrassing the Government or pursuing lines of 
activity that were incompatible with its policy. The 
graduates, he argued, were prompted by a sense of duty 
towards their country and by a strong desire to co-operate 
with the Government, in such ways as may be open to them, 
in furthering the welfare of the Sudanese. He defined 
the duties of Congress as being concerned with two main 
and distinct spheres; Firstly, social reform and other 
internal matters lying outside the ambit of official 
Government concern; and secondly, matters of public
1. J.A. Gillan, "Note on the Graduates* Congress**,
loc. cit.; also, "Memorandum on Sudanese Nationalism 
and the Graduates* Congress", PRO, FO.571/31587 
(J2664/1528/15). There is some evidence which 
suggests that two members of the Executive Committee, 
Dardiri Muhammad4Uthman and Ahmad Muhammad Salih, 
held informal discussions witk Penney, during wfiich 
the role of the Congress was defined (cf. G.M.A. 
Bakheit, on. cit.. p. 305). But no written record 
of such meetir^ survived. The sequence of events 
strongly suggests that they were held shortly 
before Azhari's letter of 2 lay, which was accordingly 
drafted along lines agreed with Penney.
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interest involving the Government or lying within the
scope of its policy and concern. With regard to the
former category, Azhari promised a friendly co-operation
and obedience to the requirements of the law, and he
expressed the hope that the Government would give due
consideration to such views and suggestions as Congress
might submit in connection with the latter. He did not
regard the position of the Congress as "prejudicial to
that of important elements in the country", but he
clearly claimed for it a peculiar responsibility
"as its only educated element" to contribute in thought
and effort to the progress and welfare of the country as
a whole. He expressed the hope that a new era would
begin, in which the Government would abandon its p.ractice
of taking the advice of individual educated Sudanese and
instead consult the Executive Committee as a separate
1body representing collectively the educated class.
Gillan had no illusions about the basic intention 
of the graduates to establish the Congress as an embryonic 
instrument of Sudanese nationalism, "an advisory body", 
initially representing only the intelligentsia but 
gradually widening its basis to include other elements as
1. Ibid; also, P.M. Holt, on. cit., p. 141.
they became politically conscious.1 For the time being,
however, he looked upon the Congress's "self-imposed terms
of reference" as essentially unobjectionable and in
conformity with the overall Government policy regarding
2
the growth of the nationalist movement. Accordingly, 
on 22 May 1938, he sent to the Executive Committee a 
sympathetic, but carefully-worded, reply. He formally 
welcomed the formation of the Congress and its avowed 
desire for co-operation with the Government, and he 
promised in return that due consideration would be given 
to any communications which the Congress might submit from 
time to time. But he took pain to emphasize that the 
Government's attitude was based on the definite 
understanding that "the Congress was neither seeking 
formal recognition as a political body not claiming to 
represent the views of any but its own members, but wished 
to be regarded as a semi-public organisation interested in 
philanthropic and public affairs"; and that the inclusion 
in its membership of a number of government officials 
must necessarily preclude participation "in any line of 
action likely to bring it into conflict with Government
1. SMIS, No. 64, dune 1939, para 1304, PRO.
FO.407/224 ( Ho. 4, Enclosure 1).
2. J.A. Gillan to British Ambassador Cairo (Despatch 98), 
5-7.1936, PRO, FG.371/21999 (J2919/220/16).
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policy or with constitutional authority."
In this way, Gillan formalised the formation of the 
Congress and gave it the green light to proceed with 
its activities. At the same time, however, by his 
emphasis on the "self-imposed" terms of reference, he 
retained for the Government an effective political stick 
with which to beat the Congress back into line, if it ever 
strayed beyond undesirable limits.
The fug of War Between Moderates and Militants.
The nature of this relationship between Congress and 
the Government was almost immediately put to the test.
In early May, the Government published amendments to the 
Personnel Regulations covering its classified staff, and 
soon thereafter it followed with the publication of 
amendments to the Leave Regulations. Both sets of 
amendments were received with great disappointment, and 
even deep resentment, by the majority of the Sudanese 
officials. The new cadre regulations were seen as 
essentially depriving the Sudanese officials of their 
prospects for promotion and of blocking the way to 
senior posts in government service. Every scale in the
1. "Memorandum on Sudanese Rationalism and the Graduates1 
Congress", loc. cit. For the text of the letter the 
Committee sent to the Civil Secretary, and his relative 
reply, cf. Al-Eil, 11 June 1938; and, J.R.S. Duncan,
The Sudan; A Record of Achievement. (London 1952), 
pp. 190-193.
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new regulations, it was pointed out, had been divided into
a number of categories that were subjected to severe
conditions; the starting rates of pay in most scales had
been lowered, and sub-normal rates of pay had been
introduced to deprive Sudanese officials of substantial
jumps in salaries; and promotions in clerical posts had
been subjected to special tests, in addition to the
required minimum period of service.1 The amendments to
the Leave Regulations increased the leave of Egyptian
officials to sixty days annually or ninety days every
other year, while improving only slightly the leave of
Sudanese officials in Division One by increasing it to
fifty days annually or seventy days every other year.
Sudanese officials who thus benefited from these
amendments were very few in number, while for the majority
2
nothing had been done. In addition, the amendments were
characterised by the paradoxical, and to the Sudanese
unacceptable, contradiction that the leave of a senior
Sudanese official would be fifty days while that of his
3most junior Egyptian subordinate would be sixty days. 
Sudanese officials had expected that, after the Treaty,
Al-IUI, 4 fey 1938 and 25 May 1938. 
2* Al-Kll, 19 May 1938.
3. Al-Nil. 24 May 1938,
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the principle of equal treatment would he applied to all 
government officials and that consequently all regulations 
discriminating between Sudanese and foreign officials 
would be abolished.^
Telegrams of protest against these amendments were
sent to the Executive Committee from nearly all government
departments, urging it to approach the Government with the
view to obtaining better conditions. On 19 May, the
Committee of Sixty discussed the matter and decided to
bring to the notice of the authorities the general
resentment felt at the publication of these amendments,
and to do all they could to obtain better treatment for
2
the Sudanese official. In an effort to encourage a 
favourable government response, Congress spokesmen 
emphasised that acquiescence by the Government to 
Congress’s reasonable demands would never be construed 
by the intelligentsia as a sign of weakness, but rather 
as a further basis for confidence in the Government.
In the days that followed, the Executive Committee 
held several meetings, at which it drew up two notes on 
these amendments, expressing the views of the graduates
1. Al-flll. 23 May 1938.
2- Al-Nll. 22 May 1938.
3. Editorial, Al~Nll. 28 May 1938.
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and the changes they would like to see made to the
respective regulations.1 In the meantime, the
Committee sent a delegation of three Congress members
to initiate personal contact with the Government and to
2
hold informal discussions on the matters in question.
With the atmosphere thus properly prepared, the Committee
3
then submitted its notes to the Government.
Gillanls reply was totally unexpected. His 
liberalism apart, Gillan was not prepared to allow the 
Congress to assume a role as a “trade union" for Sudanese 
civil servants. He was apprehensive that, in the aftermath 
of the 1936 Treaty, and under pressure from impatient 
militants, such a "trade-unionist" Congress might find 
itself in continual conflict with the Government, which 
after all was the largest employer in the country. With 
a view to minimising precisely this potential for conflict, 
Gillan notified the Congress that "in no circumstances 
could the Government allow such matters (i.e. the 
contractual relationship between itself and its officials) 
to be the subject of negotiation or discussion with
1. Al-Nll, 28 May 1933.
2. Statement by Isma^il al-Azhari, AL-Nil. 11 June 1938.
3. Al-Mll, 28 May 1938.
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the Graduates* Congress.1,1 Whether he knew it or not, 
he had adopted a position that was eventually to have a 
profound impact on the evolution of the Congress, and on 
future government policy towards it.
Por the moment, however, his reply marked the start
of a crucial conflict "between the militant and the
moderate elements within the Congress. The Executive
Committee had already come under severe criticism,
particularly from the more militant elements of the
intelligentsia, that it was essentially inactive, in spite
2
of the fact that it held several meetings every week. 
Gillan*s reply did not help matters at all, and a markedly 
depressing mood clouded the Committee. The militants 
launched a campaign against Gillan*s position, arguing 
that the Government*s basis of reasoning was essentially 
discriminatory, overlooked the valid needs of Sudanese 
officials and granted to foreign staff more than they 
deserved. Under such pressure from the militants, the 
Executive Committee took the view that the position of 
Sudanese officials in government service was a matter of
1. "Memorandum on Sudanese Nationalism and the Graduates* 
Congress", loc. cit.
2. Al-Ml. 29 May 1938.
3. Al-Nil. 4 duly 1938; 10 July 1938; 14 July 1938 and 
19 July 1938.
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public interest and not merely a contractual relationship,
and that if this was to be the Government1s attitude
towards their submissions, then Congress might as well
disband altogether.
The majority of Congress members, however, held a
more moderate view. They were no less resentful of the
Government's response but they seriously believed that
the disbandment of the Congress would be a severe loss 
1to the country. They had no illusions that some of
the duties of the Congress were by their nature rather
difficult, and they did not in fact expect the Executive
Committee to achieve success on every matter it undertook
to discuss with the Government. They argued that it was
quite sufficient, in such cases, for the Committee to
submit notes to the authorities concerned and draw their
2attention to the views and interests of the Sudanese.
They sincerely believed that a moderate and sensible 
attitude by Congress would gain increasing co-operation 
from the Government and would thus enable it to reap all
3the political benefits it possibly could at a later date. 
Against the position of their more militant colleagues,
1. Al-Nil. 1 June 1938.
2. Editorial, Al-Nil. 27 June 1938.
3. Editorial, Al-Sudan. 7 June 1938.
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they argued that the Congress should be allowed sufficient 
time to study problems thoroughly and to carry out their 
schemes properly. During this period, all members had a 
duty to support and strengthen the Congress by every means 
possible, remembering that, as the Executive Committee was 
elected for only one year, it could be easily removed at 
the expiration of its term of office if it proved 
unsatisfactory.^*
The agitation of the militants gradually subsided, 
and the Congress continued to occupy itself with its own 
internal organisation. After submitting the constitution 
to the Governor of Khartoum, the Executive Committee drafted 
and distributed the administrative and financial bye-laws 
of the Congress. By early May 1938, it embarked on a 
programme of founding Branch Committees in all the major 
towns throughout the country, including Malakal, Juba and 
Wau in the southern Sudan. The duties of these Branch 
Committees were defined, and they included a number of 
essential tasks: the spread of propaganda for the Congress 
in their respective areas; the collection of subscriptions 
and donations on behalf of the Executive Committee; the 
submission of their own suggestions in regard to matters of 
interest to the Congress; and the execution of instructions
1. Editorial, Al-Nil. 26 June 1938.
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issued "by the Executive Committee in regard to Congress 
1
activities.
On the national level, the Executive Committee set up
four central sub-committees to study matters connected with
education, economic problems, social questions and the
2
publication of a magazine. By the end of May, and in 
connection with the amendments to the Personnel and Leave 
Regulations, a separate sub-committee was set up to deal 
with matters covering the government officials.
The subject that eventually gained top priority and 
mostly preoccupied the Executive Committee was the 
Governments policy on education. The intelligentsia had 
for a long time deplored the lack of adequate school 
facilities to absorb the ever-growing number of Sudanese 
students. They attributed this to what they believed was 
the Government's mistaken assumption that the primary aim 
of Gordon College graduates was to obtain government 
employment —  an assumption which led to a policy of
1. Statement by Ismacil al-Azhari in Al-Nil. 11 June 1938. 
The Branch Committees were elected by local Congress 
members, with the resident members of the Committee
of Sixty being ipso facto members of these Committees. 
Their term of office ended with the Congress's annual 
meeting.
2. Statement by lsmacIl al-Azhari in Al-Nil. 1 May 1938.
3. Editorial, Al-Nil. 30 May 1938.
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linking the admission of new students to the absorbing 
capacity of the civil service. The intelligentsia argued 
against such an assumption, pointing out that the 
general development and progress of the Sudan was essentially
T
dependent on substantial advances in education. The
recommendations of the De La /^arr Commission and of
6Ali Bey al-Qarim were unanimously approved by the graduate
class as measures that would have undoubtedly raised the
standard of education in the Sudan and would have also laid
the foundations of a Sudanese culture, of which they could 
2
be proud. The sending of Sudanese for higher education
abroad was strongly urged as one step in implementing the
Treaty provisions, namely by qualifying Sudanese to fill
3
senior government posts. Simultaneously, the Government 
was alerted that, since the number of senior posts reserved 
for Sudanese was insignificant, higher education should not
4
be mistakenly linked to civil service requirements.
The funds appropriated for education, at that time about
Al--Nll. 8 January 1938; Hadarat al-Sudan. 13 January 
1938; Al-Sudan. 18 January 1938.
2. Editorial, Al-Nil. 4 January 1938. for a summary of the 
report submitted by the De La Warr Commission, cf.
Mohamed Omer Beshir, Educational Development in the 
Sudan. 1899-1956. (Oxford 1969) pp. 110-118.
3. Editorial, Al-Nil. 28 Eebruary 1938.
4. Editorial, Al-Nil. 10 March 1938.
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four percent of the annual budget, were deemed quite 
insufficient to meet educational requirements, and the 
intelligentsia proposed instead that this proportion should
i
be raised to about 15 percent of the annual expenditure.
Such an increase in funds could be arranged, they argued,
by effecting cuts in certain sections of the budget,
particularly by the suppression of subsidies to the
2
missionary societies in the southern Sudan.
The Government’s new plan for educational expansion 
was largely based on the recommendations of the De La W.arr 
Commission, and as such it was gratifyingly welcomed by the 
Sudanese as the realisation of their demands. Certain 
objections were raised, however, the most important of 
which were that the plan did not refer to any industrial 
training, though the Sudan was in need of industrial 
schools; that the funds assigned for educational purposes 
did not reach the proportion required, which ought to 
amount to at least 12 percent of the total expenditure; 
and that the plan should be applied to the whole of the 
Sudan and not be limited to the northern part only, as 
otherwise the latter would progress alone while the former
1. Editorial, Al-Nil, 8 January 1938.
2. Editorial, Al-Nil, 26 July 1938.
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would be left in a primitive state,1 These views were 
eventually incorporated in a Note on Education that the
Executive Committee submitted in 1939 to the Government
2for consideration.
When the second Annual General Meeting of Congress
was held on 31 January 1939, the Executive Committee could
claim* with some justification, a satisfactory record of
achievements on a number of matters. It had obtained formal
Government recognition of, and co-operation with, the
Congress, It began the publication of a magazine as its
official mouthpiece, and expanded its organisational
structure by forming Branch Committees in Wad Medani, Port
Sudan, Dongola, Kassala, Shendi, Juba El Obeid and Abu 
3Hamad, In education, the Government's policy was evolving 
along mutually acceptable lines, and this very fact 
augured for Congress an era of improving relations between
1, Editorials, Al-Nil. 25, 27, 28 and 29 August 1938; 
and 11 October 1938,
2, The full text of the Note is given in M, 0, Beshir, 
Educational Development in the Sudan. App, V, Work
on the Note commenced in April 1938 and was completed 
by June the same year, but discussion on it by the 
Committee of Sixty did not start until the end of
October, The Note was eventually submitted to the 
Government in July 1939,
3* Isma6Il al-Azhari, "The Congress in its Eirsty Year",
Ma.ialat al-M*utamar, No. 2, Eebruary 1939.
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itself and the Government, Certainly Gillan's rejection
of the Committee's initiative to discuss the interests of
Sudanese officials had disappointed the Congress, but it
was still felt that the Government might eventually be
convinced to change its attitude, as it did on education.
The realities of the first year had taught the majority
of Congress members that the road ahead was difficult and
uncertain. Committees would be formed and dissolved;
projects and requests would be submitted, and either rejected
or accepted; men would go and others would replace them;
obstacles would appear and be surmounted or prove 
1
unsurmountable. But Congress, as a living principle, had
to continue its work through all these vicissitudes, and in
the meantime it had to learn how to wait.
The more militant members, however, led by Muhammad 
—  2*Amir Bashir , did not share these views. They believed 
that the Executive Committee should adopt a bolder 
programme of action and a more adamant attitude in pursuit 
of its objectives. Accordingly, a few weeks before the 
annual meeting was held, these militants launched a
1. Editorial, "The Message of the Congress", Ma.ialat 
al-M*utamar. No. 1, January 1939*
2. Muhammad ‘Amir Bashir; Bora 1908; employed in Survey 
Department; actively^engaged in journalism under the 
pseudonym of "al-Eurawi"; translator to Legislative 
Assembly 194S-53*
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campaign deploring the "unsatisfactory" performance of 
the Committee of Sixty and the Executive Committee, and 
called for their replacement by younger men. To enable 
such younger representation on these Committees, the 
militants sought to amend the bye-laws of the Congress 
and to lower the age limit to 24 years. They distributed 
circulars containing the names of "approved" candidates 
for the forthcoming elections and urged the members to 
vote only for them.1
The spirit of discussion in the second General 
Meeting was consequently quite different from that which 
characterised the founding conference of 1938. Almost 
immediately after the report of Isma6Il al-Azhari 
(President for the month), the militants went on the 
offensive. They proposed that the minutes of all the 
meetings held in 1938 should be read by the Secretary, 
in order to identify those who were regular attendants 
and to prevent the re-election of those who showed little 
conscientiousness. But the motion was defeated when it 
was put to the vote. Another proposal, submitted by 
Mubarak Shaddad in connection with the administration of 
the Ma'ahad al-Ilmi. was seized upon by the militants as an 
issue that could be exploited in pursuit of their
1. "Annual Congress Meeting held on 31st January 1939", 
CRO, DAKHLIA (I) 1/11/27.
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objectives. The Sudanese Students* Hnion in Cairo had 
sent a telegram urging the Congress to adopt a resolution 
in favour of the affiliation between the Ma*ahad and the 
Azhar. The militants agitated to have Congress commit 
itself, vis-a-vis the Government, to a formal and public 
resolution of such an affiliation. Congress members 
present were also unanimously in favour of such an
affiliation, but the majority were opposed (from motives
of prudence) to committing the Congress to such a public
resolution. A stormy discussion ensued and the matter
came to a deadlock, Isma*il al-Azhari eventually came to 
the rescue. Arguing, on a point of procedure, he reminded 
the Congress meeting that it was not the function of the 
annual meeting to pass resolutions on specific questions, 
but that this was essentially the task of the Committee 
of Sixty. At the same time, in order to placate the more 
militant elements, he gave assurances that the Committee 
of Sixty had in principle endorsed the proposal of 
affiliation with the Azhar.1 The matter was thus
1. It was not until April 1939 that the Executive Committee 
submitted to the Government a well-worded and 
reasonable memorandum containing recommendations for 
the reform of the Ma* ahad. Although this action was 
marred by the simultaneous publication of the 
memorandum in the local press, it was generally 
regarded as the most concrete and useful thing 
Congress had achieved to that date, and the Government 
indicated its appreciation.
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dropped without being put to the vote.
The militants grew increasingly frustrated at what 
they considered to be an extreme moderation exhibited by 
the majority of the Congress members. Motivated by 
contempt for such an attitude, Ahmad Khayr ironically 
proposed that it might be better for the Congress to adopt 
openly a policy of concentrating its efforts only on social 
reforms and refrain altogether from interfering in matters 
affecting government officials —  an obvious reference to 
the Committee's handling of the amendments to the Personnel 
and Leave Regulations. The proposal brought into question 
the raison d'etre of the Congress. Ahmad Yusif Hashim1 
a staunch nationalist of moderate persuasion, strongly 
opposed the proposal, on the grounds that the adoption of 
such a policy would serve as an argument against the Congress, 
if it ever considered it necessary in future to openly 
interfere in these questions. On this point of policy 
there was general agreement, but the militants insisted 
on knowing what further action was planned by the Executive 
Committee in response to Gillan*s reply. Azhari then
1. Ahmad Yusif Hashim: Born 1905; clerk Qmduraan Shari^a 
court upto 1935£ editor of Al-Nil 1936-1944; editor of 
Al-Sudan al-Jadid; strong critic of the British 
administration and a leader of younger members of 
the intelligentsia; member of Legislative Assembly, 
1948-53.
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stated that, for the time being, the Committee simply 
recorded in their minutes that the question would be 
re-examined at a later date, and he proposed to send a 
notice to this effect to the Government, Not satisfied 
with the way the matter was being handled, the militants 
agitated that Congress should not accept the rejection 
of the Government, and they pressed for a vote to be taken 
on Ahmad Khayr's proposal, seeking to embarrass the 
Executive Committee by forcing the Congress members to 
commit themselves on this major issue. But the moderates 
were not to be so easily outmanoeuvred. They argued instead 
that the constitution had clearly laid down that questions 
of public interest were in fact one of the basic concerns 
of the Congress and that there was, therefore, no need for 
a vote on Ahmad Khayr's proposal which, after all, 
constituted a fundamental departure from the originally 
defined objectives of the Congress. The trick worked, and 
the agitation of the militants was defeated once again.
The general meeting then proceeded to elect the new 
Committee of Sixty, which turned out to be substantially 
the same as the previous one in its political temperament. 
There were altogether 23 new members, 19 of whom were at 
the bottom of the list, where changes were to be expected 
due to the transfer of officials from Khartoum and the 
general preference given for the election of candidates
iio
who were generally stationed in the capital. The campaign
launched by the militants failed to exert any significant
influence on the outcome of the elections, but they derived
some consolation from the fact that two of their leading
members, Muhammad ‘Amir Bashir and Muhammad Hamad al-Nil,* • •" '
managed to get elected to the Committee of Sixty. Isma6il
al-Azhari again topped the poll by a large margin, and he
was thus elected, for the second time, the Secretary of 
1the Committee. In the elections for the new Executive
Committee, the majority of the incumbent members were
re-elected. Among the new members, the most notable were
*Ali al-Birayr and Shaykh Ahmad al-Sayyid al-Eil, both of
whom were ardent Mirghanists, so that their election,
-  —  2coupled with the exit of Muhammad al-Khalifa Sharif and
■z
cAbd al-Munaim Muhammad , gave the Khatmiyya a preponderance 
in the new Executive similar to that enjoyed by the
1. Hamad Tawfiq was elected Assistant Secretary, and 
cAbdallah Mirghani Treasurer.
2. Muhammad al-Khalifa Sharif; Eldest son of the Khalifa 
Sharif (a cousin of the Mahdi) and a nephew of Sayyid
cAbd al-Rahman; employed as a clerk in the Education 
Department.
3.cAbd al-Munaim Muhammad; Prominent merchant and a strong 
supporter of Sayyid cAbd al-Kahman.
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flLahdists in the previous one.1
With the elections over, the Executive Committee settled 
down to a consideration of the major issues that confronted 
the Congress in 1939* Apart from the traditional problem 
of educational expansion, the intelligentsia were 
becoming increasingly concerned over the Government's 
policy in regard to the southern Sudan. They were extremely 
disappointed to observe that the Governor-General *s annual 
report for 1938 did not proposed any changes to this 
highly-controversial policy. Special permits were still 
necessary to obtain entry to the southern provinces, and
2
subsidies continued to be paid to Christian missionaries.
In fact, the Government's policy in the whole field of 
administrative activity was of deep concern to the 
intelligentsia, and the Executive Committee was urged to 
study the Governor-General*a Report carefully and to 
express its views on its contents, particularly in regard 
to the development of local government and the policy of
3
native adminitration. The general feeling was that the
1. There were 5 definite Mirghanists, 3 definite Eahdists, 
and 7 neutrals, of whom several inclined slightly one 
way or the other. The Mahdists were disconcerted at 
the result, seeing in it (especially in Shaykh al-Fil's 
appearance) a calculated Mirghanist drive to influence 
the Congress.
2. Editorial, Al-Sudan. 11 February 1939*
3. Editorial, Al-Nil. 8 February 1939*
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Report contained many points which needed to he amended 
and settled in a way that suited the Sudanese point of 
view, and the Committee was pressed to make these views 
known to, and accepted by, the Government.
The outbreak of the Second World War cut short the 
public activity of the Congress, as the nation concentrated 
all its efforts to encounter the threat of aggression.
The attitude of the Sudanese to the eventuality of war 
had evolved, slowly but surely, ever since the Munich 
agreement in 1936. After that international crisis, the 
intelligentsia became increasingly aware of the fact that 
the destiny of the Sudan was linked to that of the rest 
of the world, and that consequently it would not escape 
catastrophic results in the event of war. The majority 
held the. view, effectively expressed by Muhammad Ahmad 
Mahjub, that whatever the result of a war might be the 
Sudan would still be a loser. For, if Britain won, she 
would be so weakened and impoverished that she would have 
to exploit the Sudan's wealth to the uttermost for her own 
reconstruction; and if she lost the war, the Sudan would be 
considered as booty for the victors and thus inevitably 
suffer the fate of Abyssinia.1
The international crisis thus raised vital questions
Al-Nil* 19 September 1938 and 20 September 1938.
ti3
about the Sudan*s ability to defend itself, and the
intelligentsia called upon the Government to make all the
necessary military preparations to repel any eventual 
1aggression. The prospect of entrusting British and
Egyptian forces stationed in the Sudan with the defense
of the country was not heartily acceptable, for the
intelligentsia feared that special circumstances might
necessitate the despatch of these forces to other
battlefields where they would be more urgently required.
In such an eventuality, what would happen to the Sudan?
The Sudanese preferred to be in a position to defend their
own country.by themselves and they suggested, therefore,
that the Sudan Defense Force be expanded, a military
school be opened, and retired Sudanese officers be
2
re-appointed in the service.
On the question of support for the British and their 
allies, the attitude of the intelligentsia was divided.
The militants advocated that the Sudan should remain neutral 
and let the strongest imperialist country triumph. Other 
nations, they argued, fought to preserve their independence. 
But, as the Sudan was not independent, why should it go to 
war on the side of the Allies? To preserve its subjugation?
1. Editorial, Al-Nil. 5 October 193S.
2. Editorial, Al-Nil, 4 January 1939*
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No country, it was emphasized, would ever throw its men
into the furnace of war without expecting some benefits
from that war. The Sudanese, therefore, should support
the Allies only on the condition that the Government
would no longer ignore their views o:r demand, especially
in regard to public matters.1 They even suggested that
a clause defining the aim of Condominium rule as being
"to train the Sudanese for self-government1 should replace
the existing clause in the Treaty of 1936, which had
defined this objective as being "the welfare of the 
2
Sudanese".
The majority of the intelligentsia, however, favoured 
a policy of open support for the Allied powers. As 
nationalists, they certainly did not approve of the 
subservient political status of the Sudan. There were 
many modifications to this status that they would have 
like to see effected and many internal reforms that they 
desired the Government to carry out. But British imperialism, 
whatever its demerits, was for them far better than 
either Italian or German rule and they feared that, if 
the Sudan ever fell under the control of the latter, it 
would suffer a painfully-long subjection, since it would
1. Al-Nil. 2 April 1939
2. Al-Nil. 16 March 1939.
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be at the mercy of colonial powers that believed in nothing
but brute force. In this respect, they believed that it
would be better for the Sudanese, when the day came for
the nationalist movement to demand independence, to find
themselves facing the British and Egyptians, rather than
X
the Italians and the Germans. For the time being, they
were not allowing either internal questions of detail or
"lofty aspirations" to blind them to the need of clearly
defining their attitude towards the Sudan Government in
hours of danger. They advocated full and active support
for the Allies and they pointed out that, if Britain
emerged victorious, the Sudanese would not dare to demand
anything for their country if they had failed to
2contribute to its defense. They suggested, of course, 
that they were prepared to offer their help and sacrifice 
because they expected to live a new and dignified life 
after the war, but they did not make this a condition 
for their support.
When war broke out, therefore, Congress acted swiftly 
to commit its support and collaboration to the Government. 
In a message to the Governor-General, the Executive 
Committee pledged that "Congress itself is ready and
1. Editorial, Al-Nil. 17 January 1939.
2. Editorial, Al-Sudan. 21 January 1939; also, Al-Nil.
21 January 1939.
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prepared to give any service that can possibly be demanded
of it” in safeguarding the Sudan's vital interests and
restoring world peace.1 At the same time, the Committee
issued an appeal to the Sudanese people, urgir^ support
2
for the Government and the Allied cause.
For Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the outbreak of 
the war brought back reminescences of the first World War, 
and awakened him to the possibility of exploiting the 
situation, just as he had done in 1915, to exact some 
political concessions from the Government. In a private 
conversation with Penney, the Director of Public Security, 
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman raised the question of shura 
(i.e. collective consultation) stating that, in his 
opinion, the time had come for the Government to make a 
start in this direction. What he probably had in mind 
was the formation of an official advisory body, which would 
include members of the Congress as well as other elements 
(like himself, the other sectarian leaders, merchants
1. Letter to the Governor-General, signed by Isma^Il 
al-Azhari, 1.9.1939, quoted in K.D.D, Henderson, The 
Making of the Modern Sudan. (London 1953), P* 116.
2. "Memorandum on Sudanese Rationalism and the Graduates' 
Congress'', loc. cit. Douglas Hewbold had just then 
(August 1939) taken over from Gillan as Civil 
Secretary.
3- SMIS, No. 67, October-Hovember 1939, Appendix I, para 
89, quoted in HQ Troops in Sudan Intelligence Summary. 
Ho. 4, December 1939, para 2, CRO, HALPA 36/1/3*
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and tribal notables), and which would supersede the 
Congress. He must have felt certain that, if the Government 
had acceeded to his proposal, his own prestige would have 
increased tremendously and Mahdist candidates would win 
the Congress elections by a landslide. The Government, 
however, were not quite certain whether his proposal was 
basically anti-Congress or not, and they preferred not 
to take any action on it, lest they antagonised the 
Khatmiyya-dominated Congress at such a critical period. 
Besides, the urgent preoccupation with the war itself left 
the Government little time for embarking on such a major 
project.
Sayyid 4Abd al-Rahman1 s initiative ran parallel to 
the growing restiveness of the militant intelligentsia 
at the Government's continuous refusal to accept the 
principle of collective consultation through the Congress.
As on the eve of the Congress elections of 1939, the 
militants launched a campaign against the existing Congress 
Committees, attacking them for being too moderate and 
submissive to the Government, and demanded instead an 
attitude of more "active" opposition. A body, they argued, 
that merely put forward proposals and did not strive to 
secure their acceptance was not much use as an 
instrument of growing nationalism. What they wanted was 
some kind of nationalist party which would stand in
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political opposition to the Government. ^
The third General Meeting of the Congress, which was 
held on 20 January 1940, was attended by only 250 members, 
and this factor enabled the militants to get a significant
p
number of their members elected to the Committee of Sixty.
Despite such successes, they failed once again in their
objective of securing a more militant representation on the
new Executive Committee, which as a result remained
3fundamentally unchanged.
The Deterioration of Relations with the Government.
The visit of the Egyptian Prime Minister, fAli Mahir 
Pasha, afforded the militants another opportunity to 
challenge the hegemony of the moderates in the Congress. 
When the Governor-General was in Cairo in Hovember 1939, 
he invited*Ali Mahir to visit the Sudan and see something 
of the country for himself. *Ali Mahir accepted the 
invitation and began an intensive campaign, indirectly
1. SMIS. Ho. 68, December 1939, quoted in HQ Troops in 
Sudan Intelligence Summary. Ho. 5, January 1940, 
Part I, para 3, CEO, HALM 36/1/3.
2. SMIS. Ho. 69, January 1940, para 1350, PRO,
PO.371/24633 (J826/826/16).
3. Hamad Tawfiq was elected Secretary, Khidir Hamad 
Assistant Secretary, ^bdallah Mirghani Treasurer, 
and Ibrahim Yusif Sulayman Accountant. Although 
Azhari was removed from the Bureau, he was a member 
of the Executive Committee.
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inspired through the Egyptian press, deliberately designed 
to give the impression that the visit was to he the occasion 
of talks between the Prime Minister and the Governor-General 
on the political questions still outstanding between the 
two countries.1 Discussions, it was alleged, were to 
be undertaken in Khartoum to "regularise the 
administrative jurisdiction", and to arrive at a 
settlement of the Egyptian debt. Conversations were to 
deal also with the preaching of Islam in the south, and with
the extent of the authority of the Egyptian Ministry of
2Defense over the Sudan Defense Force.
Leading Sudanese nationalists were genuinely perturbed 
by these extravagant claims in the Egyptian press, particularly 
at the attack implicit in these claims on the autonomous 
identity of the Sudanese. Sayyid 6Abd al-Rahman expressed 
grave misgivings about the proposed visit and again urged 
the need for the Government to encourage Sudanese nationalism 
as a bulwark against Egyptian claims.^ The general 
feeling among the intelligentsia was also accompanied by 
a mixture of intelligent interest, less intelligent
1. SMIS, Mo. 69, January 1940, para 1351, loc. cit.
2. Director of Public Security to All Governors,
8.2.1940, CRO, PORT SUDA 2/28/176.
5. SMIS. No. 69, para 1349, loc. cit.
120
curiosity and mild enthusiasm, surrounded by a vague 
atmosphere of hope and doubt; Hope that the visit might 
bring some material benefits in the shape of subsidies 
for existing Sudanese establishments; and doubt of Egyptian 
sincerity or seriousness.
The hope of material benefit was amply realised.
Shortly after his arrival, cAli Mahir began to distribute 
donations to various Sudanese social and educational 
institutions, and these were followed by further donations 
throughout the whole period of his visit in the country.1
The Congress looked upon the visit as an opportunity 
to explain its real character and aims to the Egyptians, and 
so convince them that it was not anti-Egyptian but that it 
represented a genuinely local nationalist aspiration that 
deserved sympathy and encouragement. Accordingly, the 
Executive Committee intimated to the Government their 
wish to invite the visitors to a tea-party. The Government 
initially refused to arrange such a party, on the grounds 
that the official programme could not fit any additional 
engagements, but the Committee insisted that, as other 
communities (i.e. British and Egyptians) were given
1* SMIS. Mo. 70, Eebruary-March 1940, para 1357, PRO, 
EO.371/24633 (J1399/826/16). A total sum of about 
6070 Egyptian pounds was distributed in donations 
during the visit.
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the opportunity to entertain the visitors, so also Congress 
(as a representative Sudanese body) should be given the 
same opportunity. This plea was difficult for the 
Government to resist, primarily because it was recognized 
that the educated Sudanese elements had certain claims to 
consideration which it would have been both impolitic and 
unreasonable to disregard. Accordingly, a tea-party was 
arranged under the auspices of the Congress for 21 February.
The affair, which was well-organised and attended by
some one thousand persons, was intended by Congress to be
something of a demonstration. After tea, Nasr al-Haj toi1
• •
(President for the month) delivered a speech which was in 
fact a restatement of the original Congress manifesto, but 
this time addressed to the Egyptians. From the very 
start, the Egyptians had felt unfriendly towards the 
Congress, believing that it had been created by the Sudan 
Government with the aim of resisting Egyptian political 
claims. The genuine Sudanese emphasis on an autonomous 
identity was dismissed by the Egyptians as a disingenuous 
British invention. In answer to these Egyptian suspicions 
and accusations, Sudanese nationalists had written several 
articles in their local press, setting out the aims of
1. Masr al-Haj cAli; Teacher at Gordon College; member of 
the Administrative Conference 1946.
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the Congress, and the Sudanese point of view in general. 
The most important of these efforts was an interview given 
by Isma^il al-Azhari to a correspondent of the Cairo 
newspaper al-Ahram. In this interview, Azhari had 
emphasized that the principal aim of the Congress was to 
substitute national solidarity for tribal separatism, and 
that as between the two Condominium partners the Congress 
was strictly impartial. Other articles by Congress 
spokesmen had appealed to the Egyptians to understand and 
sympathize with the Sudanese desire to develop their own 
nationalism.
At the tea-party in honour of fAli Mahir, N.asr al-Haj 
cAli seized upon the occasion to re-affirm the Congress's 
position. In a clever and carefully-worded statement, he 
made it quite clear that the Sudanese did not regard 
themselves as Egyptians, but that they were a separate and 
autonomous entity, which wished to develop along its own 
lines, though in the closest possible co-operation and 
friendship with Egypt.
The overall effect of the tea-party was far-reaching. 
It restored to the Congress its lost prestige and gained 
for it, in urban circles and in the press, a recognition 
and a distinction it had never enjoyed before. The affair 
also convinced some Egyptians that the Congress was in 
fact the embryo of a genuine Sudanese nationalist
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movement in which Egypt had to take a sympathetic interest 
and which she had to court as a potential ally in the 
pursuit of her claims. The door was thus opened for 
contacts between the Egyptians and the Congress —  contacts 
which were destined to play a very crucial role in 
later years.
Encouraged by the success of the party, and by the 
generosity of the Egyptian largesse, the militants increased 
their pressure on the Executive Committee to submit to 
cAli Eahir a memorandum for financial and social assistance. 
The proposal had originally emanated from the younger men 
on the Committee of Sixty and was basically motivated 
partly by a desire to appeal against the reduction of the 
Egyptian subvention, and partly by a belief that such 
assistance from Egypt would prod the Government into 
outbidding the Egyptians, with the inevitable result that 
the Sudanese would derive the greatest possible benefits 
from both.1 The proposal had become the subject of 
informal discussions ever since the general elections in 
January, but the Executive Committee doubted the wisdom
1. The Egyptian subvention of 312500 pounds to the Sudan 
Government was reduced to 62500 for 1940, and ceased 
altogether in 1941. Cf. Report on the Administration 
of the Sudan for the Years 1959 to 1941. (Cmd 8097),
H.M* Stationery Office, London 1950, p. 22.
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of such an action and had opposed it from the start. The 
case of the militants, however, had become increasingly 
stronger by every donation that &Li Mahir made, and at a 
subsequent meeting of the Sixty, on 25 February 1940, the 
moderates opposing the proposal finally found themselves 
in a minority* The motion to submit the memorandum to 
eAli Mahir was thereby approved.
At this juncture, reports of the proposal reached the 
Government, who naturally regarded a direct approach to 
the Egyptian Government, over the head of the Governor- 
General, as being clearly and uncompromisingly 
"unconstitutional". On the same evening, Newbold1 delivered 
a friendly but categorical warning to the Congress 
Secretary, pointing out the seriousness of the step 
contemplated and making it clear that, if it were taken, 
the Government would reconsider its attitude and might even 
withdraw the recognition accorded to the Congress movement 
on the basis of its foundation manifesto. In addition, 
Newbold arranged for an urgent meeting on the following day, 
at which it was his intention to re-emphasize to the 
Executive Committee the warning he had delivered the
1, Douglas Newbold; Joined Sudan Political Service 1920; 
District service 1920-32; Governor Kordofan 1933-8; 
Deputy Civil Secretary 1938-9; Civil Secretary 1939-45; 
Died in Khartoum March 1945.
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evening before.
The militants interpreted Newbold's warning both as
a challenge and as confirmation of their belief that the
British were literaly scared of the prospect of Egyptian
support for the Congress. Accordingly, they pressured
the Executive Committee to go ahead with the submission of
the memorandum. The moderates, apprehensive of the
implications in Newbold’s warning, tried to resist but they
eventually retreated in the face of accusations that their
opposition was dictated by fear of the Government. They
did not yield unconditionally however. Under their
pressure, the form of address and the contents of the
memorandum were revised in such a way that the requests
embodied in it became in themselves largely innocuous.
Even so, four or five members of the Executive Committee
stood out firmly against the proposal and one of them,
1Mirghani Hamza, actually resigned.
1, The requests were six in all; financial help for the 
Piastre Orphanage; financial help for the Ma*ahad. on 
the basis of the recommendations contained in the 
Congress’s Note submitted in April 1939; the sending 
of Egyptian Muslim preachers for missionary and 
educational activity in the southern Sudan; the setting 
up of an Arabic library; the establishment of a hospital 
in Omdurman, to be staffed with specialists and doctors; 
and the provision of Egyptian capital for commercial 
and agricultural enterprise in the Sudan. For the full 
text of_the memorandum in Arabic, cf. Ahmad Khayr,
Kifah Jil. (Cairo 1948) pp. 209-218.
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On the morning of 26 February, Newbold learned that
the memorandum had already been sent by the hand of a
special courier, Ma^ani Muhammad Hasan, to be delivered
• •
to cAli Mahir at Gordon's Tree* Although he was extremely
disappointed at what appeared to him a fait accompli. he
decided nevertheless to hold the scheduled meeting and to
use the opportunity to convey to the Congress representatives,
1in no uncertain terms, the Government's displeasure.
The Congress representatives argued that the memorandum 
had been addressed, not to the Egyptian Government or to 
the Egyptian Premier in his official capacity, but to the 
"Egyptian, people" through *Ali Mahir as its distinguished 
personal representative; that the submissions it contained 
were merely requests for private financial assistance and 
had no administrative or political significance; and that, 
in this sense therefore, they believed that their action 
was essentially innocuous. In reply, Newbold informed them 
that, while he was prepared to believe that they had 
intended no deliberate disloyalty to the Condominium 
Government, there was no getting away from the fact that 
they had been guilty of a serious political and tactical 
indiscretion, and that they had done so in spite of the
1. The Congress representatives were Nasr al-Haj cAli_ 
(President), Hamad Tawflq (Secretary), Muhammad Salih 
al-Shinqiti (member of the Executive Committee).
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warning they had received. He deplored the fact that 
Congress was organised on a basis which permitted intelligent 
moderate opinion to be "swamped" by the political thought­
lessness of its militant members. The damage, however, 
had been done, and he proposed that on another occasion he 
would inform them of the action the Government would take 
in connection with this matter.
The defeat of the more moderate elements of the 
Congress over the issue was attributed by Newbold to the 
composition and functioning of the Committee of Sixty.
He believed that, in the absence of a deposit system and 
a qualifying minimum figure, any "inexperienced and 
irresponsible" person could manage to secure election to 
the Committee on no more than ten votes at times when there 
was a small attendance at the general elections.1 
Furthermore, he felt that the Committee of Sixty met much 
too often and this factor enabled it to interfere constantly 
with the "calmer deliberations and wiser decisions" of the 
Executive Committee. This meant that although the moderates 
might be prepared to take a "proper attitude" on a major 
issue, they still lacked the ability to defend it
1. Newbold to Mirghani Hamza, 20.2.1940 (?), in
Henderson, on. cit.. p. 134. There is apparently some 
mistake as regards the date of this letter, since the 
memorandum was submitted on 26 February.
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effectively against militant opposition in a joint session.
In addition to this, Newbold felt, the determination of the 
moderates was weakened by the fact that they were genuinely 
anxious to avoid a breach with the militants which might 
force the latter into an undesirable and independent 
opposition.
In these circumstances, therefore, Newbold was convinced 
that the time had come for the Government to put political 
pressure on the Congress with the view to achieving two 
vital objectives. Firstly, the Government had to emphasize, 
in the strongest possible terms, the seriousness of the 
Committee's action in submitting the memorandum to cAli 
Mahir, and in so doing discourage any prospect of a 
similar repetition in the future. Secondly, the 
position of the moderates within the Congress had to be 
strengthened, so that irresponsible action by the militants 
would henceforth be minimised. At the same time, Newbold 
was quite conscious that such Government pressure had to be 
so gauged as to avoid either creating unnecessary political 
martyrs or polarising irrevocably Congress opinion, which 
could create indirectly a militant nucleus in opposition to, 
and uncontrollable by, the moderates. He appreciated the 
fact that Congress had not yet acquired either a mature 
political sense or an understanding of proper procedure, 
and he therefore felt that its vagaries at this stage,
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though they might require correction, were not of such 
importance as to justify extreme measures by the 
Government*"*"
In the meantime, the Executive Committee had debated 
the desirability of sending a deputation to the Governor- 
General with a view to giving him formal assurances of the 
Congress*s good faith. But some of the members, led by 
Hamad Tawfiq, were already growing impatient with what 
they regarded as undue restriction on the Congress’s 
activities by the Government, and they took the position 
that their representatives had fully explained their 
attitude and that it was now for the Government to take 
such action as it thought fit. In the face of such 
opposition, the idea of a deputation was accordingly 
dropped altogether.
After a few weeks, during which period he gauged
public reaction to the issue, Newbold held another round
2
of discussions with Congress representatives. He pointed 
out to them that some actions of the Congress appeared to 
be in conflict with their professions of loyalty and that
1. SMIS, No. 70, I’ebruary-March 1940, para 1357-xi, 
loc. cit.
2. The meeting was held on 27 March and the Congress 
representatives consisted of Nasr al—Hirj cAli, Hamad 
Tawfiq, Muhammad Salih al—Shinqiji ancl *Abd al-lYLajid 
Ahmad.
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these actions indicated a line of policy which, if pursued, 
could destroy the mutual confidence which should govern 
the Congress’s relations with the Government, He did not 
disregard the possibility that such actions might have been 
influenced primarily by a desire to advertise the Congress 
or to exert pressure on the Government but he warned that, 
whatever their motivation, the course to which the Committee 
had rather thoughtlessly committed themselves might 
ultimately lead to a situation in which members of Congress, 
who were also government officials, would find themselves 
compromised or in a conflict of loyalties. He assured 
them that he was anxious that such a situation should not 
arise, as otherwise the only course open to the Government 
might be to compel its officials to withdraw from 
Congress membership and, if need be, dissolve the Congress 
altogether* He suggested, therefore, that government 
officials (like themselves) who formed by far the most 
influential elements in the Congress should take immediate 
and effective steps to forestall the adoption of an 
ambiguous line of policy which would lead to the 
frustration of their own, and the Government’s good 
intentions. The first step to be taken in this regard, 
he emphasized, was to review the organisation of the 
Congress itself.
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Newbold*s political pressure on the Congress came at 
a time when it could have had little effective result.
The fortunes of war in Europe were already beginning to 
modify, in a significant measure, the attitude of the 
various sections of the Sudanese urban community. The 
Norwegian setback, followed by the collapse of Holland, 
Belgium and France, strengthened the militants* growing 
belief in Germany's apparent invincibility, and 
correspondingly weakened the moderates* conviction of the 
Allies1 ability to win even an ultimate victory. A 
feeling of satisfaction at the discomfiture of Britain 
had thus pervaded the militant intelligentsia, as well as 
other urban semi-literate groups who, being less 
politically conscious, had therefore no ideology or 
political aspirations that conflicted with the 
Fascist creed.1
While Sudanese public opinion swayed and staggered 
under the shock of war events in Europe, Italy entered the 
war on the side of Germany. On 11 June 1940, the day after 
Italy's declaration of war, the Governor-General assembled 
at the Palace 21 leading Sudanese personalities, including
1. SMIS. No. 71, April 1940, para 1365, PRO, EQ.371/24633 
(J1399/826/16). In. an attempt to counter the effects 
of Axis radio propaganda, the Sudan Government 
commenced at this time its own propaganda broadcasts 
from a radio transmitter available in Omdurman.
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the three sectarian leaders and representatives of the 
Graduates* Congress.1 He communicated to them personally 
the texts of a proclamation and a message to the Sudanese 
people in connection with Italy's entry into the war.
There were no formal speeches in reply to his words, hut 
the three sectarian leaders expressed in emphatic terms 
their support for the Allied cause. Speaking in a 
Churchill style, Sharif Yusif al-Hindi proclaimed his 
readiness to fight the Italians wherever he might sight 
them —  on the river hanks, in the desert and in the hills. 
Sayyid °Ahd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, in less impassioned though 
equally emphatic manner, repeated the assurances he had so 
often given before that he and his followers were ready to 
do whatever might he asked of them in the defense of the 
country and its existing Government. SayyidcAli al-Mirghani, 
in conformity with his characteristic attitude, was the 
least vigorous and most non-committal of all. He confined 
himself to merely saying that there could he no doubt of
benefits enjoyed by the Sudanese under the existing
2
Government or of their loyalty to it. After the meeting,
1. Civil Secretary's Monthly Letter, 8.6.1940, in 
Henderson, on. cit.. p. 151.
2. SMIS. Ho. 72, May-June-July 1940, para 1374, PRO, 
FO.371/24633 (J2048/826/16).
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Mirghani Hamza and Muhammad Salih al-Shinqlti personally 
assured Newbold that the educated class, including the 
militants, "would drop all criticism and sink any 
differences" in a co-operative effort to defeat the 
Italians.'1'
The Governments inclusion of three Congress members 
among the group of Sudanese leaders that gathered at the 
Palace was received with an uninhibited sense of gratification 
by the Congress. Articles appeared in the local press 
expressing deep appreciation of this mark of recognition 
accorded to the Congress as an active element in the life 
of the country, and declaring the Congressrs readiness to 
co-operate with the Government in all measures required by 
the emergency of the war.
Spurred by this apparent raperochement« the Executive 
Committee addressed a letter to Newbold on 15 June, 
expressing the wish of the Congress to communicate with the 
"people of the Sudan” with the object of giving them such 
advice and guidance as might be required to bear the 
grave conditions through which the country was then passing. 
Attached to the letter was the first of these proposed 
messages with a request that the Congress might be allowed
1. Civil Secretaryrs Monthly letter, 8.6.1940, loc. cit.
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1to broadcast it from Omdurman.
The message was admirable in sentiment and substance, 
being essentially an exhortation to the people to remain 
calm and steadfast, to have complete confidence in the 
Government and to display the qualities of patience, 
endurance and fortitude for which the Arabs had always been 
famous. But the addressing of it to "the Sudanese people" 
was considered by Newbold as definitely presumptious, 
implying an arrogation of status and influence to which 
Congress was not entitled, and which could have offended 
other elements in the country. Besides, the proposed use 
of the broadcasting station by private or semi-private 
bodies like the Congress was regarded by Newbold as an 
undesirable precedent, which could open the door to 
such requests by others (e.g. Sayyid 6Abd al-Rahman) —  
requests that would have been extremely difficult to refuse 
with any valid justification. Newbold therefore explained 
his objections to Hamad Tawflq, the Congress Secretary, 
and he suggested instead a different procedure, whereby 
the message would be addressed to the "members and friends 
of the Congress", published in the local press and then 
quoted in the ordinary news bulletin broadcast from 
Omdurman. The suggestion was accepted, and the message
1. SMIS. No. 72, para 1376, loc. cit.
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was duly published and broadcast in the news bulletin.
The Italian invasion from Abyssinia in July 1940, and 
the subsequent occupation of Kassala, Galabat and Kurmuk, 
had shaken public morale in the Sudan. The Sudanese had 
expected rapid British successes against the Italians, and 
it was therefore particularly alarming for them to see the 
Italians occupy Sudanese territory. For a few days, there 
was something approaching panic among the population. The 
belief rapidly spread that the Italian attack was a large- 
scale invasion, and that nothing could stop it. The 
Government tried to explain that it had all along been the 
official plan to evacuate these territories in the face of 
an attack with superior forces, but the Sudanese were 
reluctant to accept such an explanation. They had already 
heard similar explanations about "strategic retreats to 
prepared positions" in connection with the battles in 
Belgium and France.
Within this atmosphere of uncertainty, Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman became extremely worried about what might 
happen if the British were, even temporarily, turned 
out by the Italians. He was genuinely apprehensive that 
Sayyid cAli al-Mirghani would enjoy, through his connection 
with the Eritrean branch of the Khatmiyya, considerable 
influence with the Italians, and would thus be in a 
position to destroy him and Mahdist influence in the Sudan.
136
Consequently, he inspired some Mahdist members of the 
Congress to solicit the support of the militants in an 
attempt to set up a National Front. The objective of the 
movement was to bring the two Sayyids and other elements 
(such as tribal leaders and urban notables) into a 
closer relationship with the Congress, and so form a 
National Committee to represent the Sudan at this 
critical time.
The idea of a National Front was welcomed by the
militants, who had been trying for some time and by various
means to enlarge the basis of the Congress and to convert
it openly into a political assembly working for the
realisation of Sudanese aspirations. But the move was
rejected by Sayyid 6Ali and the Mirghanists, who argued that
there were no "political" leaders in the Sudan and that
religious leaders could have nothing to do with the Congress
or National Fronts.1 Sayyid6Ali had grown increasingly
disappointed with the intelligentsia, in view of the
desertion of several of his former followers among the
graduates to the Mahdist camp. He had decided, as early
as January 1940, to turn his attention to organising his
2
followers on the lines of a coloured-shirt movement.
SMIS, No. 73, August-September 1940, para 1385, FRO, 
FO.371/24633 (J2048/826/16).
2. SMIS. No. 70, para 1355, loc. cit.
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Detachments of Mirghanists were accordingly drilled by
Mirghanist ex-sargeants, and they were paraded regularly
through the streets of Khartoum and Omdurman, chanting
slogans in praise of Sayyid cAli and against his opponents.
From May onwards, sectarian feeling in both Mirghanist
and Mahdist circles ran very high* and eventually Sayyid
fcAbd al-Rahman was provoked to start a similar movement of
his own. The Government, however, soon intervened and
pressured the Sayyids into stopping such activities; but
the experience had already resulted in estraging the two
Sayyids even further and accentuating the rivalry between
the two sects. Without the support of the Mirghanists
within the Congress, the attempt to set up a National
Front thus ended in failure.
In such an atmosphere, the conflict between the moderates
and the militants in the Congress became increasingly and
inevitably fused with the Mirghanist-Mahdist rivalry.
Shaykh Ahmad al-Sayyid al-Fil and Mirghani Hamza, led the
Mirghanist-moderate alliance; while SayyidcAbdullahi
al-Fadll1 and Ahmad Tusif Hashim led the Mahdist-militant 
* »
coalition. Any Congress issue was therefore bound to be 
treated out of proportion and out of proper perspective.
1. Sayyid cAbdullahi al-Fadilt Son of al-Fadil (son of the 
Mahdi) and nephew of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman; active 
member of the Graduates* Congress.
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The conflict came to a head in August 1940. When 
the Government decided to extend the broadcasting service 
and include in it a programme of general cultural talks, 
Congress was informally invited to co-operate with the 
broadcasting organisation in drawing up this programme.
After demurring a little to this method of informal approach, 
the Executive Committee waived the question of procedure 
and decided to accept the invitation, delegating four members 
to join the broadcasting organisation in a consultative 
capacity. The Committee of Sixty, however, disapproved of 
the action taken by the Executive Committee, on the grounds 
that the decision had been taken without reference to the 
Sixty and that the Congress should have not consented to 
co-operate except in return for the right to broadcast 
talks in its own name.
A crisis followed. The Executive Committee was 
defeated in a vote of censure in the Sixty and, on 31 August, 
its members resigned.1 A new Committee was elected, on 
which none of the retiring members consented to serve, 
except for Israacil al-Azhari. By August 1940, Azhari 
was emerging as the unofficial leader of the younger 
militant nationalists. His first contact with them
1. Civil Secretaryls Monthly Letter, 3*9.1940, in 
Henderson, op. cit.. p. 164*
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dated back to 1931 when, as a teacher at Gordon College, 
he had indirectly encouraged the students to continue 
their strike. But, at a time when nationalist sentiment 
expressed itself through literary activities, his 
profession as a mathematician robbed him of political 
limelight. The situation began to change after 1937 
with the founding of the Graduates' Congress. His 
election in 1938 and 1939 as General Secretary on the 
Executive Committee pushed him to the foreground of 
nationalist activity and his post as teacher at Gordon 
College brought him into daily contact with the young 
militants. Together with Ahmad Khayr, who joined the 
College in 1940 as a law student, Azhari took an active 
part in the efforts to establish a National Front.
Thus, when the conflict over the broadcasting issue 
occured in August, Azhari had already been predisposed 
toward militant action.
The refusal of moderates to serve on the new 
Executive Committee presented the militants with the 
rare opportunity to take over the control of the 
Congress. The system of rotational presidency was 
abolished and Azhari was elected President for the 
remainder of' the session. The new Committee then 
conveyed to the Government its desire to continue its 
co-operation in the broadcasting service, but made it a
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condition of this co-operation that Congress should he 
allowed to broadcast talks on social questions in its own 
name. The Government naturally refused to accept this 
condition, and the Congress withdrew its participation in 
the broadcasing service.
With themselves now in control of the Executive 
Committee, the militants began a determined effort to 
convert the Congress into a political assembly. They 
sought to make it more representative from within, by 
getting the largest possible number of Sudanese to join it 
as individuals. At the same time, they hoped to widen the 
base of their support by extending the franchise beyond 
the proper limits of the graduate class, so as to include 
all "enlightened" urban elements, particularly the merchant 
class which was not envisaged by the original title of. 
"Graduates* Congress". They adopted a national anthem 
and a national flag, and they emphasized quite strongly 
that the Congress represented "the whole of the Sudanese 
people".1
Newbold had known all along that the ultimate long­
term objective of the Congress was political, but he had 
hoped that the moderate elements would manage to keep
1. "Memorandum on Sudanese Nationalism and the Graduates' 
Congress", loc. cit.; also, Civil Secretary's Monthly 
Letter, 15.10.1940, in Henderson, op. cit.. p. 176.
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the political aspect latent and not raise it for a long 
time. The defeat of the moderates and the new activity of 
the militants had turned the political aspect into the main 
and immediate objective of the Congress. Furthermore, with 
the militants firmly in control, his efforts to get the 
Congress re-organised in favour of the moderates were thus 
unexpectedly and totally neutralised. He realised that, 
for the time being, there was little he could do other than 
to warn the militants off the newly-adopted political 
trend."1*
Newbold was by then beginning to become sceptical
about the state of the Congress itself. The absence of a
number of senior and distinguished graduates on its
Executive Committee, and the lack of any co-operation
between Mahdists and Mirghanists within the Congress, had
destroyed any appearance of national unity. In the
circumstance, he felt, the Congress could not justifiably
claim either to have a mandate from the majority of the
educated class, or even to represent a unity among the
2graduates, transcending sectarian partisanship.
SMIS, No. 73, para 1389, loc. cit.
2. Ibid, para 1388. The Governments argument was based on 
the fact that out of some 5000 graduates throughout the 
country, only about 550 were Congress subscribers in 1940, 
out of whom 250 attended the Third Annual General Meeting 
in January. Seen from this angle, Congress was not 
considered to be representative of the graduate class 
as a whole.
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Believing that the time was ripe to administer an 
official check to the militants' activities, Newhold 
summoned Azhari to his office and handed him a lettep, 
dated 30 October 1940, which dealt comprehensively with 
the situation. In his letter, Newbold traced the events of 
the previous few months and reminded Azhari of the danger 
the Congress ran of forcing the Government to instruct its 
officials to withdraw from membership of the Congress, if 
not to dissolve it altogether. He also pointed out that 
the Committee's attitude over broadcasting and similar 
matters could not have been calculated to win the sympathy 
of the Government, and that their claims to represent the 
whole nation "were not only ridiculous but constituted also 
a fundamental departure from the original manifesto of 
the Congress", upon which the promise of the Government's 
sympathetic treatment had been based. He concluded by 
emphasizing that the Government was in fact far from being 
unsympathetic towards the growth of a national consciousness 
among the Sudanese, but that it could only regard the 
Congress, in spite of frequent advice, as having departed 
in spirit and letter from its constitution and that, as a 
consequence, the Government would have no other choice but
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to withdraw its sympathy,
Newbold*s letter created sharp divisions of opinion
among the Congress members. The militants were naturally
in full support of the Executive Committee*s policies,
but the moderates and the Mirghanists accused it of
having blundered and having placed the Congress in an
embarrassing position. The Mahdists found themselves in
a difficult situation; They certainly needed the support
of the militants in their struggle against the Mirghanist-
moderate alliance; but at the same time they did not want
to place themselves, or the Congress, in a conflict with
the Government. Besides, the annual elections were only
a few weeks away and something had to be done to stabilise
the situation and neutralise the criticism of the opposition.
Accordingly, and under heavy pressure from the Mahdists,
the Executive Committee arranged an interview with Newbold,
with the object of removing Government misapprehensions
and preventing any further deterioration in the relations
2between the Congress and the Government.
At this interview, held on 6 December, Azhari assured 
Newbold that the Congress had no desire whatsoever to come
1. SPIS, No. 1, October-November 1940, PRO, PO.371/27382 
IJl/l/16); also, "Memorandum on Sudanese Nationalism 
and the Graduates* Congress", loc. cit.
2. SPIS, No. 2, December 1940, PRO, PO.371/27382
TJ171/16).
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into conflict with the Government, and he expressed the 
hope that the latter on its part would continue to look on 
the Congress with confidence and sympathy, Newbold sensed 
immediately that he had struct a sensitive chord, and he 
promptly seized the opportunity to increase his pressure on 
the Congress. He emphasized that they could certainly count 
on the Government's sympathy so long as they tried to put 
their house in order, and that they could count on enjoying 
its confidence once they had done so. Azhari, on the other 
hand, made no firm commitment to review the organisation 
of the Congress, but simply affirmed in general terms the 
Congress's intentions to co-operate with the Government 
and its readiness to do the utmost to retain the latter*s 
support and sympathy.
The Mahdist Ascendancy in the Congress.
With the situation thus temporarily stabilised, both 
the Mahdists and the militants turned their attention to 
the forthcoming elections and geared up for their respective 
campaigns. At the fourth General Meeting, held on 
9 January 1941, the militants made a concerted effort to 
amend the bye-laws of the Congress by introducing age and 
other qualifications, in the hope of electing a higher
14 S
1
percentage of their members to both Committees, Their 
campaign, however, was unwelcomed by the other factions in 
the Congress. The moderates were definitely not prepared 
to allow the Congress to fall under the control of what 
they regarded as "irresponsible hotheads", an event that 
would have compromised even further its relations with the 
Government. The Mlrghanists, who honestly believed that 
the militants were crypto-Mahdists, were likewise strongly 
opposed to measures that would have strengthened Mahdist 
influence in the Congress. The opposition of the Mahdists 
to the proposed amendments was based on a combination of 
two motives. On the one hand, they shared with the 
moderates the apprehension of a strong militant lobby 
in the Sixty that could lead to a conflict with the 
Government; on the other hand, they were unwilling to 
extend the franchise to the merchant class, as they 
believed that this class was solidly pro-Mirghanist, and 
their inclusion in the Congress would have tilted the 
balance of power in favour of their rivals. As a result 
of this joint opposition, the campaign of the militants
1. SPIS, Ho. 3, January 1941, PRO, FO.371/27382
(Jl/l/l6). The number of attendants was 473 and of
subscribers 1083, nearly double that of 1940. This 
was due partly to an increased interest in the Congress 
and partly to the reduction of the subscription fee 
from 30 piastres to 10 piastres.
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to amend the bye-laws was defeated and the Sixty were 
elected on the old basis.
The Mahdists, who had canvassed vigorously and lavishly 
for days beforehand, secured a handsome majority of 44 seats 
in the Committee of Sixty, and the newly-elected members of 
the Executive Committee were, therefore, almost entirely 
Mahdists, with only one or two being neutral.1 The 
greater majority of them were from the older and more 
respectable members of the graduate class, a factor which 
encouraged the Government to look more favourably on the 
Committee. Isma^Il al-Azhari was re-elected again 
President for the year.
The new Executive Committee was determined to make a 
success of its term of office, no doubt believing that in 
so doing they would lay the foundation of continued Mahdist 
predominance in the Congress. Since overt political 
activity was precluded for the time being, the Committee 
focussed its attention to the social questions of major 
public interest. The burning issue at the time was 
education and the annual crisis, resulting from the failure 
of a large number of boys to gain admission to government 
schools, was then at its height. The Mahdists knew that
1. Ibid. The only two Mirghanists elected to the
Executive Committee had resigned and were replaced by 
pro-Mahdist elements.
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high value was placed by the Sudanese on education, and 
they immediately realised that they would gain enormous 
prestige if they tackled this problem effectively. They 
devised therefore a scheme, which came to be known as the 
"Education Day Festival1*, according to which the Muslim 
new year day would be set aside each year for the purpose 
of collecting public donations in aid of education.
The scheme was implemented almost immediately. Having 
missed the Muslim new year day for 1941, the Committee 
fixed on 28 February as a substitute to launch the scheme. 
They obtained the permission of the authorities to make 
such collections, and they then convened a meeting of some 
100 leading merchants and notables of the capital, 
representing both sects, to discuss the details of the 
project.1 In the meeting, a number of suggestions were 
put forward for raising the required funds: that the 
Government should tax every Sudanese one piastre per year; 
that a surcharge on telegrams and railway policies be 
imposed; that merchants should levy a small sum. on every 
purchase made in their shops; and so forth. But no 
agreement could be reached and the meeting broke up 
in some confusion.
1. SPIS. Ho. 4, February 1941, PRO, H>.371/27382
13171/16).
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The Mahdists, however, did not despair, and they sought 
instead to raise the funds by appealing for voluntary 
contributions from prosperous citizens and business firms. 
Sayyid 6Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdl, the real patron of the 
scheme, led off with a donation of 500 pounds, and this was 
followed by substantial contributions from a number of 
Sudanese and foreign trading firms. Encouraged by these 
initial responses, the Executive Committee addressed a 
circular letter to a large number of individuals of all 
nationalities throughout the country, informing them of 
the project and soliciting their contributions. By 
28 February, some 2500 pounds had been collected as a 
fund for the scheme.
In the meantime, the Mirghanist camp became enviously 
apprehensive at the growing prestige of Mahdists within the 
Congress, and to a lesser degree among the urban populations 
as a whole. When the Executive Committee called on Sayyid 
4Ali al-Mirghani to solicit his support and assistance, he 
responded only with an evasive promise that he would let 
them know his decision at a later date, and he instructed 
his followers instead to sabotage the scheme by spreading 
insidious propaganda against it. The scheme, however, 
commanded widespread support, and the Mirghanist campaign 
was severely criticised by the majority of the graduates 
and the public at large. As a result of their obstructive
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behaviour, Sayyid *Ali and other leading Mirghanists became 
increasingly isolated from the mainstream of moderate 
support, especially within the Congress.
The second issue of importance confronting the 
Congress was the subject of co-operation with the 
Government. The Mahdists traditionally believed that a 
policy of co-operation was undoubtedly more beneficial, and 
wiser, than one of aloof co-existence. Soon after the 
elections were over, the Mahdists began a cautious and low- 
keyed approach to restore relations with the Government.
In private conversations with senior British officials, some 
members of the Executive Committee intimated that they were 
prepared to resume participation in the broadcasting service 
and on the original Government terns. But apparently the 
details of a face-saving formula had still not been worked 
out and the Committee did not follow up these suggestions 
with any immediate official action.
By March 1941, the successful offensive against the 
Italian invasion and the re-occupation of Sudanese territory 
had removed the threat of an Italian conquest of the Sudan. 
The British administration was once again firmly seated on 
the saddle, and its prestige had increased enormously in 
the public view. The Mahdists realised, therefore, that 
a restoration of good relations with the Government would 
inevitably enhance the prestige of Congress itself, and
15 0
may even shed some of the limelight on its Mahdist members. 
With the need for a National Front fading, the Mahdists felt 
less constrained to initiate a bolder attempt to resume 
Congress's participation in the broadcasting service.
A meeting was, therefore, arranged between Congress 
representatives and the Broadcasting Officer to devise a 
formula acceptable to both sides. The Congress representa­
tives argued that they could not approach the Committee of 
Sixty without having some new cause, however slight, on 
which to base a move for a reconsideration of the ban.
They agreed with the principle that Congress should not 
broadcast talks in its own name, and they accepted the 
original offer that Congress should select four advisory 
members to form, with four of the broadcasting staff, a 
committee to supervise the cultural side of the programmes. 
They insisted, however, that a notice to this effect be 
published in the press and broadcast from the studio.
On its part, the Government was prepared to make some small 
concession. Congress pronouncements on matters of social 
importance or reform would be broadcast over the radio, 
provided they had first been broadcast as ordinary items 
in the news bulletin^, and they could be followed by an 
explanatory talk on the matter after the bulletin by one 
of the four Congress members of the Broadcasting Committee, 
speaking in his personal capacity. But the Government
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attached certain conditions to such a scheme; that such
pronouncements would have to be a reasonably rare occurence;
that they should be passed by the Broadcasting Officer as
suitable news items for broadcast; and that the subjects of
1pronouncement should be commendable to the Government.
The formula was accepted unanimously by the Executive 
Committee, but it did not have such an easy passage in the 
Committee of Sixty. The opposition, composed mainly of 
the Mirghanists, put up a fight based entirely on personal 
and sectarian motives, but in the end the scheme was approved 
with only five dissenting votes.
The decision to resume participation provided the 
occasion for the seven Mirghanist members of the Committee 
of Sixty to resign. Their action was not essentially anti- 
Government, but it was prompted by the underlying conflict 
between the Mirghanists and the Mahdists, and by the painful 
realisation that they could have little influence in the 
formulation of Congress policies. With their resignation, 
they wanted to expose the Congress for what it had actually 
become —  a purely Mahdist body, at least as far as its 
Committees were concerned.
The stabilisation of relations between the Congress 
and the Government left the Executive Committee free to
1. SPIS. Mo. 7, June 1941, PRO, K>.371/27582 (Jl/l/16).
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concentrate on other social matters. Committees were
formed to deal with a number of specific subjects, two of
which had special political implications. One was a
committee set up to study labour matters and it had drawn
1
up a scheme for “organising the lives of the workers". 
However, it was not clear to the Government whether the 
scheme was merely one of social welfare or whether it was 
intended to be in some way political, and consequently the 
attempts by Congress to publicise its activities in the 
local press and on the radio were stopped. The other 
Committee was concerned with a study of affairs of the 
southern Sudan, but again the Government imposed a ban 
on all discussions in the local press of the political 
aspects involved in its Southern Policy.
Despite such setbacks and a growing dissention from 
the militants, Mahdist influence continued to increase 
and Sayyid ^ Abd al-Rahman emerged once again as the patron 
of the intelligentsia and a powerful leader of the country. 
At the fifth general elections of the Congress, held in 
December 1941, the Mahdists won again a resounding victory, 
thereby retaining their control of both Committees in the
1. SPIS. Ho. 9, August 1941, PRO, FO.371/27382 (Jl/1/16).
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Congress*1 Isma^il al-Azhari, who had increasingly
associated himself with the militants and assumed their
2
leadership, was replaced by Ibrahim Ahmad Ibrahim as 
President for the new term, probably in an attempt to 
maintain a more stable and balanced political overtone in 
the Congress’s activities, cAwa& Satti , who headed the 
poll for the Executive Committee elections, became the
Secretary, Khidir Hamad the Assistant Secretary, and
— — 4Ibrahim Xusif Sulayman the Treasurer, With such
individuals on the Bureau of the Executive Committee, 
the Government felt relieved that the spirit of 
moderation had finally returned to the Congress, and that 
1942 would prove to be a year of fruitful co-operation.
1. wMemorandum on Sudanese Nationalism and the Graduates* 
Congress”, loc. cit. The total number of subscribing 
members stood at 1390, of whom some 464 attended the 
general elections in December 1941.
2. Ibrahim Ahmad Ibrahim; Engineer, taught at Gordon 
College and was eventually made Students* Warden in 
1945; Vice-Principal Khartoum University 1950; member 
of Om&urman Town Council 1938-44; President of the 
Graduates* Congress 1942 and 1944; member of Khartoum 
Town Council 1944; Minister of Finance 1956; 
subsequently became a banker.
3. °Awad Satti; Teacher at Gordon College.
4. Khartoum Province Monthly Diary. July 1940, para 14, 
CEO, CXVSEC 57/15/56.
The Congress Memorandum of 1942.
The lull on the surface, however, was concealing a 
growing discontent, not only among the graduate class, 
hut also among significant sections of the population 
as a whole, particularly in urban areas. The outbreak 
of the war in September 1939 heralded an era of economic 
hardships for the Sudan. In 1938 and 1939, the Sudanese 
economy was going through a recession. With the bogey of 
the international situation taking on a more menacing 
aspect, the export trade of the Sudan was adversely 
affected, in spite of the comparatively low prices ruling 
at that time. Stocks of export produce accumulated while 
the availability of cash declined simultaneously —  a 
factor which inevitably also affected movement in internal 
trade and led to a decline in the import of consumer 
goods. When war broke out, and as the sources of supply 
in Europe and maritime communications became uncertain, 
the merchant class dealing in the import trade sensed a 
golden opportunity to make enormous profits from the sale 
of their goods in the black market. Accordingly, 
the prices of imported commodities soared sharply, and 
the Government responded promptly by introducing emergency 
legislation to control the prices and supply of consumer
15 5
goods.1 The Department of Economics and Trade fixed the 
prices of certain foodstuffs and other main commodities at 
the level ruling during August 1939- At the same time, 
the export of groundnuts, millet, sesame and maize was 
prohibited, and the export of cattle and sheep was made 
subject to permits from the Government.
The wholesale merchants reacted by refusing to sell 
their goods except on a cash basis and, since there was
4
already a lack^cash liquidity, the effect was to bring 
about an acute shortage of goods in retail stores, and this 
in turn encouraged what the Government sought to avoid in 
the first place —  a brisk black market trade. The entry 
of Italy into the war in 1940 and of Japan in 1941 cut off 
the supply of Abyssinian coffee, Japanese textiles and 
Australian wheat flour, thereby leading to further 
increases in the prices of these commodities.
The export trade of the Sudan during this period did 
not fare any better. The closure of sea traffic through 
Port Sudan and the lack of orders for Sudanese produce 
from abroad affected the export trade considerably. By 
April 1940, the export merchants began to complain more 
loudly of the continued stagnation in the trade, and: they
Khartoum Province Monthly Diary, September 1939, 
para 14, CRO, CIVSEC 57/9/36,
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sought to make their voices heard through the Sudan
1
Chamber of Commerce. The Italian invasion of eastern Sudan 
had upset grain cultivation in that area and, in order to 
stave off famine in that region after the re-occupation in 
January 1941, the Government began to purchase grain from 
other provinces (particularly the White Nile Province) for 
distribution to the population in the affected areas.
In addition, the commitment of Sudanese resources to the war 
effort led the Government into huge purchases of grain and 
meat for British forces in the Middle East. By autumn 1941, 
the trade in grain began to improve, but the Governments 
policy of fixing a maximum for grain prices came under 
increasing criticism from traders and cultivators, who 
looked on it as an obstacle to lucrative profits. The 
Governments main objective in fixing grain prices was to 
prevent speculation and hoarding of produce by the traders, 
and to discourage the growth of a black market in what 
consituted the staple food of the population. However, 
in the absence of provincial government purchasing centres, 
the traders were able to use these fixed prices as levers 
against the cultivators, and they were thereby able to 
purchase grain at levels much lower than the prices fixed 
by the Government, In the meantime, the cultivators
1* Khartoum Province Monthly Diary, July 1940, para 14, 
CRO, CIVSEC 57/13/49.
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themselves needed the liquid cash to purchase the other 
necessities of life and they were therefore forced to sell 
at such lower prices. Accordingly, at a time when imported 
consumer goods, as well as such other local commodities as 
milk and meat, were being sold at exhorbitant prices in an 
uncontrollable black market, the Governments policy of 
restricting grain prices inevitably generated an increasingly 
hostile opposition both from the traders and the 
cultivators.
The lot of Sudanese government officials was the
hardest hit of all. Living in urban areas, where they did
not have their own little "vegetable gardens11, they bought
their daily needs from the market, mostly at ruling black
market prices. The cost of living had increased by about
150 percent, since September 1939, and the salaries of
Sudanese officials were consequently insufficient to make 
1
ends meet. They had petitioned the Government for a 
war allowance to supplement their earnings, but they 
received no positive response, except some assurances that 
the matter was under due consideration. A deep sense of
1. According to Newbold, by September 1941 "the budget of 
the Sudanese man-in-the-street has proved that food is 
67% of his expenditure and clothing 17$n, which left 
little for transport and other necessary expenses.
Gf. Newbold to Margery Perham, 6.9*1941, in Henderson, 
op. cit., p. 224.
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discontent, therefore, pervaded the graduate class as a 
whole.
It was against this background of general discontent 
that the Gongress submitted a memorandum to the Government 
in April 1942. Since the declaration of the Atlantic 
Charter, the intelligentsia had become increasingly 
encouraged by what appeared to them Britain's official 
recognition of the principle that all nations had the right 
*to choose the form of government under which they will 
live”. The incorporation, by reference, of the Atlantic 
Charter in the Declaration of the United Nations in January 
1942 had confirmed to the intelligentsia that this principle 
had now become fundamentally accepted worldwide, and that in 
effect it promised self-government and independence after 
the war. They were elated at this "reward” for their 
support of the "democratic countries”.
The status of the Sudan, however, was of a. special 
nature, and the nationalists realised all too well that 
they had to get a similar commitment from JSgypt, whose 
attitude to the war in general, and to the Sudan in 
particular, was unsatisfactory and uncertain. The occasion 
to obtain such a commitment presented itself in March 1942 
when the Government decided to send Sudanese troops to fight 
on the side of British forces in Libya. In an interview 
with Penney, Ibrahim Ahmad pointed out that the Governments
IBB
decision had nothing to do with the defense of the Sudan, 
and that in any case why should, the Sudanese defend Egypt 
while the Egyptians did nothing to defend themselves?1 
He left no doubt whatever that the Sudanese nationalists 
intended to exploit politically this decision to the 
maximum possible advantage.
The offensive of the nationalists was not long delayed. 
They began by hammering at the fact that, although Sudanese 
were being used to fight for democracy, the Condominium 
partners had so far made no concessions to Sudanese 
aspirations, and they suggested to the Sudanese officers 
that they should demand a Government declaration on future 
policy before setting out for Libya. Sayyid *Abd al-Hahman's 
position, though more diplomatically expressed, was essen­
tially identical. In private conversations with senior British 
officials, he emphasized that the Sudanese would certainly 
demand "a big advance towards a democratic government as 
their reward". But he went one step further and prodded 
British sensitivities. There would certainly be resentment 
against the Egyptians, he argued, and some of this 
resentment would fall on the British for putting the 
Egyptian half of the Condominium yoke on the Sudanese neck.
1. SB I S., No. 17, April-lay-June 1942, para 144, CBO, 
POET SUDAN 2/19/133.
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He warned, in the most emphatic terms, that this resentment
might he greatly intensified if, after the war, Egypt
claimed greater privileges in the Sudan as a reward
1
“for not joining the Axis powers.” He was, in fact,
suggesting to the Government that this was the hest
opportunity for the British to drive a permanent wedge
between the Sudanese and the Egyptians and that in such a
move they would enjoy the solid support of the Sudanese
nationalists. Alternatively, failure to satisfy Sudanese
aspirations would inevitably turn these nationalists into
2a hostile and militant opposition to the Government.
The announcement that Sir Stafford Cripps would stop 
over in Khartoum on his way back from India, presented the 
Congress with an excellent opportunity to obtain their 
desired commitment from both Britain and Egypt regarding 
Sudanese independence after the war. A sub-committee, 
consisting of Isma^Il al-Azhari, *Abd al-Halim Muhammad, 
cAbdallah Mirghani and Ahmad Khayr, hastily prepared a 
memorandum in draft form, which was later endorsed by
1. Ibid.
2. Sayyid 6Ali al-Mirghani, characteristically enough, 
made no comment on this subject, and neither did any of 
his lieutenants.
3. cAbd al-Halim Muhammad: Doctor in the Sudan Medical 
Service; leading member of the Ea.ir group, and later 
of the Qawmiyyin party.
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both Committees of the Congress*1 A delegation, consisting 
of Ibrahim Ahmad, Ibrahim€Uthman and Ahmad Yusif Hashim,
then consulted the sectarian leaders and solicited their
— 2support. Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman gave his consent outright.
But Sayyid *Ali al-Mirghani was more sceptical of the 
Government's response, particularly of the Egyptian 
consent, and he stated in a non-committal way that, if 
the Congress felt they must submit it, then they should 
do so. He was no doubt pleased at the prospect that, 
if the Government rejected the memorandum, Congress and 
Mahdist influence might suffer considerably throughout 
the country.
On 3 April 1942, and encouraged by the widespread
support for the memorandum, the Executive Committee submitted
it to the Governor-General. The Memorandum contained the
3following demands:
(l) The issue, on the first possible opportunity, 
by the British and Egyptian Governments, of a joint 
declaration, granting the Sudan, in its geographical
1. SPIS, Ho. 17, para 140, loc. cit.
2. SPIS, Ho. 19, August-September 1942, para 157, CRQ, 
PORT SUDAN 2/19/133.
3. President of the Graduates* General Congress to the 
Governor-General of the Sudan, 3*4.1942, PRO,
EO. 371/31587 (<12664/1528/16); also, Muddathir fiAbd 
al-Rahim, on. cit., pp. 127-^ 8.
lea
boundaries, the right of self-determination, directly 
after the war; this right to be safeguarded by 
guarantees assuring full liberty of expression in 
connection therewith; as well as guarantees assuring 
the Sudanese the right of determining their natural 
rights with Egypt in a special agreement between the 
Egyptian and Sudanese nations.
(2) The formation of a representative body of 
Sudanese to approve the budget and the ordinances.
(3) The formation of a Higher Educational Council, 
composed of a Sudanese majority, and the devoting of
a minimum of 12 percent of the budget for education.
(4) The separation of the judiciary from the 
Executive.
(5) The abolition of ordinances on. closed areas, 
and the lifting of restrictions placed on trade and 
on the movements of the Sudanese within the Sudan,
(6) The promulgation of legislation defining 
Sudanese nationality.
(7) The stopping of immigration, except within the 
limits agreed upon in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.
(8) The termination of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate contract at its expiration.
(9) The carrying out of the principle of the 
welfare of the Sudanese and their priority to Government 
posts as follows
(a) By giving the Sudanese an opportunity to share
effectively in ruling the country; this is 
to be attained by the appointment of 
Sudanese in posts of political responsibility, 
in all the main branches of the Government.
(b) By limiting the appointments to Government
posts to Sudanese.
As regards posts for which it is necessary to 
appoint non-Sudanese, they shall be filled with persons 
serving on definite term contracts; in the meantime 
Sudanese to be trained to fill the posts at the 
expiration of the contract.
(10) The Sudanese to be enabled to exploit the 
commercial, agricultural and industrial resources of 
the country.
(11) The promulgation of an ordinance imposing on 
companies and commercial firms the obligation of 
reserving a reasonable proportion of their posts for 
the Sudanese.
(12) The cancellation of subventions to missionary 
schools and unification of syllabus in the Northern 
and Southern Sudan.
16 3
The primary objective of the Memorandum was to 
request for the Sudan the status of independence after the 
war, and the Congress hoped that it would be given to 
Sir Stafford Cripps for transmission to the British and 
the Egyptian Governments. If the Memorandum had contained 
only a carefully-worded expression of the Sudanese desire 
for independence, Newbold*s response might have probably 
been somewhat different, and subsequent political events 
in the Sudan might have consequently followed a different 
course altogether. Most of the demands were already known 
to the Government, as they had been repeatedly ventilated 
in the local press, and they had apparently not been 
considered serious enough to prompt the curse of Government 
reaction in the past. But this time, the official nature 
of the Memorandum placedthe combination of these demands 
in quite a different perspective, clearly implying a formal 
condemnation of existing, and sometimes controversial, 
administrative policies.
One such policy was that concerning the southern Sudan. 
The intelligentsia had opposed, from the start, the 
restrictions laid on the entry of northern Sudanese into the 
southern provinces, and they were especially apprehensive 
that Christian missionary activities in the area would 
eventually create a Christian minority which would pose
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serious problems of national integration, additional to 
that of tribalism.1 Congressls attempt to ventilate the 
issue in the autumn of 1941 were stopped by the Government 
with a ban on discussions of the Southern Policy in the 
local press, and it was therefore a painful disappointment 
for Newbold to see this issue formally raised again in 
the Congress Memorandum.
The other policy, on which the Government was
particularly sensitive, was the pace in the Sudanisation of
government posts. There was a general consensus of opinion
among the intelligentsia that this pace was unjustifiably
slow. The number of Sudanese officials promoted to higher
posts was considered to be insignificantly small, and the
quality of the promotion itself was regarded as being far
from satisfactory or complete. The Sudanese replacement,
it was argued, was not given either the grade or the salary
of his British predecessor, although he was believed to be
2
performing the same work. After 1940, as the cost of 
living soared, the Sudanese officials became more conscious 
of the inadequacy of their earnings, and the disparity in 
grades and salaries between them and foreign officials 
came under increasingly hostile attack. The Government's
1* Al-Nil. 18 October 1938; Al-Sudan. 1. April and 14 June 
1938.
2. Editorial, Al-Nil, 12 January 1938.
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policy of recruiting British or Egyptian personnel to fill
posts for which "qualified" Sudanese could not he found
was criticised as prejudicial to the prior rights of the
Sudanese, and it was recommended instead that either the
Government should appoint Sudanese who held degrees from
foreign universities, or should appoint expatriates on the
basis of short-term contracts, after which they would be
replaced by trained Sudanese,1 Such measures, it was
argued, would save the Sudan valuable sums of money in the
future, which would otherwise be paid out in pensions to
colonial officials. As the war progressed and many British
officials were temporarily recruited for military service
abroad, Sudanese officials expected to replace them in their
posts, and they were therefore extremely disappointed when
this did not occur and when British women, resident in the
country, were instead recruited temporarily into the
2government service. Within this perspective, the
1. AI-Nil. 26 February 1938; 9 May 1938; and 16 June 1942.
2. By the end of 1940, approximately 220 British officials 
(i.e. one in five of the total adult British male 
civilian population in the Sudan) had been released 
from the civil service for the war. The demands for 
more releases increased and Newbold was forced to 
complain that the "Sudan has bled itself, especially the 
Political Service and the Syndicate, to supply them,
but we are now drying up, and we must maintain some 
facade of Government and essential services here."
Cf. Henderson, on. Git.. pp. 175 and 187.
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intelligentsia grew increasingly bitter, and a number of 
them in fact accused the Government of being unfaithful 
to the provisions of the 1936 Treaty and of unduly 
delaying the promotion of Sudanese officials in the civil 
service. In support of their criticism, they pointed out 
that the promotion of Sudanese officials to higher posts, 
which began after 1936, had proceeded in such a slow pace 
that by 1942 only eight percent of the posts in Division 
One were in fact occupied by Sudanese. They urged the 
Government to proceed more rapidly with the promotion of 
Sudanese officials, and they emphasized repeatedly that 
such promotions should be accompanied with the concomitant 
political power and responsibility that would enable these 
officials to participate in the confidential decision-making 
processes of the Government."1 By the eve of the Congress 
Memorandum, therefore, relations between British and 
Sudanese officials had already begun to be clouded with 
an atmosphere of suspicion and resentment.
The Governmentts view on the pace of Sudanisation was 
essentially different from that held by the intelligentsia. 
The general outlines of this policy were laid down by
Al—Milt 16 June 1942 and 20 June 1942; 
also, Al-M’utamar, 4 July 1942.
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Gillan in the Northern Governors1 Meeting in February 1939. 
The role of Sudanese sub-inspectors in the administrative 
machinery had created a big cleavage in the Governors1 
opinion. One group believed that the appointment of a 
permanent cadre of Sudanese sub-inspectors would inevitably 
result in an Anglo-Sudanese Political Service. The sub­
inspector, they argued, was the lowest rung of the 
administrative service ladder, and pressure would eventually 
be put on the Government for his admission to higher 
administrative posts. There were no guarantees whatever 
that such pressures could be successfully resisted. 
Therefore, they believed that Government policy should aim 
at getting the intelligentsia into local government units,
and not at encouraging them on the rival course of the
X
Political Service. In opposition to this view, another 
group advocated that Government policy should proceed, 
deliberately and carefully, with the substitution of some 
British personnel by educated Sudanese of proven 
administrative talent, and they assured their dissident 
colleagues that such substitutions did not constitute the 
"bogey" of a Sudanese Political Service. Gillan drew a 
distinction between the political and administrative parts
1* This group consisted of P. Ingleson (Governor Darfur), 
M.W. Parr (Governor Equatoria), B. Kennedy-Cooke 
(Governor Kassala), and C.L. Armstrong (Governor 
Khartoum).
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of government service, and he envisaged the Sudanese sub- 
inspector as playing an integral part in the administrative 
machine without being a part of the Political Service. He 
expected the sub-inspectors to serve initially as the link 
between the central government and the local government 
units and eventually, as the role of the British Governor 
was gradually transformed into that of a Resident or 
Political Advisor, these sub-inspectors were expected to 
become Deputy Governors.'1' It was still not clear to the 
British authorities what form the evolution of government 
would finally take in the Sudan, but in one thing they were 
all agreed: The Sudan would not emulate the native
administration system of other countries (like Nigeria), 
but would evolve instead along its own lines, pursuing 
the solution of its own peculiar problems within a system 
of local government units. In this regard, therefore, 
the fate of the Sudanese sub-inspector was linked to the 
development of local government, and the pace of expanding 
their numbers (and by inference, the pace of promoting 
more Sudanese to these posts) was consequently determined
1. "Record of Discussion: Item 4"» Minutes of Northern 
Governors1 Meeting (1959). GRO, DARFUR 1/13/73.
This group included J.A. Gillan (Civil Secretary),
D. Newbold (Deputy Civil Secretary), R.C. Mayall 
(Governor Blue Nile), C.W. Cox (Director of Education), 
M.. Lush (Governor Northern), and E. Campbell 
(Governor Kordofan).
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by the pace of development in local government.
When Newbold succeeded Gillan in the autumn of 1939,
he inherited the extremely difficult task of devising a
system of local government for the Sudan. The absence of
models which could be adapted to Sudanese conditions
dictated that he should proceed slowly and cautiously along
this path, and his pace was further retarted by his
1
subsequent preoccupation with the war. The Government*s
original design was to channel pressures for the promotion
of Sudanese officials into a horizontal direction, by
expanding the class of sub-inspectors, but the slow pace
in the development of local government inevitably diverted
these ever-mounting pressures into a vertical direction.
Newbold was apparently aware of this, and a few days
before the Memorandum was submitted he urged that the
Government should
"start now clarifying and intensifying our 
plans for (i) local government (ii) Sudanese 
dilution of the British cadre which means the 
proper use and after-care of Higher School 
graduates and (iii) Sudanese association with 
Central Government. I am preparing a note 
on all this and will send you a copy. I am 
sure itrs wrong to retard education or self- 
government in the colonies, because of the 
War. It's the worst kind of propaganda; 
rather we should accelerate it. Plain acts
1. Newbold to Margery Perham, 6.9*1941, in Henderson, 
op. cit.. p. 228.
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and facts carry the day with the educated 
classes who distrust vague post-dated pledges.
We are still In the Golden Age in the Sudan 
with no communal problems (as India), no racial 
problems (as Palestine), no settlers (as Kenya), 
no poor whites (as S. Africa) no slums or 
trade unions (as W. Africa). So we should act 
while we still have time and not 1
wait for internal or external pressure."
Although the Congress Memorandum actually made no 
explicit reference to the pace of Sudanisation, Newbold was 
probably influenced by circumstances to interpret the 
document essentially in such terms. Whatever his sympathies 
for the aspirations of the intelligentsia, he clearly 
felt that the time was not opportune for a formal 
commitment on the major issues involved. Firstly, with the 
German threat looming in North Africa, he was convinced that 
it was indeed impolitic to antagonise the Egyptians by 
forwarding to them a demand for the independence of the 
Sudan. The scenario of the 1924 disturbances inevitably 
came to mind. He probably feared, as did Huddleston2, 
that pro-Egyptian interests might respond by submitting 
rival petitions, which in turn might be followed by 
political demonstrations and counter-demonstrations.
1. Newbold to Mayall, 9-2,1942, in Henderson, 
op. cit.. p. 233-
2, Sir Hubert Huddleston; Officer Commanding British Army 
units in the Sudan; became Commander-in-Chief of Sudan 
Defence Force 1925-1940; Governor—General of the 
Sudan 1940-47; left the Sudan 1947.
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He must have hence felt that an ounce of political 
prevention was worth a pound of military cure. Secondly, 
Newbold believed that the Memorandum was the product 
mainly of the militant elements in the Congress, who were 
hoping to exploit recent British setbacks in the Far East 
and North Africa to extract political concessions and who 
had thus "stampeded” the Executive Committee into 
submitting it.."*' He decided, therefore, to discourage 
any further adventures along this line by "beating" the 
Congress back onto a non-political path.
On 29 April, despite verbal assurances by at least one 
of the drafters that the Memorandum did not mean what it 
literally stated, Newbold returned it to Congress with a 
stiff reply, pointing out that the political status of the 
Sudan was based on the Condominium Agreement of 1899 and 
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, and that as such it 
could not be altered except by a joint act of the 
Condominium powers, at which time responsible Sudanese 
opinion would be consulted. He castigated the Congress 
for persisting in the claim to represent all the Sudanese 
and in its attempts to turn itself into a political national 
body. As in October 1940, he brandished his political
1. "Memorandum on Sudanese Nationalism and the Graduates1 
Congress", op. cit.
17 2
stick and advised the Committee that, by submitting the 
Memorandum, Congress had forfeited the confidence and 
co-operation of the Government. He did not conceal his 
displeasure at the fact that they had disregarded his 
suggestion to review the organisation of the Congress, and 
he stated unequivocably that there "can be no restoration 
of that confidence until the Congress has so reorganised 
the direction of its affairs that the Government can rely 
on having its wishes respected and. its warnings observed.
He concluded by affirming that the Government, and not the 
Congress, would determine the pace of political development 
in the country.
In a move probably designed to isolate the militants 
in the Congress, Newbold instructed all the Governors and 
Heads of Department not to discuss the contents of the 
Memorandum, in any way whatsoever, with any Sudanese 
officials or notables. Even those demands, which by 
themselves might have been unobjectionable, were to be 
regarded as contaminated so long as they were associated 
with the Memorandum, and as such they were not to be 
discussed. He advised them to make it absolutely clear
1. Civil Secretary to President Graduates* General
Congress, 29.4.1942, PRO, FO.371/31587 (J2664/1528/16).; 
also, in Henderson, op. cit.. pp 542-3*
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that Congress had forfeited the Government's confidence, 
and that the onus was now on the Congress to show their 
good faith by so amending their constitution and 
reorganising their machinery that a repetition of such an 
incident would he impossible. Furthermore, in order to 
restore the Government's confidence, the Congress was 
expected to drop any claim to be the mouthpiece of the 
whole country; to ensure that their future communications 
to the Government would represent the considered views of 
the majority of their members, and not merely of a caucus 
of the Committee; and to show an intention to confine 
their representations to the Government only to internal 
administrative and social issues, except where those issues 
had been the subject of specific agreements with other 
governments.’*'
Congress was extremely surprised and severely shaken 
by Newbold*s rebuff, particularly by the announcement that 
it had lost the Government's confidence. The return of 
the Memorandum itself was considered, by Sudanese standards, 
as a most serious political insult. For some time, 
confusion reigned in Congress circles. The majority were 
in favour of replying to Newbold*s letter, but they were
1. Civil Secretary's Circular to All Governors and Heads 
of Department, PRO, K>.371/31587 (J2664/1528/16).
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divided as to what form the reply should take. Some 
urged an apologetic explanation, others a defiant comeback, 
while a small minority advocated some practical 
demonstration of protest such as a strike. Finally, a 
reply was drafted and delivered to Newbold on 12 May 1942.1
In this letter, Ibrahim Ahmad stated that certain
clauses in the Memorandum had been misunderstood by the
Government. The Congress recognised the fact that the
political status and constitution of the Sudan was
determined by the Condominium powers. Therefore,
"when we asked for the right of self- 
determination after the war our object was 
merely to reserve to our country the rights 
guaranteed to all people by the Atlantic 
Charter and the pledges of the Democratic 
leaders. We were not oblivious, however, 
when we made that demand, to the detailed 
elaboration which its fulfilment might 
involve, and which might well have been 
made the subject of discussion. Nor were 
we unaware of the fact that it was not in 
the power of the Sudan Government to take 
a decision on this point, or to make 
promises either in the name of the g
two Condominium partners or in its own name."
In view of the above, Ibrahim Ahmad stressed that the
Memorandum should have been forwarded by the Government to
SPISt No. 17, para 140, loc. cit.
2, President Graduates' General Congress to Governor- 
General (through the Civil Secretary), 12.5.1942,
PRO, FO. 371/31587 C.J4388/1528/16); also, in Henderson, 
op. cit., pp. 543-546.
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the Condominium partners and support it by its testimony 
as "to the standard attained by this people under its 
orderly supervision".
In regard to the reorganisation of the Congress,
Ibrahim Ahmad raised the Congress's own political stick.
The war, he argued, had divided the world into two camps 
struggling for world domination. In this struggle, the 
Sudan "has taken up an attitude involving moral and material 
sacrifices, and is playing its part in order to secure a 
place in the new era. All these things must inevitably 
modify a people's attitude towards life and towards its 
rights. They must prompt every individual and everybody 
in every country to think along new lines, and this new 
thought in its turn necessitates a modification in existing 
arrangements.” The spirit and objectives of the Congress 
were inevitably affected by such modifications, and the 
terms of reference, specified in Gillan's letter of May 
1933, could therefore no longer be applicable. Such being 
the case, the Congress did not expect the Government to 
meet this natural manifestation of Sudanese aspirations 
with a withdrawal of its confidence, "so long as the methods 
adopted by /^ongress7 in putting forward the demands of the 
country did not go beyond legitimate means"; not did it 
expect that the restoration of that confidence would be 
made dependent on "undefined and unintelligible conditions11'.
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Ibrahim Ahmad reaffirmed that, in the absence of any other
representative body, the Congress expressed public opinion
in the country and that it would not abdicate that position
in spite of the Government's tendency to "monopolise the
right to decide /Sudan/ affairs". He pointed out that the
Government had rejected all the demands contained in the
Memorandum, when it could have confined its rejection to
some demands, and discussed the form and substance of the
others. In an apparent attempt to initiate a discussion
on the Memorandum, he reaffirmed the demands and expressed
the hope that nothing would "prevent understanding
concerning those demands if the country’s welfare is the 
1
common object."
The way was thus opened for negotiation on the contents
of the Memorandum, and Congress spokesmen moved swiftly
to clarify the position of the intelligentsia. In the
Memorandum, they argued, the Sudanese were merely putting
forward their point of view and expressing certain hopes
which they had cherished for a long time with occasional 
2doubts. However, if the Sudan had not yet achieved 
the necessary qualifications for complete independence, it 
was then quite idle for the Sudanese to speculate on the
1. Ibid.
Al-M’utamar, 9 May 1942.
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political status of the Sudan after the war, and they would 
therefore he prepared to confine themselves to discussions 
on purely local matters, like education and greater 
responsibilities for Sudanese officials.1 In addition, 
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman made every effort to ensure that the 
Government became fully aware of the serious view that the 
intelligentsia took of the matter. In a number of private 
discussions with senior British officials, he indirectly 
defended the Congress point of view, and he expressed his 
appreciation that, if autonomous Sudanese nationalism was 
not encouraged, many Sudanese nationalists might, against 
their better judgement, throw themselves into the arms 
of Egypt.2
Newbold must have realised that he had probably 
over-reacted to the submission of the Memorandum. He had, 
however, already committed the Government to a position 
from which he could not easily retract without strengthening 
the hand of the militants in the Congress —  the very thing 
he had so anxiously sought to avoid. He wanted to restate 
the Gase, partly in an attempt to prevent a final breach
1. Editorial, Al-Nil. 21 May 1942.
2. SPIS, No. 17, para 136, loc. cit. It is interesting to 
note that Mirghanist quarters accused SayyidcAbd 
al-Rahman of having engineered the Memorandum and of 
using his influence to win for Congress the support of 
tribal chiefs.
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with the Congress and also partly in an effort to regain
the support of the moderate elements within the Congress.
Accordingly, in a letter dated 16 June, he reaffirmed the
Government*© position on the Memorandum and declared that,
despite new tendencies of thought deriving from the war,
the Government would not modify its attitude to the Congress
as described in Gillan*s letter. The fact that Congress
was the only organised body of educated Sudanese did not
"give it a monopoly of representation, or advice, or
wisdom". The Government
"has never restricted its consultation with 
the Sudanese to one particular organisation, 
or any one group of individuals, and intends 
to continue to consult the Sudanese, whether 
educated or uneducated, individually or 
corporately, as widely as it wishes with a. 
view to a full understanding of the needs 
and. wishes of all classes, who, as His 
Excellency is well aware, have given loyal 
and valuable assistance in men, money and 
effort to the defense of the 
Sudan and the prosecution of the war."
While thus denying to Congress the role of sole mouthpiece
of the Sudanese nation, Wewbold nevertheless indirectly
confirmed the Government*s readiness to continue
consultations with the Congress in carrying out the
"numerous measures for the further development of the
Sudan whether political, social or economic." But he.
1. Civil Secretary to Congress President, 16.6.1942, PRO, 
EO.371/31587 (J4388/1528/16); also, Henderson, 
op. cit., pp. 546-547.
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then committed an unfortunate tactical error. He delivered 
an unequivocal warning that, if the Congress persisted in 
its assuming a political role, the Government "will have 
no choice but to forbid its officials to become or to remain 
members of the Graduates1 Congress" —  a warning that made 
it extremely difficult for the moderates to manoeuvre for 
a rapprochement without appearing to yield to Government 
threats.
On. 20 June, in an effort to ensure that there would be
no misunderstanding again, Newbold arranged for Penney to
hold a private discussion with Ibrahim Ahmad on the Civil
Secretary's letter.'*' Penney stated that, while the
Government's two letters meant precisely what they said and
stood as a statement of the Government's attitude, they did
not infer any innate hostility to the Congress, nor did
they close the door to a restoration of confidence and
co-operation. He emphasized that there was nothing in the
situation, from the Government's viewpoint at least, that
would warrant any hasty and irrevocable action by the
Congress, or by individual members of it, that could likely
2
lead to a complete rapture.
1. Newbold to Mayall, 21.6.1942, in Henderson, 
op. cit.. p. 245.
2. SPIS, No. 17, para 140, loc. cit.
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The moderates, however, on. whom Newbold pinned his
hopes to salvage the situation, were already losing their
leverage in the Congress. Developments in the country had
been already strengthening the hand of the militants. On
25 May 1942, the Government announced details of the long-
awaited war allowance to Sudanese officials, but the latter
were bitterly disappointed and resentfully criticised it
1as being totally unsatisfactory. The militants in
particular, both within the Committee of Sixty and
outside it, agitated vigorously for the rejection of
2
the allowance as a sign of protest. At the peak of 
this agitation, the Government also announced that, due 
to increasing pressure of work resulting from the war, it 
had decided not to exercise the option to retire British 
officials on their attaining the age of 50, except for 
medical or other serious reasons; and that, failing the 
adequate supply of qualified young Sudanese, the Government
1. Al-Nil. 28 May 1942; Sawt al-Sudan. 28 May 1942, and 
Al-Mfutamar, 30 May 1942. The Government's programme 
provided an allowance of 30 piastres a month to a 
person whose pay was 3 pounds or less (i.e. 10$ or more 
for this salaried group); 50 piastres to those paid over
3 pounds upto 6.50 pounds (i.e. 7.7$ to 14$; and 70 
piastres to those paid over 6.5 pounds upto 17 pounds 
(i.e. 10$ to 4$). The Sudanese reaction was summed up 
i*1 Al-Nil*s cynical.statement: "The mountain laboured 
and gave birth to a mouse."
2- SBIS. No. 17, para 143, loc. cit.
181
had decided to re-engage some of the already-pensioned 
British officials.'1' This announcement flared up 
widespread criticism of the Government for not choosing 
instead either to promote competent Sudanese to higher posts 
or to employ Sudanese with a university education from 
abroad. The militants agitated in several provinces for the 
support of local government leaders, cultivators and 
merchants and, in view of the growing dissatisfaction 
resulting from the deteriorating economic situation, their 
efforts met the encouraging responses.
In such circumstances, the verbal assurances given by
Penney were considered by the Executive Committee as
insufficient to satisfy the Committee of Sixty, and
Ibrahim Ahmad therefore asked for a written record of the
conversation. This was refused, on the grounds that an
informal and discursive conversation of this nature could
not properly be committed to writing, and instead Penney
addressed a personal letter to him, explaining clearly
2what his objective had been in arranging the meeting.
1. In 1942, 114 officials of different nationalities 
(38$ British, 38$ Sudanese and 24$ other) reached 
retirement age. Of these, 73 were retained (40$ 
British, 40$ Sudanese and 20$ others), and the 
remaining 41 were retired. _Cf. "Government 
Communique Wo. 13% in Al-Nil. 28 May 1942.
2- SPIS. No. 18, July 1942, para 150, CEO, 
PORT SUDAN. 2/19/133-
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The Executive Committee, however, were again not 
satisfied with this letter, and the impression grew in 
Congress circles that the aim of the conversation had been 
merely to lull the Congress into a state of acquiescence.
At this point, Newbold decided to see himself the President 
and two other members of the Executive Committee ( *Abd 
al-Majid Ahmad and Dr cAbd al-Halim) in order, if possible, 
to stabilise the situation and lessen the danger of 
precipitate action by the Congress that could unfortunately 
lead to a complete and final breach.
In a frank discussion held on 16 July, Newbold took 
the same line as Penney had done. Explaining why he 
had written his two letters, and that those letters stood in 
every respect, he emphasized that the Government was not 
actuated by any hostility towards the educated class. On 
the contrary, he assured them, the increase of the Sudanese 
share in the administration of the country was indeed a 
fundamental part of its policy. But, in the process, the 
Government inteded to maintain contact with all sections of 
responsible Sudanese opinion, and not only with the Congress. 
He told them that the undoubted hardening in attitude of 
British officials towards the Congress, of which they had 
complained, was due partly to war distractions and a 
distaste for politically-minded officials, but mainly 
due to the increasing carping and hostile attitude of
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Al—Nil; to the "foolish and persistent" claim of the 
Congress to represent the whole Sudan; to Congress’s 
undemocratic habit of regarding Sudanese officials who 
declined to join it as renegades or "dogs of the Government"; 
and above all, especially as regards the alienation of the 
District Commissioners, to the widespread campaign in the 
provinces to canvass and enrol villagers, artisans and 
tribesmen, with scant regard to the educational 
qualifications laid down by the founders of the Congress 
themselves. How could, he asked, ex-khalwa lorry-drivers 
be regarded, by any stretch of the imagination, as 
"graduates"? If they did not stop such recruitment, the 
Government would have to dilute its recognition of the 
Congress. He urged them to go for quality rather than 
quantity, as the Government was unimpressed by large 
membership and judged the Congress neither by its noise 
nor by its numbers. He urged them also to damp down 
Al-Nll for a period, and to curb their younger 
"exhibitionists", whose antics were seriously damaging some 
of the very aims of the Congress for which he had been 
actively working —  e.g. the greater dilution of British 
posts and the closer association of the educated Sudanese 
with the Government, both in the provinces and in the 
capital. He also pointed out the effect that their 
Memorandum had in Egypt —  namely, the annoyance on the
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part of that Government and an immediate recrudescence of 
the Egyptian "colonial1 attitude to the Sudan. Congress 
was urged to leave diplomatic matters to the Sudan 
Government, who were experienced in these delicate 
subjects and had an open record of defending Sudanese 
interests against outside exploitation whether British, 
Egyptian, Indian or otherwise. He made clear the 
Governments objection to civil servants indulging in 
public political controversy and the reasons why the 
Congress could not be recognised as a political body.
He added that, until such time as adequated machinery 
existed for the official representation of Sudanese opinion 
in matters of policy, there was no objection to Sudanese 
leaders of opinion and responsible government officials, 
whether members of the Congress or not, intimating their 
views on such matters either by personal approach or 
private delegation, provided that such contacts were treated 
by them as confidential and were not used as material for 
self-advertisement. But no Government, he argued, could 
countenance the overt political agitation of the previous 
months by its afandiyya. unless it adopted the method of 
promoting such officials on the basis of loyalty rather 
than merit. He affirmed that he still had confidence in
1. In fact, the Egyptians had suspected that the Memorandum 
was British-inspired and had refrained from playing it
up in the Egyptian press.
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the Executive Committee but little in the Committee of 
Sixty, and he urged them to act courageously to dissuade 
the Sixty from folly or defiance, which could only result 
in a clash with the Government.^
The Congress representatives professed to be personally 
satisfied with Newbold1s assurances, but they again asked 
for some record of the discussion in writing, which they 
could show to their Committees. On the following day, 
therefore, Newbold handed Ibrahim Ahmad a personal letter, 
summarising certain points of the conversation and saying 
that, while announcements of Government policy were and 
would continue to be made from time to time, it was
obviously right that they should be made to the public of
2the Sudan and not to any particular section. In this 
way, while recognising the Congress as representing 
“a considerable bo,dy of educated opinion", he denied to it 
the status of "sole mouthpiece" of the whole nation.
Newbold*s letter proved to be on the whole acceptable 
to the moderate elements in the Executive Committee, 
particularly the Mahdists who had by now become apprehensive
1. SPIS. No. 18, para 151, loc. cit:: also, Newbold 
to Ray all, in Henderson, on. cit., p. 252 and 268.
2. Newbold to Ibrahim Ahmad, 17.7.1942, PflO,
K). 371/31587 (J4388/1528/16); also, Henderson, 
op. cit». pp. 548-9.
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of the growing and undesirable conflict with the Government. 
Hut when the Committee of Sixty met on 24 July to discuss 
Newbold*s letter and consider the action to be taken, 
the Executive Committee was virtually confronted with a 
revolt by the militants, led by Isma^il al-Azhari, who 
openly accused it of "weakness and cowardice". Ibrahim 
Ahmad and some others, however, pressured to Sixty to 
accept the position as put to them by Newbold and to 
avoid any tendency to place the Congress in political 
opposition to the Government. In an attempt to reach 
a compromise, the Committee of Sixty finally adopted a 
resolution that the reply to the Civil Secretary, while 
expressing an acceptance of the existing position, should 
also make it clear that the Congress stood by the demands 
contained in the Memorandum and reserved the right to 
pursue the matter at a future date. A heated discussion 
followed and the meeting broke up without a clear agreement 
being reached as to the character of the proposed reply. 
Ibrahim Ahmad was, however, authorised to draft the reply 
to Newbold, and to submit it to the Sixty for approval.^ " 
Everybody, including Newbold, wondered whether he would be 
able to produce a draft likely at once to be acceptable 
to the Government and to satisfy the expectations of the
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Sixty.
In the event, Ibrahim Ahmad drafted a carefully- 
worded letter, which was delivered to Newbold on 24 August. 
In his reply, Ibrahim Ahmad expressed the gratification of 
the Congress at the assurances given by Newbold and Penney 
of the Government's sympathy for “the hopes and aspirations 
of Congress" for the progress of the Sudan and its future.
He accepted the Government's affirmations, expressed in 
those conversations, that the Sudanese would be consulted 
when the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was reconsidered, and that 
the Sudanese share of responsibility in the administration 
of the country's public affairs would be increased "by 
endeavouring to set up a representative advisory Sudanese 
body, and by increasing the number of responsible Sudanese 
po.sts in the Government. He welcomed these as the 
realisation of some of the demands embodied in the 
Memorandum, and he expressed the hope that continued contact 
between the Congress and the Government would "lead to 
complete understanding on all its demands." But, by 
simultaneously emphasizing "the Government's sincere wish 
that contact should continue between it and the Congress", 
he gave the impression, whether intentionally or not, 
that such continued contact was conditional on the eventual
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realisation of all the demands embodied in the 
Memorandum,1 Apparently, in an attempt to convey the 
impression that the letter was not influenced by militant 
opposition in the Committee of Sixty and thereby presenting 
it as a product of the moderates, Ibrahim Ahmad back-dated 
the letter to 23 July —  one day before the adoption of 
the resolution by the Sixty.
Newbold had expected a more favourable end to the
whole affair. He had apparently misinterpreted developments
in the Congress and, only a few days before receiving
Congresses reply, he thought that the moderates had
"won through, and I am awaiting a final 
epistle, which will 'call it a day* and 
accept the Government letters with, 
probably, some reservation of 1inalienable 
rights*. The delay is rather unaccountable 
and may be due to events in «
India. I went as far as I could."
Newbold must have therefore been sadly disappointed at
the reply of the Congress, which he interpreted again as
another victory of the militants. The letter was a
"cleverly drafted document which could not be allowed to
remain on record unchallenged", for fear that any future
1. Ibrahim Ahmad to Newbold, 23.7.1942, £&Q,
K).371/31587 (J4388/1528/16); also, Henderson, 
on. cit.. p. 550.
2. Newbold to Mayall, 14*8.1942, in Henderson, 
on. cit.. p. 268,
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co-operation with the Congress might he coloured by that
1implied condition. But how was he to respond, and what
were the options open to him in the event the Congress
insisted on the stand it had taken?
Newbold appreciated the fact that the Congress
could not confine itself to purely social matters and
that it would inevitably interest itself in politics.
But he was definitely not prepared to allow it then to
become a political body in the sense of an opposition
party, as otherwise the Government might be faced with
the alternatives of a policy of appeasement on the one
hand, or of suppression on the other, neither of which
he was inclined to adopt unless forced to do so. A
policy of appeasement would have opened the door to a
"sequence of blackmail and premature concessions, and
would bewilder the non-Congress body of enlightened
Sudanese; suppression would create a sense of frustration,
clashes, and probably 'martyrs1, and might drive the
2
movement underground and into the arms of Egypt."
Newbold therefore delayed his reply until he had
1. Civil Secretary's Circular to All Governors and Heads 
of Department, 22.9.1942, PKO, FO.371/31587 
(J4388/1528/16).
2. D, Newbold, "The Graduates* Congress: Directive 
Statement", 21.9.1942, Ibid.
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put his own house in order first. On 10 September 1942, 
he submitted a Note to the Governor-General1s Council, 
outlining certain proposals on how the Government could 
best meet the legitimate aspirations of Sudanese 
nationalism.1 These proposals, which included the 
establishment of an indigenous Advisory Council, were 
approved in principle on 14 September and, armed with 
this mandate, he felt politically confident, to respond 
firmly to the Congresses letter.
In his reply to Ibrahim Ahmad, Newbold pointed 
out that the renewed reference to the demands embodied 
in the Memorandum showed a misunderstanding of the 
Governmentts position regarding the role and membership of 
the Congress, and he regretted that there was nothing in 
the President*s letter to indicate any intention on the 
part of the Congress to "examine those aspects of its 
activities and organisation" which were considered as 
manifestly contrary to their expressed desire for 
co-operation with the Government. He reiterated the 
evidence proving the British intention to associate the 
Sudanese in the government of the country and expressed 
his confidence that "all enlightened Sudanese will see 
in /Jhese7 measures tangible proofs of the earnest
1. The Note is discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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intention of the Government to execute its policies."
He hoped that the Congress, on its part, would realise 
its own responsibility and make a serious effort to 
co-operate both in the restoration of good relations and 
in the execution of Government policy. With this clear 
implication that the restoration of good relations was 
conditional on the Congress putting its house in order, 
Newbold officially terminated further correspondence 
on the subject.1
This action was indeed unfortunate, for it inevitably 
limited the options for manoeuvres, both by Newbold and the 
Congress. As it has already been shown, Newbold 
misinterpreted the submission of the Memorandum as being 
essentially the product of a well-orchestrated lobbying 
by the militants and his respective responses were 
consequently based on that misconception. The correspondence 
on the Memorandum had convinced him that the moderates 
were either unable or unwilling to check the pressures of 
the militants, and he therefore felt that the best way to 
achieve this objective was to bring effective Government 
pressure to bear on the Congress. Accordingly, in a move 
obviously designed to threaten the existence of the
1. Newbold to Ibrahim Ahmad, 19*9*1942* PHO,
FQ.371/31587 U4388/i528/l6); also, in Henderson, 
op. cit.. pp. 551-2.
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Congress, Newbold instructed the Legal Department to 
issue a circular directive forbidding its judges and legal 
assistants to serve on any Congress central or branch 
Committees, except those whose sole function was to deal 
with educational or social matters. Soon thereafter, he 
authorised all Province Governors to impose a similar 
ban on sub-inspectors, mamurs. sub-mamurs and police 
officers.1
These two circulars, together with Newbold*s final 
reply, deeply distressed the Congress, who clearly 
interpreted these measures as open acts of hostility from 
the part of the Government. The subsequent appointment 
of a Sudanese Relations Officer in the Civil Secretariat 
was interpreted by the graduates as an additional attempt 
to undermine the Congress by developing individual 
contacts with educated Sudanese, instead of encouraging 
a policy of collective consultation through it.
The breach between the Congress and the Government, 
which both tried so hard to avoid, had finally materialised 
in spite, and probably as a result, of eaoh other*s 
attempts to devise a face-saving formula to solve the 
crisis generated by the submission of the Memorandum.
1. SPLS, No. 19, August-3eptember 1942, para 153, CRQ, 
PORT SUDAN 2/19/133.
C H A P T E R  F O U R  
THE GROWTH OF FACTIONS WITHIN THE CONGRESS
The Triumph of the Militants.
Despite the rapture with the Congress, Newbold was 
convinced that a very large proportion of its members were 
genuinely anxious to co-operate with the Government, and he 
urged British officials to make contact with them and to 
strengthen their hand against the more vocal "but less 
responsible hot-heads". He sought to reassure these persons 
that, despite the conflict resulting from the ill-timed 
manifesto, the Government was still "interested in them and 
their views, that we want to understand and appreciate their 
outlook and that we are prepared to tell them frankly when 
and why we disagree with them."'1' At the same time, he 
counselled against any tendency by British officials to 
simply disregard the "less responsible elements", or to 
treat them as a mere nuissance. Newbold urged instead that 
personal contact should be maintained with them as well, 
though discreetly and through occasional sympathetic
1. Newbold to All Governors, "The Graduates* Congress: 
Directive Statement", 21.9.1942, PRO, FO.371/31587 
(J4388/1528/16).
194
discussion of their more reasonable aspirations. His 
objective was to establish mutual confidence, in the hope 
of inducing them to adopt a more friendly and co-operative 
attitude toward the Government's policies.
In either case, Newbold sought to impress on all the 
Congress members that, while the Government was prepared to 
continue to give due consideration to their views on public 
matters, it would only do so on two conditions: Firstly, 
that if they had any doubt about the propriety of the 
subject, or the method of presentation, they should seek 
advice from a responsible British official; and secondly 
that, having presented their views and recommendations, 
they should be prepared to abide by the result and not 
oppose declared policy by political agitation or other 
means.
The contents of Newbold*s directive became known 
verbatim to Congress members and reactions to it varied 
according to political attitudes.^ Mirghanist quarters 
were somewhat pleased to see the Government finally 
drawn into a conflict with a Mahdist-dominated Congress, 
and they grasped the opportunity to blame British officials 
for the failure of moderate (and by inference Mirghanist)
1. SBIS, No. 20, October 1942, para 163, CRO, 
PORT SUDAN 2/19/133.
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elements to smooth the relations between Congress and the
Government, The authorities, they argued, had failed to
pay sufficient attention to their presence in the Congress
and had not given due consideration to their opinions.
Other moderate nationalists, however, Mahdist and non-
Mahdist alike, took exception to the Governments repeated
reference to “responsible public opinion*1 which, being then
clearly undefined, could mean all things to all men. In
the absence of a parliament, they argued, or an advisory
council which could speak on behalf of the whole nation,
the Government had better give primary consideration to
views expressed by the Congress which had the greatest
influence over the public. They warned that individual
unripe opinions expressed at tea parties or in the course
of other private meetings could not be taken seriously,
and they counselled Newbold hot to expand the official
practice of individual consultations, but to encourage
instead a policy of collective consultation through 
2
the Congress.
The reaction of the militant elements was, as expected, 
uncompromising. Not only did they reject Newbold*s 
stipulated procedure for submitting future Congress
1. Editorial, Sawt al-Sudan. 27 September 1942,
2, Editorial, Al-Nll, 5 October 1942.
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memoranda, but they also viewed with deep concern the 
Governments deliberate efforts to strengthen the position 
of the moderates, both inside and outside the Congress.
Xn the days that followed, they quietly watched the 
situation while they evaluated the various alternative 
courses of action open to them. In the end, they decided 
to concentrate their efforts in winning decisively the 
forthcoming elections and imposing their effective control 
over the Congress.
The task did not appear easy at first sight. Two 
newly-formed groups had already entered the field. The 
first, the Abu Huf group, comprised mostly graduates who 
were employed in the Finance Department and who shared a 
common devotion to Fabian principles.1 They viewed the 
Congress as a cultural and political movement whose final 
goal was to achieve the cultural and political independence 
of the Sudan. In this respect, they were not prepared to 
accept the limitations imposed by Newbold on the Congress^ 
role. The second group, calling itself Al-NL’utamirrin 
al-Ahrar, was born of a split between *Abd al-Rahim
1. The group first made its appearance in the late 1920's 
as a literary society and it gathered for discussion at 
the house of Hasan and Husayn AhmadcUthma.n in Abu Ruf. 
It included also Hakawi’Sulayman Akrat, cAbdallah 
Mrghani and Khidir Hamad.
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- 1Shaddad and Yahya al-Fadli, both of whom were close
associates of Azhari —  a split probably arising from some
o
disagreement about sectarianism in Congress*s activities.
The Ahrar consisted of petty merchants, artisans and other 
non-afandiy.ya elements who, unhampered by the restrictions 
of civil service regulations, were anxious to take an 
effective part in the Congress*s activities and who, like 
the Abu Ruf group, were determined to keep themselves 
independent of either Sayyid. On the question of the 
Congress*s relations with the Government, however, both of 
these groups held views more akin to those of Ibrahim 
Ahmad, than to those of Azhari, and they were consequently 
expected to side with former in the elections.
The appearance of these two groups probably suggested 
to the militants that they should concentrate their 
efforts along two lines of action. On the one hand, they 
should seek to undermine further the base of electoral 
support on which their opponents depended. In this 
connection, they courted the alliance of Sayyid ^ bdullahi 
al-Fadil. During the debates following the submission of 
the Memorandum, Sayyid cAbdullahi had increasingly
1. LAbd al-Rahlm Shaddad: Employed in the Posts and 
Telecommunications Department; as President of the 
Football Association, he was a popular figure in the 
Sudanese community, especially in the sporting clubs, 
where the Ahrar counted on wide support.
2. SFIS. Mo. 21, November 1942, PRO, FQ.371/35580 
td2856/200/l6).
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associated himself with the position adopted by the more 
militant wing of the Congress. This posture had been 
calculated to win for him a personal influence over the 
Congress and, in so doing, to counter-balance the rising 
influence of Sayyid 6Abd al-Rahman* s sons (Siddlq and 
al-Hadi) who, backed by the powerful Yatfqub al-Hilu1, 
had gradually rendered his position as the Sayyid*s
p
chief lieutenant very precarious indeed. When he was
1. Ya^qub al-Hilu; Son of Khalifa cAli wad al-Hilu £one 
of the_Mahdi's khulafa*) and nephew of the*Khalifa 
6Abdullahi; employed as a clerk in the Intelligence
Department and later retired to an agricultural scheme.
2. In. the 1930 *s, Sayyid cAbdullahi al-Padil and Muhammad 
al-Khalifa Sharif were quite successful in extending 
Mahdist influence among the intelligentsia. In 
December 1935, under strong Government pressure,_Sayyid
cAbd al-Rahman grudgingly replaced*Abdullahi al-Fadil 
with Yacqfib al-Hilu as his wakil in Khartoum. The 
former, however, continued his activities and, with 
the appearance of the Congress idea, he gained increasing 
favour withJ3ayyidcAbd al-Rahm&n. By the end_of 1937^ 
bothcAbdullahi al-Fadil and Muhammad al-Khalifa Sharif 
had come to enjoy paramount influence in Mahdist circles 
and,_with matters becoming extremely uncomfortable,
Yacqub al-Hilu resigned and retired to an agricultural 
scheme on the White Nile. From then onwards, owing, to 
his position as SayyidcAbd al-Rahman*s wakil in Khartoum 
and to_his membership in the Congress Committees, Sayyid 
cAbdullahi*s personal influence and ambition had grown 
continuously. In August 1941, however, Muhammad Salih 
al-Shinqlti and Muhammad cAli Shawqi launched a 
movement designed to replace him with Sayyid6Abd 
al-Rahman* s son., al-Siddiq, whom they believed more 
suitable as a successor to the Sayyid*s role in the 
nationalist movement. Cf. SFIS. No. 9, August 1941,
PRO, FO.371/27382 (Jl/l/l6).
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approached, therefore, Sayyid fAbdullahi al-Fadil decided 
to throw his support behind the militants led by Ismacil 
al-Azhari and Yahya al-Fadli.1 SayyidtfAbd al-Rahman did 
not approve ofcAbdullahi*s intrigues but, probably not 
realising the serious consequences that were to follow, 
he did not do anything definite to stop them. As usual, 
he wanted to have it both ways, believing that Yahya 
al-Fadli could still prove useful to him. In the 
circumstances, the Mahdist camp was split, one part 
supporting6Abdullahi al-Fadil and Azhari, and the other
part supporting Ibrahim Ahmad and the influential
-  2Hashmab group.
The second line of action open to the militants was 
to mobilise as much support as possible, particularly 
among the newly-recruited members of the Congress. The 
endeavour to expand Congress membership had constantly 
been an important activity of the graduates, becoming 
particularly intense during the election season. In
1* SPIS, No. 21, November 1942, PRO, FO.371/35580
CJ2946/200/16). In August_1941, Yahya al-Fadli had 
clashed with Ahmad Yusif Hashim over some petty issue, 
and there gradually evolved a personal animosity 
between these two individuals. His decision to back 
Azhari was very much motivated by this animosity.
2. Ahmad Yusif Hashim*s faction, which also included
some of his relatives, were popularly known by this
name.
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November 1942, however, this drive assumed an unprecedented 
and peculiar form. In response to Newbold*s circulars, 
the graduates wanted to make Congress less open to 
government pressure by increasing the proportion of its 
non-afandiy.va membership and, in this way also, to offset 
the compulsory withdrawal of government officials from its 
Committees. Accordingly, the Sixty approved an alteration 
to the membership application form, which had previously 
required a candidate to state the school at which he had 
been educated and the length of time he had spent at it.
The new form merely asked whether the "educational and 
cultural level" of the candidate was above the elementary.1 
The militants exploited this alteration and registered, 
as members of Congress, a large number of ineligible 
persons, particularly from among the artisan and petty 
merchant classes. On realising this, the Executive 
Committee tried to bring the situation under control.
They announced that no member would be admitted to vote 
unless he carried a special pink card, signed by the 
President, as proof of his identity and membership, and 
that members had to call individually to collect and 
sign for their cards beforehand. A member who could not 
sign his name and write his address freely was to be
1- 3PIS. No. 21, November 1942, loc. cit.
2 01
regarded as unqualified for membership and would not be 
given a voting card. The measure proved only partially 
successful. While it kept out illiterate elements, it did 
not prevent the registration of persons with elementary 
educational standards (or less) —  persons who knew how to 
write but were not necessarily qualified to be regarded as 
"graduates". cAbdullahi al-Fadil and Yahya al-Fadli 
successfully canvassed this new electoral bloc of petty 
merchants and shopkeepers and, with additional support 
from some Mahdist elements and the militants, they were 
able to defeat the opposition in the Congress elections.
Ibrahim Ahmad apparently did not gauge properly the 
general feeling among the voters. He based his campaign 
on the issue of "responsible" versus "irresponsible" 
leadership, inappropriately associating the former with 
the senior graduates and the latter with the junior ones.
He called upon the moderates not to leave the field 
entirely to the subvan, but to step in with their 
experience and to lead them along the proper path. He 
emphasized that the real threat to the Congress came not so 
much from external forces but rather from internal 
disruptive influences. His adminitions, however fell 
mostly on deaf ears. For, given the aftermath of the 
Memorandum, the economic hardships of wartime conditions 
and the hard line proposed in Newbold1s directive, the
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majority of Congress members felt that Ibrahim Ahmad*s 
moderation now verged on submission.
The elections resulted in a resounding victory for 
Azharifs faction, which secured about 40 seats in the 
Committee of Sixty.1 Azhari himself headed the poll 
with nearly 200 votes more then Ibrahim Ahmad, and his 
election to the Presidency of the Congress thus appeared a 
foregone conclusion. It was equally obvious that the new 
Executive Committee, to be elected the following afternoon, 
would consist almost entirely of Azhari*s faction and that, 
if any members of the Hashmab group managed to find a place, 
they could be no more than an insignificant minority.
Ibrahim Ahmad, Shawqi, Shinqlti and the Hashmab were furious, 
and they held several meeting to decide whether, if 
elected, they should remain on the Executive Committee 
or withdraw.
Meanwhile, Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman and his lieutenants 
met to consider various means of effecting a compromise 
and preventing an irreparable split in the Mahdist ranks.
He instructed cAbdullahi al-Fadil to stay away from the
1* SFIS. No. 22, December 1942, PRO. EG.371/35580
C.J2956/200/16). The_remaining 20 seats were shared by 
the Hashmab, the Ahrar and the Abu Ruf factions in 
about equal proportions._ About 1250 members took part 
in the elections. IsmacIl.al-Azhari was elected _ 
President, Amin Zaydan Secretary and Isma6ilcUthman 
Treasurer.
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meeting which would elect the new Executive Committee, 
believing that, without Abdullahi's attendance and 
nomination, Azhari*s ticker would lose considerable Mahdist 
support. On a different line of action, Muhammad 
al-Khalifa Sharif and others proposed to Yahya. al-Fadli 
and his caucus that they should elect a fair proportion of 
the Hashmab group to the Executive Committee, that Ibrahim 
Ahmad should be elected President and that both Yahya 
al-Fadli and Ahmad Yusif Hashim (the principal protagonists) 
should keep out of the Executive Committee. The proposals 
were definitely unacceptable but, in order to prevent 
further canvassing by the opposition, Yahya al-Fadli gave 
the false impression that they had agreed to them. When 
voting time came, however, the militants elected an entirely 
partisan Committee, with only Ibrahim Ahmad from the 
opposition managing to squeeze in. To Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman1s 
additional chagrin, 4Abdullahi al-Fadil was nominated, and 
elected, in absentia to the new Executive Committee.
As soon as the results were announced, Ibrahim Ahmad, 
cAwad Satti and Muhammad £Ali Shawqi resigned from the 
Committee of Sixty.1 All efforts to persuade them to
1. Muhammad cAli Shawqi and cAwad Satti did not belong to 
the Hashmab group. They_were indeed among Yahya 
al-Fadli*s nominations, but they did not like*him 
nor wished to be associated with his caucus against 
Ibrahim Ahmad.
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withdraw their resignations failed, and reservists had to
be taken in their place.
Daring those first few days, there was much talk to
the effect that some provincial branche committees might
pass a vote of no confidence in the hew Executive
Committee. In fact, the members of the Wad Medani branch
committee (the most influential Congress body in the
provinces) did consider such a step, but they ultimately
decided against taking any action at that moment. The
general feeling, both at Wad Medani and other provincial
centres, was that while the new Executive Committee was not
worthy of such confidence, any open action against it at
this stage would endanger the existence of the Congress
itself. Even the vanquished Hashmab, in fear of bringing
down the whole structure of the Congress, preferred to
abstain from such drastic action as resigning en masse 
1
from the Sixty. They took comfort instead in the time-
honoured belief that personalities changed but that political
institutions remained. If the new Executive Committee
lived up to their responsibilities all would be well;
?
if not, they and not the Congress would disappear.
1. SEIS. Ho. 23, January 1943, PRO, P0.371/35580 
(J2956/200/16).
2. Muhammad tAmir Bashir in Al-Nil, 24 December 1942.
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The 1942 elections mark a turning point in the 
evolution of the Congress. Whereas in previous years the 
elections had been contested by the two traditional parties 
(the Mahdists and the Mirghanists) with their sub-divisions 
working within each, in 1942 four distinct factions entered 
the field on the basis of a new alignment , completely 
superseding the old sectarian division. The interplay of 
personal animosities that engulfed the elections, coupled 
with an uncompromising pursuit of personal power by the 
principal protagonists, not only subverted sectarian 
solidarity, but had also seriously undermined unity within 
the Congress itself, leading to a split with far-reaching 
consequences. On the one hand, coming on the eve of a 
renewed Anglo-Egyptian tussle over the future of the Sudan, 
such a split fostered the evolution of various factions 
into distinct political parties, each advocating its 
particular path to independence. On the other hand, this 
split gradually subordinated nationalist aspirations to 
personal ambition which, unable to succeed on its own, 
subsequently mobilised sectarian support on a basis that 
was to influence politics for many years to come.
In. the light of Government restrictions on political 
activities by its Sudanese officials, the outcome of the 
1942 elections had an additional serious impact on the 
evolution of the Congress. The defeat of the moderates
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devalued further the authority of the Congress in the eyes
of the Government and undermined any prospects of an
immediate rapprochement. This factor, in its turn, caused
increasing difficulty for the Congress in pursuing
effectively the implementation of its programmes, even with
regard to those projects which were purely concerned with
social matters. Thus, when the Executive Committee
delegated a number of government officials to collect from
their office colleagues their annual Education Day
subscriptions, the Government directed these officials not
to undertake the task, pointing out that in doing so they
1
would be giving the collection an official colour.
Again, when the Executive Committee addressed a circular
to senior graduates soliciting their views on higher
education, many of the recipients, not knowing what use the
Committee proposed to make of such views, were reluctant 
2
to express any. Finally, when a number of Sudanese 
officials presented the Government with a petition setting 
out the cost of living hardships and asking for relief, 
they did so directly, rejecting Congresses mediation on
1. SFIS. No. 23, January 1943, loc. cit.
2. SBIS. No. 27, May-June 1943, PRO, EO.371/35580 
(J2956/200/16).
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the grounds that it had nothing to do with the matter.1 
The 1938 subtle distinction between social and political 
activity thus became blurred and, in the absence of 
Government co-operation, Congress’s activities henceforth 
inevitably assumed political overtones.
Under the direction of Yahya al-Fadli, the Executive 
Committee embarked on a public relations campaign, 
apparently designed in part to restore Congress’s public 
image. They organised numberous tea parties, at which 
Azhari featured as the main speaker, and they arranged 
political tours to various parts of the country where 
Congress leaders could come into personal contact with 
tribal shaykhs and notables. The campaign proved 
successful in projecting Congress’s lively concern with 
the social issues confronting the community; but a more 
important consequence was that the campaign established 
Isma6il al-Azhari as an increasingly prominent national 
figure and closely identified the Congress with him.
The Beginnings of Flirtation with Egypt.
The year 1943 witnessed major constitutional
1. SFIS. No. 28, July 1943, FRO, EO.371/35580 
(J2956/200/16).
2. SFIS, No. 25, March 1943, Ibid.
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developments in the Sudan. Early in 1942, Newhold had 
begun to study lines of further associating the Sudanese, 
and especially the educated elements, with local and central 
government. But his preoccupation with urgent war matters, 
coupled with a desire to acquaint himself more fully with 
the future trend of British colonial policy, imposed on 
him a delay in completing the details of his proposed 
scheme. The submission of the Congress manifesto, however, 
and the sequence of events that followed it, incited 
Newbold to resume his task. From replies he had received 
to a circular sent to the Governors of the northern provinces 
in March 1940, he had become convinced that the majority of 
British officials did not realise in what a sadly 
backward state local government was at the time. He was 
apprehensive that Congress’s political agitation in 
Khartoum, and its ill-advised ’’electioneering" in the 
provinces following the submission of the Memorandum, would 
undesirably polarize the position of most British officials 
on the whole question of relations between the Government 
and the educated class. He was determined to save the 
situation and accordingly, in September 1942, he submitted 
a Note to the Governor-General *s Council, recommending 
certain proposals for achieving a more substantial
£00
association of the Sudanese with the administration of 
1their country.
In this Note, Newbold advised his colleagues not to 
allow "this Congress sandstorm" from fogging the basic 
issue lying before the Government, "of how to meet 
adequately the legitimate and reasonable aspirations of 
the enlightened Sudanese, both in the towns and in the 
countryside, and including the more progressive tribal 
leaders and merchants as well as the mainly official 
class known as reffendia*." He viewed this basic issue as 
having two aspects: One concerned the nature of the 
proposed association, while the other involved the pace at 
which this association could be implemented. In regard 
to the first aspect, Newbold impressed on his colleagues 
that the future trend of British colonial policy aimed at 
converting "trusteeship" into "partnership", and that 
these progressive sentiments were being propagated by 
Colonial Ministers and responsible ex-Governors, and not 
merely by people normally described as "left-wing 
idealists" or "humanitarian cranks". Good Government, 
he declared, was indeed no lasting substitution for
1. D. Newbold, "Note on Purther Association of Sudanese 
with Locan and Central Government in the Sudan", 
10.9.1942, CRO, NORTHERN 2/1/11; also, PRO,
H>.371/31587 (J4413/1528/16); and in Henderson, 
op. cit*. pp. 553-560.
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self-government. In his view, the episode of the 
Congress Memorandum had high-lighted the urgent and 
genuine need to move from trusteeship to partnership, a 
need which was manifestly obscured by the extravagant 
demands of a section of the educated Sudanese, but which 
nonetheless must not be neglected or overlooked. No 
colonial Government, he warned, could conduct for long a 
progressive or happy administration without the 
co-operation of the educated classes. deny or delay
their effective participation in the various branches of 
government means that disgruntlement turns into despair, 
and despair into revolt, of which the end is Amritsar."'*'
In regard to the second aspect —  the pace of moving 
towards partnership —  Newbold counselled against the view 
that war-time was no time for far-reaching schemes of 
political or administrative development, and that 
Government should await the piping times of peace before 
it embarked on such paths. He pointed out that the times 
of peace would not be wo piping after all. "There will 
be a psychological malaise among British officials, a 
reaction from war-effort, an exodus on long leave, a spate 
of retirements with consequent changes in higher posts, 
an influx of raw recruits, a restlessness among Sudanese
1. Ibid.
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for the removal of economic restrictions (which may well 
have to be kept on awhile) and a probable distraction of 
the Central Government on to external affairs (fu.tare of 
Eritrea, Lake Tsana, Increased attention from Egypt, 
pan-Arabism, winding up of Imperial finance questions)."'*'
It was imperative, therefore, to begin immediately laying 
the foundations of a full Sudanese share in the Government 
not only to honour local and Allied pledges, but also to 
present a united front to the outside world, particularly 
to any renewed claim by Egypt to sovereignty over 
the Sudan.
Mewbold*s proposals were approved in principle by the
Council and in his broadcast to the people on Muslim new
year's day in January 1943, Huddleston announced in
unequivocal terms this new basis in Government policy.
He identified local government councils and administrations
as "the foundation on which the part to be played by the
2
Sudanese in the future of their country will be built".
On these bodies, which he regarded as giving the individual 
Sudanese a fuller chance of representing his opinion, 
Huddleston proposed to confer a very real and constitutional
1. Ibid.
2. Governor-General *s Message to the Sudanese People, 
EfiO, EO.371/35576 (J1024/50/16).
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transfer of executive power and responsibility, and he 
appointed a high-powered Special Committee to examine the 
best method of implementing these proposals,3'
Huddleston's message made a deep impression in 
Sudanese political circles. For several days, it was the 
subject of widespread and generally favourable comment in 
the capital, since it was regarded as the first official 
pronouncement on the Government's intention of admitting 
the Sudanese to a closer and increasing association in the 
administration* Coming from the Governor-General on a 
public occasion, it had the added effect of confirming all 
previous assurances and putting them on a new plane as 
an approved and proclaimed policy. But, despite the 
realisation that this was an important political step 
forward, Sudanese nationalists did not think it went far 
enough* In their view, local councils and administrations 
could not give the Sudanese as full and real an 
opportunity for closer association in government as would 
a general representative Advisory Council authorised to 
express opinions on the political, social and economic 
development of the country. Local councils and 
administrations, it was argued, acted in narrow circles
1. Hewbold to Mayall, 30.1.1943, in Henderson, 
op. cit,. p. 293*
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and for limited objectives which were only part of
a general policy. It was imperative that the Sudanese
should participate in laying down this general policy for
the whole country, otherwise their opportunities for self-
expression would remain only of secondary importance. In
this respect, therefore, Sudanese nationalists believed
that only the establishment of a higher representative
Council would constitute genuine political progress in 
1
the Sudan.
While these serious reservations still lingered on in 
the minds of the nationalists, the Government announced the 
formation of a Local Government Advisory Board, a 
departmental committee whose function was to advise the 
Civil Secretary on matters pertaining to local government. 
The composition of the Board was designed to secure the 
representation both of the departments chiefly interested 
in local government development and of "responsible 
Sudanese opinion". Misinterpreting the function of this 
Board as being to make political recommendations in 
connection with the new line of Government policy, the 
nationalists resented the fact that representatives of the 
Congress had not been included on it. They were furthermore 
upset by the Government's reference to the appointed
1. Editorial, Al-Nil, 14 January 1943.
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Sudanese officials as representatives of "responsible 
Sudanese opinion". This phrase had been used by Newbold 
repeatedly in rejecting the Memorandum and Congress's claim 
to represent the Sudanese people. Its use again in this 
particular reference carried with it implications which the 
nationalists were not prepared to leave unchallenged. 
Sudanese opinion, they retorted, could only be represented 
by an elected, not appointed, body and they felt that, 
since the Congress was the only such body, it alone could 
rightfully claim to reflect "responsible" opinion and it 
should therefore have been represented on this Board.3"
The Government eventually clarified the role of the 
Local Government Advisory Board as being purely 
administrative, not political or representative, in 
character; and the agitation finally subsided. But the 
incident had jolted some members of the Executive 
Committee. Winston Churchill's controversy will Wendell 
Wilkie over the future of the British empire, Sir Stafford 
Cripps's exit from the War Cabinet, and the tone of the 
speeches made by various British statesmen on the position 
of the empire in the post-war world had already generated 
a deep sense of apprehension among nationalists that the
1. Editorial, Sawt al-Sudan. 10 February 1943; also, 
Editorial, AL-NIl, 10 February 1943*
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determination to build a new world based on new ideals, 
so often expressed in times of defeat, might be forgotten 
in the hour of victory.'*’ Thus, the events surrounding 
the formation of the Local Government Advisory Board were 
interpreted by some members of the Executive Committee as 
prefiguring some of the ominous impediments that the new 
Government policy presented to the Congress, firstly, 
there was a very real danger that, with the withdrawal of 
Government co-operation, Congress would neither be 
consulted nor actively participate, let alone take the 
lead, in the anticipated political developments. Secondly, 
with the Congress so excluded, these developments could be 
diverted onto an undesirable path, culminating into a 
configuration of local councils with a strong rural flavour 
and with appointed, not elected, members —  a path which 
ultimately meant more delays in self-government and 
independence. Both of these impediments, the nationalists 
felt, had somehow to be neutralised effectively.
The primary concern of the new Executive Committe was 
to pursue further the realisation of the demands in the 
Congress Memorandum and, despairing of any prospects of 
sympathetic co-operation from the Government, Azhari and 
his confidants turned to Egypt for political support.
1*- SEIS, Ho. 22, December 1942, loc. cit.
£16
There had been a renewed interest by the Egyptian
Government in Sudan affairs and, in fact, some attempts
had been made to initiate contacts with the Congress. In
October 1942, as a result of efforts by &Ali al-Birayr and
the Cairo Congress Committee, the Egyptian Government
agreed that applications by Sudanese students for free
admission to Egyptian schools should be channelled through
the Congress instead of through the Sudan Education 
1
Department. furthermore, when the sandstorm of the 
Congress Memorandum was still blowing, the Egyptian 
Economic Expert in Khartoum had held political discussions 
with prominent Sudanese nationalists on the future of the 
Sudan and had requested them to submit to him a statement
2of Sudanese aspirations for transmission to Na££as Pasha.
In June 1943, therefore, Azhari visited Egypt with the 
view of discussing the Memorandum with Egyptian leaders. 
Ostensibly, he went alone and in a private capacity as an 
official going on leave, but two other members of the
1. Al-Nll, 15 October 1942. The Cairo Committee was first 
established by the Congress in April 1942, and 
originally comprised^Ali al-Birayr, MahmudtfAbu’l-Ila 
and Bashir cAbd al-Rahman.
9
2. Sf18. Mo. 19, August-September 1942, para 160, CKO, 
POET SUDAU 2/19/133.
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Committee of Sixty, Mahmud al-Fadli1 and Muhammad &bd 
-  2al-Rahman , also left by the same train. The three arrived 
in Cairo as one party and let it be known that they were a 
delegation from the Congress on a political mission.
Almost immediately, Azhari set about arranging private 
meetings with influential government and other political 
personalities, particularly members of the Watanist party 
known for their interest in the Sudan. He intimated that 
the Congress wanted to open secret negotiations with 
Egyptian politicians concerning the future of the Sudan, 
and more particularly to concert measures for eliminating 
British influence from the Nile valley after the war.
Azhari also tried to see the Prime Minister but Nahhas 
evaded him believing, as most Egyptians did at that time, 
that the Congress Memorandum was conceived and submitted 
at the instigation of the Sudan Government with a view 
to stimulating Sudanese autonomy at the expense of Egypt. 
Azhari persisted and followed Nahhas to Alexandria 
where, on the intervention of Mahmud Sulayman Ghannam 
(Minister of Commerce), he finally secured an interview.
In the meeting, Azhari assured the Prime Minister that the
1. Mahmud al-Fadli: Brother of Yahya al-Fadli; teacher at_ 
Omdurman Rational- School; leading member of the Ashiqqa* 
party and later of the National Unionist party.
2. Muhammad cAbd al-Rahman: an accountant employed in a 
private business firm.
3. SPIS. No. 38, July 1945, loc. cit.
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Congress was not a British-sponsored movement and that it 
was not pursuing a “separatist" policy, but Nahhas 
remained unconvinced and gave him to understand as much in 
a courteous manner,1
Although Azhari*s first exploratory mission to Egypt 
was unproductive, the publicity given by the Congress 
magazine to the exalted contacts he made inevitably enhanced 
his personal prestige at home even more. The experience of 
the visit had a more direct impact on Azhari*s political 
attitude as well. Exactly what scheme Azhari had in mind 
in connection with securing Egyptian support for the Congress 
is not known, for the subject was not developed in depth 
in the interview with Eahhas. But the scepticism
1. Apparently, Hahhas Pasha consulted Shaykh Ahmad Hlthman 
al-Qadi, who was in Egypt at the time, about the 
importance of Congress, the status of Azhari and whether 
he should see him or not. Shaykh Ahmad advised against 
the interview and deliberately sabotaged Azharils 
mission. A few weeks earlier, Shaykh Atimad had tried to 
convince Egyptian politicians that the Memorandum was a 
genuinely spontaneous expression of Sudanese aspirations 
and that the Congress was not a Government-sponsored 
movement. But "when Azhari arrived and embarked on the 
same attempt and I found the Egyptians sceptical about 
him and his assurances that Congress did not represent 
a separatist movement, I decided to reverse my tactics 
and leave them in their error so that they should 
continue to mistrust Azhari". Kote by Sheikh Ahmed 
Qthman al Qadi on his stay in Egypt from 1.5.45 to 
12.10.45. 23.11.1943, PRO, FO.371/42363 ( J713/185/16) 
also, in K>.141/939 (file 31/9/44).
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exhibited by his Egyptian hosts about the integrity of the 
Congress, and his resulting anxiety to neutralise such 
scepticism, became two contributory factors that 
subsequently induced him to adopt a defiantly anti- 
Government, and openly pro-Egyptian, position.
The Advisory Council and Nationalist Heaction.
In September 1943, after Azhari*s return from Egypt, 
the Government published legislation regarding the 
formation of Provincial Councils and an Advisory Council 
for the Northern Sudan. These ordinances were the 
implementation of some of the recommendations proposed by 
Newbold in his Note to the Governor-General *s Council a 
year before. He had believed for some time that the first 
step was to build up Provincial Councils and then to have 
these send up delegates to an "advisory council of chiefs, 
saints, intelligentsia and merchants." He did not know, 
however, what system should be used to compose this 
Council. Of one thing he was definitely certain: That all
general interests in the Sudan should be represented - 
religious, social and economic - without "sacrificing 
the vast majority of inarticulate peasants and villagers
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to the cleverer minority of townsmen and merchants."
In drawing up the draft legislation for the Advisory 
Council, Newbold and his colleagues on the Special 
Committee
"tried to strike a balance between educated 
and uneducated, town and county, merchants 
and farmers. We wanted to ensure a level 
or a leaven of intelligence and 
sophistication which would lift the Council 
above the place of a glorified tribal 
gathering and yet have a sufficient, even 
preponderant group of ‘countrymen* so as 
not to allow the cultivator and the nomad 
to be butchered to make the effendia*s 
holiday. It is not an easy balance to 
strike but the draft law is flexible enough 
to enable a shift of appointment if the 
ratio shows signs of becoming ^
overweighted in one direction or another."
Newbold was faced with yet another major difficulty - 
that of relating the proposed Advisory Council to the next 
stage in the process of Sudanese political development.
His attempts to visualize what that next stage should be 
proved extremely frustrating. Many pundits of colonial 
reform, like Hailey and Lugard, had rejected Legislative 
Councils as ideal and had discarded Parliamentary 
institutions as unsuitable for Africans and Arabs, urging 
instead that something new should be devised.
1, Newbold to Margery Perham, 18.5.1940, in Henderson, 
on. cit., p. 139.
2. Newbold*s note introducing draft legislation in March 
1943j in Henderson, on. cit.. p. 561.
"But what that something is they don't 
know and won't say, which is like a 
doctor saying, *1 don't advise an 
operation or medicine, but am unable to 
suggest an alternative1. Meanwhile the 
patient gets restless. What is the next 
step? Are we to hand over all the reins 
of Government to a Sudanese Assembly?
If we reserve military defense, currency, 
solvency, policy, racial and religious 
issues, minorities, foreign relations, 
etc., to the Sudan Government (i.e. G.G.) 
then we may get clashes or frustration.
How can. we have an official majority 
if officials are mainly Sudanese? British 
officials may walk tamely into a lobby 
behind the Governor of Kenya or Fiji, 
but can we ask Sudanese* to do so on ^
an unpopular issue? What is the answer?"
As a consequence of these uncertainties and 
apprehensions, the Advisory Council legislation was 
characterised by a strict limitation of the scope of the 
Council's function, and a set of heavy safeguards on the 
regulation of its procedure. The determination of the 
Council’s agenda was the sole responsibility of its 
President (the Governor-General) and, although a partial 
provision was made for the addition of any other subject at 
the request of five Council members, the inclusion of the 
requested item was entirely subject to the discretion of 
the President. Furthermore, not all subjects on the agenda 
were open for discussion by the Council. On. some subjects, 
the Government merely explained its respective policy, and
1. Newbold to J.A. Reid, 14.3.1944, in Henderson, 
on. cit.. p. 357.
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the Councills opinion was neither sought nor allowed.
Even where discussion on a subject was allowed, procedural 
safeguards authorised the Civil Secretary (as Chairman of 
the Council) to terminate further debate at any time.
Newbold was conscious, and even privately admitted,
that excessive restrictions had been imposed on the
Advisory Council* He was confident, however, that although
these safeguards looked more formidable on paper they would
prove not to be so in practice, and that they would actually
facilitate the conduct of Council affairs by preventing
the congestion of its agenda or the discussion of trivial
and premature subjects* He probably did not anticipate
then that the Congress would subsequently boycott the
Council. Presupposing instead some participation by
Congress members, he felt more secure by having these
safeguards inserted from the start and diluting or
amending them gradually, than to have them omitted
initially and then be faced with the difficult task of
2
inserting them at a later date, when found necessary.
The provisions of the Advisory Council were greated
1. Eor a more elaborate exposition on the Advisory 
Council, cf. Muddathir *Abd al-Rahim, op. cit*. 
Chapter V.
2. Newbold to May all, 30.10.194:5* in Henderson, 
op. cit., p. 345*
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with a tirade of disapproval by the nationalists. The
general feeling was effectively summed up by Ahmad Xusif
Hashim in a sarcastic comment. "The proposals", he
wrote, "give an accurate idea of the Sudan Government's
estimate of the progress so far achieved by the country
and it can be regarded as the Government's considered
judgement on the results of its own administration over
half a century".*^  As expressed in the Congress
Memorandum, Sudanese nationalists had aspired to a
Legislative Assembly, which would have the authority to
approve the Budget and Ordinances of the British
Administration and which would form the basis of self- 
2government. In contrast to their expectations, however, 
they were given a Council whose functions were purely 
advisory with, as Sayyid °Abd al-Rahman explicitly 
complained, no hint whatever of any obligation on the 
Governor-General to act upon the Council's reasonable 
advice. Universal criticism was directed against the 
plethora of the safeguards imposed, which were interpreted
Al-Nll. 5 September 1943*
2. Al-Nil. 7 September 1943; Al-M'utamar. 11 September 
1943*
3. Wallis, "Summary of Criticisms of Advisory 
Council Legislation", 29-9.1943, PRO, K>.371/35576 
(J3678/J4998/50/16).
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as designed to stifle all criticism or free discussion of
any important or controversial subject. In this respect,
therefore, the nationalists gravely doubted whether the
voting patterns of the members themselves could genuinely
1
be regarded to reflect their own opinions. This element, 
together with the fact that the majority of the members 
were local government representatives, discredited the 
Council as truly representative of "responsible public 
opinion" and featured it instead as a Council for the 
Governor-General, not for the Sudanese.
Another aspect of the legislation which drew heated 
criticism was the limitation of the Council to the northern 
Sudan only. Newbold*s reasoning behind such a limitation 
was that the ethnic diversity and comparative backwardness 
of the southern tribes precluded the selection of suitable 
indigenous representatives. This pretext, however, was 
altogether unconvincing for, as some had pointedly argued, 
missionaries or Government administrators could
2
alternatively be appointed to represent the South, 
furthermore, the nationalists felt that, although the 
proposed Council fell far short of their expectations,
1. Editorial, Sawt al-Sudan. 4 September 1943*
2. E.J.N. Wallis, "Summary of Criticisms of Advisory 
Council Legislation", loc. cit.
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the Government should not, as a matter of principle, 
deprive the southerners from enjoying the same limited 
rights and privileges that were at that time being granted 
to the northern Sudanese.^ But the limitation of the 
Advisory Council to the northern Sudan was unacceptable 
for a basically pragmatic reason. The legislation itself 
contemplated eventually either a separate Advisory Council 
for the Southern Sudan, or one for the whole country. For 
the nationalists, both alternatives were fraught with 
political dangers: In the former case, a separate advisory 
council prefigured the partition of the Sudan; and in the 
latter case, the persisting regional disparities could 
subsequently be used by the British Administration as a 
justification to retard further progress towards full 
self-government and independence, until such time as the 
southern provinces caught up with the level of political 
development in the northern Sudan. The form of the 
proposed Council was, therefore, viewed as basically 
detrimental to national unity and aspirations.
Whereas there was universal agreement among 
nationalists in censuring the constitution of the Advisory 
Council, there was no such consensus as to the line of 
action they should adopt towards it. A significant
1, Ahmad Xusif Hashim, Al-Nil, 5 September 1943*
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minority, mostly from among the moderate elements, were
prepared to grant a qualified acceptance to the Advisory
Council. From the beginning of 1943, as the theater of
war pushed farther away from Sudanese borders, there had
been a gradually reviving interest among the intelligentsia
regarding the political future of the Sudan. British
Government assurances to Egypt that the Sudan Question
would not be discussed at the Peace Conference without the
participation of Egypt had enraged the old ghosts of 1936
and spurred Sudanese nationalists to refuse again to be
treated as a "flock of sheep to be disposed of in the
1
market" without any reference to their wishes. The Sudan
Question, they insisted, should not be settled without the
consultation of the Sudanese people, and their legitimate
aspirations should not be ignored in any post-war 
2
settlement. It was in preparation of such consultations 
that they had urged the speedy formation of a Central 
Advisory Council to represent public opinion as a whole and 
to express authoritatively the aspirations and wishes of
1. Editorial, Al-Nil. 23 December 1942;,_also, "The Future 
of Freedom after the War", Sawt al-Sudan.
2 February 1943*
2. Editorial, Al-M’utamar, 13 February 1943; 
also, Editorial, Al-Ml, 16 March 1943.
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the country. In this sense, although they "begrudged the
very small and restricted political role given to
Sudanese under the Advisory Council legislation, many
nationalists nevertheless regarded the very institution
of such a Council as an extremely important step forward
down an uncharted path towards the complete attainment of
2
Sudanese aspirations. They confidently believed that, 
with the proper amendments to the legislation and with the 
presence of suitable members, the Advisory Council could 
eventually be transformed into a more acceptable body, not 
only for expressing legitimate Sudanese aspirations but
3
also as an institution of self-government. Babikr Badri
and Ibrahim Ahmad took the initiative in this respect and
suggested that the Government should make an authoritative
pronouncement to the effect that the safeguards in question
would not actually be used, except in the most exceptional 
4circumstances.
The posture of the militants, however, was quite
1. Editorial, Al-Nil, 21 February 1943*
2. Editorial, Sawt al-Sudan. 4 September 1943;
also, Ahmad*Yusif Hashim, Al-Nil. 5 September 1943.
3. Babikr Badri; A leading educationalist; serve in 
Education Department until 1929; quite popular among the 
graduates, particularly for his efforts to expand_private 
education; strong supporter of Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman
4. E.J.N. Wallis, "Summary of Criticisms of Advisory 
Council Legislation", loc. cit.
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different, influenced also to a great degree by their
growing opposition to the Government's economic policies*
British officials had for long been convinced that the real
culprits for their failure to control prices and keep the
lid on economic inflation were the hordes of merchants
swarming on the rungs of the distribution ladder in the
commercial community, Ho “middleman*1, they believed, would
sell goods at fixed prices but rather at whatever price
above it he thought a customer would pay* Worse still,
owing to a lack of public spirit or moral courage or both,
consumers would not give evidence in court against these
“profiteers", so that the Government’s tussle with them
was turning out to be futile* A change of policy and
tactics were, therefore, obviously required and the
Government finally decided
"to reduce gradually - if not eradicate 
temporarily - the number of middlemen.
The latter are vociferous and their 
plaint may be heard on all sides but 
they neither deserve nor receive the 
sympathy of anyone. The middlemen 
must be made to realise that they 
are parasites - necessary for customers' 
convenience in the piping times of 
peace, but a luxury in war-time if 
they demand more than their quota of 
blood. If they cannot accept changed 
conditions, they must be scrapped with 
other articles the public  ^
are being forced to give up."
1. Khartoum Province Monthly Diary. Hovember 1942, 
para 14, CRO, CIV3EC 57/17/65.
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This policy was in part a response to earlier
comments in the nationalist press in connection with the
rising cost of living. From as early as April 1942, the
press had called on the Government to institute special
courts which would inflict severe penalties on merchants
1
or cultivators accused of hoarding and profiteering.
Later on, when consumer goods and grain disappeared from
market shelves altogether, the press repeatedly urged the
enforcement of stricter controls on all merchants
(wholesalers, middlemen and retailers) in regard to those
commodities whose prices had been fixed, and the
limitation of the merchant's profit on the other goods
2
to a maximum of 20 percent. In fact, in the case of some
extremely vital commodities (like sugar and paraffin), the
press had strongly urged the Government to supervise
effectively their distribution through a workable system
g
of rationing cards.
In February 1943, therefore, as the cost of living 
continued to rise unabated, the Government embarked on a
1. Al-Hil« 30 April 1942; also, Sawt al-Sudan. 30 April 
1942.
2. Editorials, Sawt al-Sudan. 2 July 1942; and,
AI-Nil, 7 July 1942.
3. Editorials, Sawt al-Sudan. 20 June 1942; and, 
Al-Hll, 23 August 1942.
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new programme. They closed certain agricultural areas to
the merchants and undertook instead to distribute the grain
under an arrangement whereby stocks would be collected and
sent from Gezira by the province authorities, taken over by
Grain Boards at the receiving ends, and sold to the public
at the fixed prices through a restricted number of approved
retailers.^ But the new system soon proved to be inadequate
for ensuring the availability of abundant grain in the
market. The Government suspected that either people bought
more grain than they actually required or that the merchants
themselves bought grain indirectly and hoarded it, or both.
They decided accordingly to extend their new policy one
stage further —  namely, to place grain on a rationed
basis and to control its distribution in the strictest
possible manner.^
In addition to alienating the merchants, particularly
the very large number of retailers who had thereby lost
a most important source of their livelihood, the
Government's new policy extended the spirit of discontent
3
to the agricultural community as well. A combination
Khartoum Province Monthly Diary. February 1943, 
para 3(c) and 14(c), CRO, CIVSEC 57/19/71.
2. Ibid, April 1943, para 14.
3, Editorial, Al-Nil, 21 July 1943; Ahmad Khayr, 
“The Difficulties of the Retailer in Omdurman", 
Sawt al-Sudan, 22 July 1943.
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of factors had brought the Government's fixed prices into
disharmony with the actual costs of cultivation. Firstly,
agricultural labour wage had risen quite sharply as a
result of an increasing labour shortage. The brisk
animal trade had placed a lot of money into the pockets
of tribesmen who had hitherto worked in agriculture to
supplement their earnings, and who consequently felt no
such need anymore. Furthermore, the Government's own
widespread labour recruitment efforts in connection with
the execution of various military projects had absorbed
much casual labour that had previously been employed
in agricultural schemes. Secondly, petrol rationing had
caused vehicle transport charges to rise sharply, and the
latter in turn increased the cost of pump fuel supplied to
agricultural schemes. With such high expenditure in
agricultural production, and with other essential
commodities available only at exorbitant prices,
cultivators found it extremely difficult to make ends
meet, and they agitated to have the Government reconsider
1the principles on which fixed prices were based.
The agitation was especially acute in areas where 
export crops were grown, particularly in the Northern 
Province. Crops exported to neighbouring countries,
1. Editorial, Sawt al-Sudan, 20 July 1943.
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it was argued, should not be subjected to the Government's 
fixed maximum price, but rather they should be allowed to 
fetch what price they could in the world market. The 
Government was criticised for carrying out blindly Allied 
policies of supply to the Middle East at the expense of 
the Sudan's own prosperity, particularly since the United 
Kingdom Commercial Corporation, through which Sudanese 
produce were exported, had failed to reciprocate by 
supplying imported consumer goods at reasonably low 
prices.'** Sudanese nationalists were distressed to 
observe that, while other nations accumulated wealth by 
leaps and bounds, the standard of living in the Sudan fell
lower and lower as a result of the Government's "faulty
2
policy". They called for an urgent reconsideration of 
this policy if the country's wealth was to be preserved 
for post-war reconstruction and if cultivators were not 
to be discouraged from continuing to grow their valuable
1. Editorials, Sawt al-Sudan, 24 March 1943; and 
Al-Nil. 30 March 1943* It should be noted that 
Sudanese nationalists were mistaken in assuming that 
the UKCC was responsible for supplying imported 
consumer goods, Some of these items were imported 
under an arragement with the Middle East Supply 
Centre at ruling market prices, and rationed to the 
Sudanese consumer at fixed prices, the difference 
being subsidized from the Price Stabilization Reserve 
Account.
2. Editorial, Al-Nll, 1 May 1943-
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cash crops.'*'
By the time the Advisory Council legislation was
promulgated, therefore, the agricultural and commercial
communities had already lost confidence in the Government’s
capacity to administer the country for the ’welfare of the
Sudanese". The greater majority of the subvan. in fact
over 40 percent of the educated class, came from
agricultural and commercial communities along the Sfile,
and their attitude towards the Advisory Council was,
quite understandably, influenced by developments in these 
2areas. Their fundamental political objections to the 
proposed Advisory Council were now augmented by economic 
ones; A Council so restricted in its function and 
composition, they lamented, could not afford them the means 
of reversing such unacceptable Government policies, but 
rather would serve perfectly the role of merely rubber-
1. Ahmad Muhammad Yasin, "financial Inflation",
Al-M*utamar. 16 June 1943*
2. An investigation into the background of students 
attending Gordon College during the period 1934-1944 
reveals that about 50$ of these came from Khartoum 
Province, some 22$ from Northern Province, and about 
13$ from Blue Nile Province. Another aspect of such 
an investigation reveals that the students’ fathers 
were mainly occupied as government officials (50$), 
or as farmers (16$), or as merchants (22$). for 
detailed tables of figures, see M.O. Beshir, 
Educational Development in the Sudan. 1899 to 1956. 
(Oxford 1969)* PP* 200-1.
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stamping them. In the circumstances, they turned to the 
Congress as the only genuine forum of nationalist opinion 
and the best potential instrument of opposition to the 
Government and its Advisory Council.
Despite such strong criticism of the Council, the 
Congress's initial reaction did not display any serious 
signs of antagonism. A special meeting of the Committee 
of Sixty was held in early September 1943* at which a 
special sub-committee was formed to study the new 
ordinances and to report on them. After a few days, this 
sub-committee duly submitted its report and the Sixty, 
after approving it, decided to send a Note to the 
Government, embodying the criticism raised and suggesting 
a number of amendments to the respective legislations.'*' 
Briefly, the Note argued that a Council with even partial 
Executive or Legislative powers had proved in practice to 
be more efficient and effective than a purely advisory 
body; that the number of members was far too small in 
proportion to the population, with representatives being 
nominated and not elected by popular vote; that in view 
of the restrictive provisions the Council could not be 
expected even to carry out the advisory duties for which
1. SPIS, No. 30, September 1943* ERQ, K>. 371/35580 
(J2956/200/16).
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it was constituted; and that the legislation reflected
the widely condemned Southern Policy of the Sudan 
1Government*
The impatience of the militants, however, did not
allow matters to rest there. At the annual meeting of
Congress Provincial Committees, which was held in
Qmdurman on 2 October 1943* the militants obtained an
endorsement of the Congressis Note to the Government, and
they proposed a resolution boycotting the Advisory Council
and forbidding Congress members to accept nomination to it
2on pain of expulsion. The more moderate elements in the 
Congress campaigned feverishly to block the resolution. 
They were convinced that, apart from its myopic political 
overtones, the motives behind it were mainly personal —
1. F.D. Rugman to A* Stone (Cairo), 8.11.1943> PRO,
PO.371/35576 (J4998/50/16).
2. This meeting must not be confused with the annual 
general meeting of the Congress. In September 1942, 
taking advantage ofcId al-Fitr holidays, Ibrahim Ahmad 
summoned all provincial committees of the Congress to 
a general meeting at the capital to discuss 
developments regarding the Memorandum and other 
Congress matters. At this meeting it was decided to 
form a special bureau, to be supervised by the General 
Secretary, whose function would be to co-ordinate 
activities between the Executive Committee and the 
provincial branch committees in the implementation
of the Congressls programmes. Henceforth, a general 
meeting of all these committees- was held annually 
during theGId al-Fitr holidays.
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namely, Azhari*s desire to force on Ibrahim Ahmad the 
choice "between withdrawing from the Congress and declining 
nomination to the Advisory Council if, as expected, he was 
nominated hy the Government to sit on it,^ In the end, 
the resolution was adopted first by the meeting of the 
Provincial Committees and subsequently by a small majority 
of the Congress Sixty.
The opportunity for Azhari*s opponents to have their 
revenge was not long delayed. In a letter to the 
financial Secretary on 15 October 1943, Azhari committed 
the indiscretion of recommending a Sudanese official 
for promotion. The letter was on Congress notepaper and 
was signed "President of the Graduates* General Congress", 
though the world "unofficially" was inserted in ink into 
the last paragraph. The letter was written and sent 
without the knowledge of the other Executive Committee 
members. When news of this letter were leaked out by 
the finance Department, the Executive Committee became 
furious and Azhari*s opponents were delighted. Azhari 
became alarmed and tried without success to withdraw the 
letter. Re pleaded before the Executive Committee that 
he had not written it in his capacity as President, and
1. 3EI3. Ho. 31, October 1943, PRO, K).371/35580 
(J2956/200/16).
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that his official title at the bottom had not been put in
by himself but that it had been either inserted by the
person who was recommended in the letter, with the object
of giving it more weight, or as a plant by one of his 
1enemies,
Azhari*s opponents, however, were determined to pursue 
the matter further, and they arranged for a special meeting 
of the Committee of Sixty to call him to account for his 
extraordinary action. In the meeting, the opposition 
accused Azhari of uncostitutional and irresponsible behaviour, 
dismissed with derision his plea that he had written to the 
financial Secretary in his private capacity, and demanded 
his immediate resignation. But Azhari stood his ground and, 
in the voting that followed, he was upheld by his
2
supporters who formed the majority of the Committee.
Ibrahim Ahmad, Muhammad *Ali Shawqi, Muhammad cUthman 
• • •
Mirghani and Makki Shibayka, walked out of the meeting 
when the results were announced and, a few days later, 
resigned from the Sixty altogether.
These developments caused grave concern both within 
and outside Congress circles. The Executive Committee met 
to consider possible means of healing the rift with the
1* Ibid.
2. Out of 58 members attending, 40 supported Azhari.
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seceding members, but all subsequent attempts at a 
reconciliation failed. It was normal, the militants had 
argued, for persons in public bodies to resign when they 
realised that their views conflicted sharply with those 
of their colleagues; but to resign from, the Committee of 
Sixty at a critical moment of its life was an ill- 
considered and unpatriotic act.1 faced with such taunts, 
the moderates found it impossible to acquiesce to the 
Executive Committee’s public call for a withdrawal of 
their resignations without at the same time incurring 
unacceptable political humiliation.
The Split between Sayyid °Abd al-Rahman and Azhari.
The resignation of the moderates from the Committee 
of Sixty provided the occasion for Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman 
to put an end to his unusual association with the Azhari- 
Padli faction in the Congress. The relation between 
Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman and the militants had begun to 
deteriorate as far back as August 1942 when, in an effort 
to avert a clash with the Government, he counselled 
moderation in the Congresses responses to Newboldrs 
rejection of the Memorandum. The relationship deteriorated 
even further at the annual elections in December 1942,
Al-M’utamar. 13 November 1943.
339
when the Mahdist camp was split into two main groups.
After the elections, Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman found himself 
on the horns of a painful dilemma. His personal 
sympathies were with the defeated Ibrahim Ahmad and the 
Hashmab but, at the same time, he was reluctant to 
repudiate the victorious Azhari-fadli faction and lose 
their allegiance. In an attempt to check 6Abdullahi 
al-Eadil's ambitions, Sayyid tfAbd al-Rahman had privately 
ordered him to resign from the new Executive Committee but, 
when the latter refused, he refrained from openly 
compelling him to do so. He was apprehensive that such a 
public stand would not only alienate the victorious 
Azharists but, worse still, would polarize even further 
the latest split in the Mahdist ranks. In the circumstances, 
he decided that the best policy was to play a waiting 
game.
As the months passed, however, various factors combined 
to force Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman to finally come out against 
Azhari. firstly, the feud between the Azhari and Ibrahim 
Ahmad factions intensified steadily, and it became 
extremely difficult for Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman to retain 
a foot in each camp. Secondly, he grew increasingly 
alarmed at Sayyid ^ Abdullahi1 s personal ambitions, which 
were overtly supported by Azhari. Thirdly, he disapproved 
strongly both of Azhari*s mission to Egypt,- which seemed
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to him to lead* Congress into a pro-Egyptian policy running 
counter to his own ideas about the future of the Sudan, 
and of the Congress’s decision to boycott the Advisory 
Council. He therefore seized the opportunity presented by 
the secession of the moderates and he compelled Sayyid 
^Abdullahi al-fadil to resign from both Committees of the 
Congress, and to sever all connections with the Azhari- 
fadli group. In order to further combat *Abdullahi*sm
ambitions, Sayyid 4Abd al-Rahman decided to keep Muhammad
al-Khalifa Sharif in Khartoum for some time to come.1
Sayyid‘'Ahd al-Rahman*s posture naturally alienated
Azhari who, like his great grandfather, now decided to
2
combat Mahdist ascendancy in the Sudan. Azhari had 
earlier been a member of Sayyid 6Abd al-Rahman*s "salon", 
an informal preparatory school in the politics of
1. SPIS, No. 32, November 1943, PRO, fO.371/42348
(J58/58/16). Muhammad al-Khalifa Sharif was the
leader of that section of the Mahdist family who
supported the claims of Sayyid ^ Abd al-Rahman*s son,
al-Siddlq, to the succession against those of
4Abdullahi al-fadil.
•
2. Isma^il al-Azhari*s great grandfather, Sayyid Ahmad 
Kurdufani al-Azhari, had strenuously opposed the claims 
of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi and denounced them in a 
risala, written in 1882. He accompanied Ra4uf Pasha, 
the then Governor-General,■ on an expedition against
the Mahdi and was killed in battle*, Cf. P.M. Holt, 
"Holy families and Islam in the Sudan", Studies in the 
History of the Near.East, (London 1973), p. 128.
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nationalism, and there he had learned to appreciate fully
the political implications of sectarian support.
Accordingly, he contacted Shaykh Ahmad al-Sayyid al-Eil
and Muhammad Mur al-Din\ the two principal political
advisors of Sayyid ^ Ali al-Mirghani, and sought the political
support of the Mirghanist camp. SayyidGAli was attracted
by the idea of replacing Sayyid °Abd al-Kahman as the
patron of the Congress and he allowed Shaykh al-Ell to
2
promise Mirghanist support to Azhari.
Sayyid 6Ali's commitment, however, was strongly 
resented by many Mirghanist members of the Congress who 
were opposed to Azhari, and these openly disagreed with
1. Muhammad Mur al-Dln: Born in Wadi Haifa in 1897; after 
completing his intermediate education, he entered the 
employment of the National Bank of Egypt; he studied 
economics by correspondence and in 1925 he was appointed 
manager of the bank's branch in El Obeid; he was 
transferred to the Khartoum branch in 1937 and to 
Omdurman in 1940. He had been interested in politics 
since 1918, and had been President of the Graduates1 
Club in El Obeid and the Nubian Club in Khartoum.- He 
helped in the formation of the Graduates' Congress in 
1938 and was a member of its first Executive Committee. 
On the foundation of the Ashiqqa' party in 1943 he was 
made one of its top leaders and in 1946 he was Vice- 
President of the Sudanese Delegation to Egypt. During 
the split in the Ashiqqa* party in about 1952, he was 
a leader of one of the factions and of the Congress.
When the National Unionist Party was formed, he was 
elected Vice-President.
2- SPIS. No. 52, November 1943, loc. cit.
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Shaykh al-Ell's policy of building up a Mirghanist-Azhari
alliance. Towards the end of November 1943, as the annual
Congress elections drew near, they joined forces with
other senior graduates in a last attempt to preserve the
unity of the Congress. They agitated for a compromise,
whereby half the seats on the Committee of Sixty would be
filled partly by supporters of Ibrahim Ahmad and partly by
neutral graduates of recognized standing, while Azhari
himself would retire from the presidency in favour of 
1
Ibrahim Ahmad. The compromise formula was naturally
rejected by Azhari and, in the Congress elections on
11 December 1943, his faction won 40 out of the 60
2
Committee seats. It seemed, therefore, that the election 
of a strong pro-Azhari Executive Committee and the 
re-election of Azhari himself as President was a foregone 
conclusion.
At this point, new influences suddenly appeared 
and snatched a last minute victory for Ibrahim Ahmad, 
Muhammad al-Khalifa Sharif (who had arrived from his White 
Nile agricultural scheme on the eve of the elections) and
1. SPIS. No. 33, December 1943, PKQ, EO.371/41348 
(158/58/16).
2. Out of 1300 members qualified to vote, 966 turned up 
at the elections, and of these one-third were 
government officials, the remainder being petty 
merchants and artisans.
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Ahmad Yusif Hashim (who also had just returned from a trip 
to Egypt) lobbied the newly-elected members of the Council 
and succeeded finally in healing the Mahdist split.
In addition, they won over some other graduates who had 
been elected on the Azhari ticket. These, mostly the 
Mahdist, had initially shown little concern about the 
outcome of the elections but, when they were advised of 
the Mirghanist support for Azhari, they reacted swiftly and 
reversed the result at the last minute. Azhari's faction 
secured only seven seats on the Executive Committee, with 
another seven captured by the opposition. The fifteenth 
place went to Muhammad 6Uthman Mirghani, a neutral, who thus 
found himself with the fate of the presidency in his hands. 
Muhammad*Uthman had in fact cherished hopes of the 
presidency for himself and, at one moment, it seemed that 
the opposing factions might compromise on this basis. No 
agreement was reached, however, and MuhammadcUthman, 
already sceptical of Azhari's qualities as a President, 
was persuaded to cast his vote for Ibrahim Ahmad, electing
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him President by a majority of one.1 The same majority
also put supporters of Ibrahim Ahmad into all the other
offices, thus denying Azhari the control of the Executive
2Committee and its Bureau.
After the excitement of the elections had subsided, 
the moderates began to consider ways and means of bringing 
about a repeal of the resolution boycotting the Advisory 
Council. Their task was to prove a difficult one. Although 
they enjoyed a bare majority on the Executive Committee, 
they had an actual minority on the Sixty, and this fact 
made their control of the Congress precarious indeed. They 
realised that they would have to move very carefully and 
avoid raising this controversial issue until they were 
definitely sure of carrying the majority of the Sixty 
with them.
The situation began to change in mid-January 1944.
In a broadcast from Omdurman radio, Newbold replied to
1. There is an interesting episode which illustrates 
Muhammad*Uthman1s growing disillusionment with Azhari. 
In*February 1943, at_a meeting of the Committee of 
Sixty, Muhammad6Uthman pressed Azhari to consider the 
proposal for setting up a board of trustees to 
administer the Education Day Fund. Azhari by a quibble 
oh a point of^procedure, refused to do so, whereupon 
MuhammadCUthman appealed to the Committee for support. 
Meeting with a stony silence all around, he sat down 
exclaiming "This Congress deserves this Presidenti"
Cf. SPIS, No. 24, February 1943, PRO, FO.371/35580 
tJ29557200/16).
2.cAwad Satti was elected General Secretary, Ismacil
al-Atabani Assistant Secretary, cAbdallah Mirghani
Treasurer, and Muhammad6Uthman Mirghani Accountant.
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the criticism that had been directed at the Advisory 
Council legislation. Briefly, he sought to assure the 
nationalists that the Advisory Council would not be 
merely a "talking shop", but that it would play an 
effective role in the legislative process; that the 
advisory state proposed for the Council was only a 
transitional phase, wa school of self-government", one more 
station on the railway to the final realisation of Sudanese 
aspirations; that the Government was genuinely prepared to 
amend any of the restrictions that might actually hinder 
the Council*s work; and finally, that the British 
Administration harboured no designs to separate the 
southern from the northern Sudan. This broadcast was 
supplemented by an article in the Sudan Star on 17 January 
1944.1
Following a prolonged period of cautious reconnais­
sance, and taking their cue from the assurances given by 
Newbold in his broadcast, the moderates decided to make 
their move in February 1944. They calculated that the 
best strategy was to avoid making a confidence issue 
of the repeal motion. Although they had a majority on 
the Executive Committee, they did not take a vote on it
1. For the full text of the broadcast, cf. PRO,
FO.571/41363 (J514/185/16); extracts of the broadcast 
are also available in Henderson, on. cit.. pp. 562-7.
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there, lest they should he thus committed to repeal when 
they appeared before the Sixty and be compelled to 
resign if the move failed. They merely invited the 
Committee of Sixty to reconsider the matter, and they 
themselves took part in the debate as individual members 
and not as a bloc committed to either side. In that 
debate, the moderates took the line that the Advisory 
Council was not an isolated institution but that it was, 
as Newbold had declared in his broadcast, part of the 
Government’s whole scheme for associating the Sudanese with 
the administration of the country and for training them 
towards self-government. In this respect, they pointed out, 
to boycott the Advisory Council while co-operating with 
the Government on other councils and in other ways was not 
only inconsistent but essentially detrimental to the 
Congress itself and to the country’s own political 
progress.^
The opposition, however, maintained that no new 
element had come into the situation since the boycott was 
adopted and that consequently there were no grounds for 
repealing it. Newbold’s confirmation that the British 
aimed at achieving self-government for the Sudan had
1. SBIS. Mo. 35, February 1944, PRO, FO.371/41358 
(J58/58/16).
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certainly impressed the militants; hut his declaration,
that the road of self-government was a long and arduous one,
only added to their apprehension that the proposed form
of the Advisory Council would ultimately serve to make it
so. Unlike the moderates, they were more concerned with
what Newbold failed to mention —  the methods by which the
British planned to give the country self-government.
They believed that nothing short of vigorous measures for
social, cultural and economic development (particularly
the lifting of the detested economic restrictions) could
1
guarantee the achievement of this goal. Besides,
Yahya al-Fadli's unsuccessful proposal during the Congress 
elections, that a Legislative Council be formed by the
2
Congress to submit draft legislation to the Government, 
had noticeably impressed some members and these could not 
be persuaded to look instead on the Advisory Council with 
interest. All these factors, combined with Azhari's 
obsession with preventing Ibrahim Ahmad from becoming a 
member of the Advisory Council, eventually defeated the
3
repeal motion by 29 to 19 votes.
Sawt al-Sudan, 3 February 1944.
2. SPIS, No. 33, December 1943, loc. cit.
3. SPIS, No. 35, February 1944, loc. cit. Also,
Newbold to J.A.- Reid, 14.3.1944, in Henderson, 
on. cit., p. 357.
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The decision had profound consequences for future
developments in the Congress and the country. Firstly, it
forced on some prominent leaders of the Congress the
uncomfortable choice of either accepting or rejecting the
Governor-General *s nomination as ordinary members of the
Advisory Council. Ibrahim Ahmad eventually chose to
decline the nomination, genuinely convinced that he could
do more good by remaining President of the Congress and
preventing the Azhari faction from, asserting their influence
on the Executive Committee.’*' °Abd al-Majid Ahmad was more
critical in his reaction: He resigned from the Committee
of Sixty in protest against their decision to maintain the
boycott, but he also declined the nomination to the
Advisory Council lest his opposition to the boycott be
ascribed to motives of personal interest. Muhammad 6Ali
Shawqi, on the other hand, accepted the nomination and
2ceased to be a member of the Congress. Secondly, the 
decision to maintain the boycott had the long-term effect 
of gradually eroding graduates’ allegiance to the Congress. 
Whatever the shortcomings of the Advisory Council, some 
graduates considered it an important symbol of Sudanese
1. SPIS, Bo. 36, March 1944, PRO, FO.371/41348 
IJ58/58/16).
2. SPIS, Mo. 35, February 1944, loc. cit.
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national identity and, in the light of subsequent. Egyptian 
machinations on the future of the Sudan, these nationalists 
found the fetters of the boycott unbearable. They revolted 
against it and they sought to articulate their 
aspirations through channels of political expression 
other than the Congress. This situation let to the rise 
of political parties.
The Sudan Question and the Polarization of Nationalist
Sentiment.
Congress’s boycott of the Advisory Council was to 
become the crucial factor for Azhari in winning Egyptian 
support. The formation of the Advisory Council had been 
universally interpreted by Egyptian nationalists as an 
additional convincing proof that, under the protection of 
the Treaty, the Sudan Government was encouraging a 
separatist Sudanese movement inimical to Egypt’s interests, 
and that unless they did something about it quickly they 
might lose the Sudan for good.'*' Accordingly, in the 
debate on the Speech from the Throne in November 1943, 
speakers from all parties insisted that, immediately the 
war was over, the Egyptian Government should demand
1. Newbold to G.E.R. Sandars (Sudan Agent Cairo), 
24.11.1943, PHO, FO.371/41363 (J264/185/16); 
also, PO.141/903 (-file 840/69/43).
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total evacuation from, and the union of, Egypt and 
the Sudan.
Nahhas Pasha shared the same sentiments, hut he was• 0 *
convinced that the problem should be approached in a more 
subtle manner. He had become increasingly aware that with 
the evolution of Sudanese political consciousness since 
1936, with an Advisory Council in existence and the 
Atlantic Charter in the background, it would be impossible 
for the Condominium partners, separately or jointly, to 
modify the status of the Sudan or even make any new 
decisions about its future without some formal consultation 
of the wishes of the Sudanese people. Since the 1936 
Treaty had been signed, he had also come to know the 
Sudanese better and to appreciate that any Egyptian claim 
to sovereignty over the Sudan, deriving from rights of 
conquest, was highly offensive to them. He had even come 
to realise that some Sudanese nationalists really wished 
to preserve and develop an autonomous identity. In the 
circumstances, he considered that the best approach might 
be to base the Egyptian case on a direct appeal to the 
Sudanese so that, when the Sudan Question was raised again, 
it would not be merely in the form of bilateral 
negotiations with the British Government about Egyptian 
rights in the Sudan, but rather in the form of political 
proposals to be put to the Sudanese. Accordingly, while
251
emphasizing to the Egyptian Deputies that the 1936 Treaty
had reserved the question of sovereignty over the Sudan for
the future, Nahhas concurrently assured Sudanese
nationalists that Egypt's relationship with the Sudan would
not he that of ruler and subject. "/Egypt/ and the Sudan
are one nation," he said. "Its sons have the same rights
and obligations as we have."'*'
The speech formalised a tactical change in the Egyptian
approach to the Sudan Question. Henceforth, the new line
put out by Egyptian nationalists was that they fully
accepted the desire of the Sudanese for an autonomous
identity; that they did not regard the Sudan as a dependency
of Egypt; that they had no desire to force the Sudan into
any union with Egypt which would be prejudicial to its
distinctive identity but that, on the contrary, they would
like to see the Sudanese attain full self-government and
preserve an autonomous status on the basis of equal rights
and obligations with Egyptians in a common allegiance to
the Egyptian crown. It was probably in connection with such
a changing tactic that PrincecUmar Tusun suggested to
Muhammad al-Khallfa Sharif that there would be no objection *
to the Sudan having its own local government under a
1. Nahhas's speech at the V/afdist Congress, 14.11.1943* 
in*SPIS, Ho. 32, November 1943* THO, EG.371/41348 
(J58758/16).
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— 1Sudanese wali.v representing the Egyptian Grown; and it
was probably an indication of things to come that Yahya
al-Eadli and Y^Li al-Birayr took an active part in an
Egyptian by-election, in March 1944, campaigning for a
2
candidate who advocated the unity of the Kile Valley.
The above instances were the overt manifestations of 
a new Egyptian strategy, aiming at mobilizing the support 
of both Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman and the Sudanese nationalists. 
Nahhas evidently believed that to gain the one but lose the 
other would only complicate matters in any negotiations 
with the British Government. The doubts that previously 
plagued him about the nature and objectives of the Congress 
were almost totally dispelled by the Congress's boycott of 
the Advisory Council; and, aware of the nationalists' 
distaste of the purely advisory nature of the Council, he 
offered to them instead the more palatable prospect of a 
higher political status in a Legislative Assembly under the 
Egyptian crown. His gamble, as far as the Congress was 
concerned, paid off: The Executive Committee, under Azhari's
Presidency, sent a telegram to Hahhas, expressing their 
appreciation of his views concerning the fraternal character
1. Hewbold to G.E.R. Sandars, 24*11.1943, loc. cit.
2. SPIS, No. 36, March 1944, loc. cit.
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of the relations between Egypt and the Sudan.
In regard to Sayyid .^bd al-Rahman and the Mahdists,
however, Nahhas1s speech solicited a different response 
• •
altogether. Since June 1943, Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman had
become increasingly apprehensive about the revival of
Egyptian interest on the Sudan. His attitude hardened
as he grew more convinced that the Egyptians planned to seek
a settlement of the Sudan Question immediately after the 
2
war. Like other pro-independence nationalists, he 
resented both Nahhasrs implication that Egypt, by the 1936 
Treaty, had not surrendered her sovereignty over the Sudan, 
and his declaration that the two countries formed one nation. 
He decided, therefore, to come right into the open and make 
his attitude known in unequivocal terms. In an editorial 
i*1 Al-Nil. written on his instructions as a reply to 
Nahhasrs speech, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman strongly advocated 
that independence should definitely be the ultimate goal 
of the Sudan, that the Sudanese should openly proclaim 
their aspiration for it, and that they should "set out 
to reach it by deserving steps with the help of the
1. SPIS. No. 32, November 1943, loc. cit.
2. SPIS, No. 27, May-June 1943, loc. cit.
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friendly guardian (Britain) and the loving sister (Egypt).'1'1' 
Neither Britain nor Egypt, he argued, could deny the right 
of the Sudanese to seek independence, firstly "because they 
had already proclaimed their aim to he the "welfare of the 
Sudan", and secondly because they had morally bound
2
themselves by the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
This was indeed a most categorical repudiation of
Egyptian claims publicly made by a Sudanese leader since
1924, and it constituted a major setback to Nahhasfs• *
initial tactical objectives. A faint-hearted and indirect 
attempt was made to court Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman again in 
April 1944, but the latter snubbed Egyptian approaches and
1. Editorial, Al-Nil. 30 December 1943* Ahmad lusif 
Hashim, who did not himself write the article, refused 
at first to publish it as an editorial since he was 
unwilling to commit himself personally to the clearly 
anti-Egyptian policy which it_expressed. He demanded 
that Muhammad al-Khalifa Sharif, who had brought it to 
him, should sign it himself. He was informed that the 
Sayyid*s wish was that the article should appear as an 
editorial representing the policy of the paper and that 
he must either publish it as such or resign from the 
editorship. He finally agreed to publish it, but only 
on the understanding that he would absent himself from 
the offices of Al-Nil on the day of its appearance and 
insert in the same issue a note announcing his absence 
on "account of illness". Cf. SPIS. No. 33* December 
1943* loc. cit.
2. In his memoirs, Sayyid °Abd al-Rahman refers to this 
article but he erroneously connects it with the 
Congress Memorandum in 1942. Cf. Jihadun fi Sabil 
al-Istiqlal. (Khartoum, n.d.), p. 42.
blocked firmly any chances of collaboration with Egypt.
With Italy’s surrender heralding an early termination to
the war, and under increasing pressure from both King Faruq
and the Wafdists to do something about the Sudan, Nahhas
concentrated instead on a political cultivation of the
Azhari caucus in the Congress and, at the same time,
launched a press campaign against the "separatist" policies
2of the British in the Sudan. The main theme of this
1. cAbd al-Hadi Bey (the Grand Qadi) and Hamid Bey Sulayman 
(Director of Egyptian Irrigation Department in Sudan) 
purposely visited Aba just as Sayyid 6Abd al-Ra£iman was 
about to leave for Khartoum, and they invited him to 
return with them in their steamer. They probably intended 
to discuss matters in more detail during the long trip
to Khartoum and they probably also hoped that, by 
arriving together at Khartoum docks, they would 
effectively convey the impression that the Sayyid was 
not uncompromisingly hostile to Egyptian interests in 
the Sudan. Quite aware of these implications, Sayyid 
6Abd al-Rahman naturally declined their invitation.
Cf. SPIS,#No. 37, April 1944, PRO, FO.371/41348 
(J58758716).
2. British Embassador (Cairo) to Eoreign Office, June 1944, 
PRO, PO.371/41348 (J2147/185/16); also, Defense Security 
Summary of Egyptian Affairs. 29.6.1944 to 5.7.1944,
PRO, FO.371/41363 (J2639/185/16), Al^Sayyid al-Mahruqi, 
who was the Chef de Bureau at the Office of the Egyptian 
Economic Expert in Khartoum, was believed to have 
spearheaded such activities. He kept in close touch 
with Azhari and other pro-Egyptian members of the 
Congress and allegedly assisted them to organise the 
campaign against the Advisory Council and the general 
line of the Government’s policy of political 
development in the Sudan. In September 1944, he was 
transferred to Cairo, at the request of the Sudan 
Government.
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campaign was that the British planned to separate the Sudan 
from Egypt by nominating Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman independent 
Sultan of the Sudan and concluding a separate treaty with 
him. The campaign reached its climax in September 1944 
when Nahhas, in an interview with the Cairo correspondent 
of the London. Times, categorically repudiated the belief 
that the welfare clause of the 1936 Treaty provided for 
self-government by the Sudanese. Self-government, he 
asserted, or any other political reform for that matter, 
comprised one of the questions still pending settlement 
by further negotiations between the British and the 
Egyptian Governments.^ A few weeks later, on 8 October, 
Nahhas was removed from office by King Faruq, but his 
campaign on the Sudan Question had already affected 
considerably the various schools of nationalist thought 
in the Sudan.
The first of such schools comprised those who believed 
in complete independence for the Sudan immediately after the 
war. Apart from staunch Mahdist nationalists, it included 
a significant number of the intelligentsia who did not
1- SPIS. No. 42, September 1944, PRO, FO.371/41348 
(J58/58/16)„ Na&^as’s statement was probably a 
response to an article published_in Al-Sudan al-Jadid 
on 7 July 1944, in which Ahmad Yusif Hashim expounded 
the various schools of Sudanese nationalist opinion 
on future Sudanese-Egyptian relations.
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regard the Sudan as a territorial part of Egypt hut rather
as a national entity aspiring to an independent existence
of its own. In their view, the Condominium Agreement did
not transform the Sudan into a colony of either Britain
or Egypt but, on the contrary, conferred on the Sudan a
special status, which was expressed more explicitly in the
welfare clause of the 1936 Treaty.'*' In return for the
Sudan's active contribution to the Allied cause, and in
accordance with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, this
school of nationalists genuinely expected the victorious
"United Nations" to reward the Sudanese with a greater
2recognition of their right to self-determination. This 
national aspiration, they felt, had already been clearly 
expressed in the Memorandum of 1942 —  a document which
3
commanded the unanimous support of the Congress.
For these nationalists, the renewed Egyptian campaign 
threatened to obstruct the Sudan's path to independence by 
imposing the undesirable continuation of Condominium rule.
A political status, based solely on the "welfare" clause of
1. Sayyid tod al-Rahman*s statement to Scrivener (Head of 
the Egyptian Department of the Foreign Office), 
26.2.1944, PRO, FO.371/41363 CJ1274/185/16).
2. Editorial, Al-Nil. 21 February 1944.
3. "The Sudan in Egyptian Circles", Al-Nil.
21 August 1944.
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the. Anglo-Egyptian treaty, was rejected outright both as
an inadequate recognition of Sudanese aspirations and a
most unsatisfactory basis for their future political 
1
development. They feared that such an ambiguous status
would provide the Egyptians with an opportunity to intrigue
for the restoration of their sovereignty over the Sudan,
a claim to which they were convinced Egypt had no right,
especially as she had remained neutral and refused to
defend the Sudan in 1940, Furthermore, they believed that
such an unsettling atmosphere would, like in the 1920*s,
promote confusion of direction in nationalist circles and
thus jeopardize Sudanese political development towards
2
self-government and independence. Finally, they were 
genuinely concerned that a successful Egyptian campaign 
would undermine the territorial integrity of the Sudan. 
Convinced that the Southern Policy aimed at shielding 
East Africa from the 1 subversive” influences of Arab 
nationalism, they feared that, if Egyptian pressure became 
unbearable, the British Government might decide to 
partition the Sudan, retaining the southern region under
1. Sayyid*&bd al-Rahman*s statement to Scrivener,
26.2.1944t loc. cit.
2. "Hote by Sheikh Ahmed Othman al Qadi on his stay in 
Egypt from 1.5.43 to 12.10.43"» 23-11.1943> loc. cit.
25 9
British domination. In the circumstances, the pro­
independence nationalists believed that one of their basic 
concerns was to preserve the geographic unity of the Sudan,
and that this could best be achieved by pursuing a policy
1
of complete independence immediately after the war.
The second school of nationalist thought represented 
those who sought to acquire independence from British rule 
through some association with Egypt. They consisted mainly 
of the more militant members of the intelligentsia who 
were deeply disappointed with Newbold's response to the 
Congress Memorandum, and who were consequently very 
sceptical about the British Administration's readiness to 
concede independence to the Sudan after the war. They saw 
in the institution of the Advisory Council further proof 
of the Government's plans to delay Sudanese self-government, 
a measure reminiscent of the Native Administration policies 
adopted in the 1920's in response to earlier nationalist 
agitation. Under such conditions, they genuinely doubted 
whether the intelligentsia could successfully promote 
nationalist aspirations against an alliance of the 
preponderant rural interests in the Advisory Council with 
the Sudan Government, an unholy alliance which could
1. cAbdallah cAbd al-Rahman Nuqdallah, "The Sudan Question 
in Egyptian Papers ", Al-Nil. 2 September 1944*
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effectively 'block steps for immediate independence when 
the time came to consult the Sudanese on the future of 
their country.^
Under the direction of Ismacil al-Azhari and Yahya 
al-Eadli, this group of nationalists decided to appeal over 
the head of the Sudan Government to, and collaborate with, 
Egypt for the independence of the Sudan. In the early 
stages their blue-print for action was largely obscure and 
their initial approaches to Egyptian politicians were, as 
already noted, discouraging. With the change in Nahhas*s 
tactics, however, they were able to formulate a persuasive 
platform of Sudanese collaboration with Egyptian 
nationalists, a platform which they believed to he the 
quickest way to independence. They advocated the unity of 
the Nile Valley under the Egyptian Grown, on the condition 
that the Sudan would be a self-governing partner managing 
its own internal affairs with Egypt representing it in 
foreign policy, on an analogy of "the system followed by
1. "Summary of Criticisms of the Advisory Council 
Legislation", loc. cit.
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England and Scotland In older times"'*' In such a union, 
they argued, the Sudanese would enjoy equal rights and 
responsibilities with their Egyptian brethren and they 
would be represented in both chambers of the Egyptian 
Parliament.
The third school of nationalist thought comprised those
who sought independence through a more balanced approach.
It had included, it its earlier stages, the bulk of what
had been previously referred to as the "moderates'', and its
more prominent figures included Ibrahim Ahmad, A^bd al-Majid
Ahmad, and Ahmad Xusif Hashim. They had grown increasingly
sceptical about their earlier joyful predictions of the
Sudan1s political salvation through the Atlantic Charter,
realising that the intelligentsia had initially merely
imitated people in other countries without really knowing
2
what it was all about. Unlike their pro-independence
1. Badawi Mustafa, "The future of the Sudan", Sawt al-Sudan,
23 Inly 1§^4. The author was editor of Al-M*utamar and
wished to publish it as an_editorial in the Congress
magazine, Ismacil al-‘Atabani, however, acting as
a censor for the Executive Committee, did not allow it
on the grounds that the editor had no right to commit the
Congress to a particular point of view on this paramount
question before the Congress had officially declared its
policy. *Atabani nonetheless offered to publish the
article in Sawt al-Sudan as a personal contribution from
Badawi Mustafa.• #
2. "The Dreams of the Expected Morrow", Sawt al—Sudan. 
17 March 1943.
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colleagues, they believed that the Sudan, at its then
existing stage of political development, could not possibly
become viably independent since the Sudanese lacked the
political institutions, including the economic capacity and
1
military power, to shoulder the burdens of preserving it.
In this perspective, therefore, they were most apprehesive
that, if independence was imposed on the Sudan in opposition
to Egyptian demands, the ambitions of Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman
would lead to the institution of a monarch without real 
2
independence. Such a situation, they argued, would be 
catastrophic to the Sudan's political development because 
the King would be, or at least appear to be, a mere tool in 
the hands of the ruling power, a facade behind which the 
real rulers would exercise their power without responsibility 
to the Sudanese people.
In opposition to their pro-union colleagues, these 
nationalists suspected that, given the Sudan's undeveloped 
political state, any union with Egypt would ultimately 
result in the weaker partner being submerged by the stronger
1. Editorial, Al-Sudan al-Jadid. 7 July 1944. An English 
translation can be found in PRO, 10*371/41363
(J 2634/185/16).
2. "Extract from Conversation between Ibrahim eff. Ahmed, 
President of Graduates' Congress and Mr. E.S. Atiyah, 
Public Relations Officer on 7.1*44", PRO, EG.141/939 
(file 31/9/44); also, 10*371/41363 (J713/185/16).
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in every field. They argued that, if personal 
qualifications constituted the only valid title to senior 
government posts, it would be impossible for the less- 
qualified Sudanese to obtain even a small proportion of 
these posts in competition with Egyptians. The same 
consideration applied in the fields of commerce and 
industry, indeed in any field in which there could be 
competition between Sudanese and Egyptians. Finally, the 
same arguments applied to the question of parliamentary 
representation, in that a minority of Sudanese members 
might fail to obtain the agreement of a joint sitting of 
Parliament to any proposal vital to the interests of the 
Sudan, if that interest happened to be in conflict with the 
interests of the northern part of the Valley.***
In the circumstances, they believed that the Sudanese 
still needed political guidance and training for self- 
government. They held a good opinion of the British as 
administrators, and they wanted to benefit from the British 
presence and become adequately trained before assuming the 
government of the country themselves. But, at the same 
time, they did not wish the British to be present without 
the Egyptians. Much as they admired the British as 
administrators and desired their help, these nationalists
1. Editorial, Al-Sudan al-Jadid. 7 July 1944*
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did not trust them sufficiently to he willing to place the 
Sudan entirely at their mercy. They realised that the 
Sudan was a small and weak, country and that, if the British 
obtained exclusive control over it, the Sudanese would have 
no safeguards against political exploitation. They also 
recognized that, while the Sudan might not benefit directly 
from the Egyptian presence, nevertheless Egyptian 
partnership in the Condominium constituted a significant 
limitation on British prerogatives in the country. In their 
view, therefore, the best course for the Sudanese was to 
maintain, for the time being, the existing Condominium 
Administration, in which Egypt's share was nominal and 
real control in the hands of the British. Within this 
framework, the Sudanese would be able to press for quicker 
training in the arts of self-government and also steadily 
increase their share in the administration until, at a 
Specified future date, they were ready and capable to 
assume fully the burdens of independence.1 Only then, 
when they were free from confusion of thought and 
uninfluenced either by sentiment or fear, would they be
1. Report by the Political Intelligence Centre of the 
Middle East, paper Ro. 66 (1944), PRO, EG.371/41363 
(J3521/185/16). This report is a revised version of 
the Admiralty Intelligence Report on Egypt and the 
Sudan, 7.5.1938, PBO, TO.371/22004 (J2106/2106/16).
265
able to determine wisely and safely their external 
connections with Egypt, Britain and the Arab world.
When Nahhas's campaign intensified, these nationalists 
became apprehensive that their colleagues might 
underestimate Egyptian designs on the Sudan and commit 
themselves by ill-advised and premature pledges from which 
they might find it difficult to free themselves. They 
blamed the Government for the resulting confusion of 
direction in nationalist circles, which they attributed to 
official neglect in working out beforehand constructive 
schemes, showing the stages towards the realisation of 
self-government and obtaining the views of the. 
intelligentsia as to whether the pace could or could not 
be hastened.** They took advantage of the situation, 
however, to urge the Government to translate the policy 
of guardianship to one of partnership by taking immediate 
steps to Sudanize senior government posts, and by 
announcing a clear programme with a specified time limit
1. Editorial, Al-Sudan al-Jadid, 11 February 1944; 
also, "Note on the Discussion between Scrivener 
and Sudanese officials, 26.2.1944% PRO, FO. 371/41363 
(J1418/185/16).
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for the achievement of self-government.1 This programme,
they pointed out, should cover educational, economic and
administrative progress in the country; and, a
democratically-elected Legislative Assembly should be
instituted to discuss and draft the relevant measures,
while Sudanese representatives should be included on the
Governor-GeneralTs Council to take part in the execution
2of Government policy.
Ibrahim Ahmad and Ahmad Yusif Hashim. struggled 
endlessly to get the Congress onto the train of political 
development before the whistle had gone. They emphasized 
the common obligations, rather than the divergent views, 
shared collectively by all nationalists, and they exhorted 
their fellow Congress members to abandon their 
unproductive attitude of critical aloofness toward 
government policy, to examine instead the subjects of 
paramount importance set out in the agenda of the Advisory 
Council, and to express their opinions with a view to
1. Ahmad Yusif Hashim, "Senior Posts are the first step 
toward Self-Government”, Al-Sudan al-Jadid,
3 March 1944* Ahmad Yusif suggested a time limit of 12 
years, being the*balance of the period remaining 
before the 1936 Treaty expired, during which time the 
Condominium powers would continue to rule the Sudan 
as a mandate.
2. Ahmad Yusif Hashim, HTo where is our Country Drifting?*1, 
Al-Sudan al-Jadid, 28.July 1944.
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1
enlightening the Council members. After all, the
primary aim of the Congress was to work for the general
welfare of the country, irrespective of whether Congress
adopted a critical attitude towards the Advisory Council
or collaborated with it.. One aspect of that general
welfare was to cultivate a sense of national consciousness
among all Sudanese, and this task required the highest
degree of. co-operation between all graduates. They
reminded their colleagues that people were still largely
ignorant of their duties, both political and social, to the
community, and that a significant number still relied
2
blissfully on a wrong conception of Providence. A great 
deal of both social education and national consciousness 
therefore needed to be acquired before these people could 
become useful citizens.. Carefully-studied plans must be 
drawn up promptly for the educational and economic 
development of the country, otherwise the delays involved 
in prolonged discussions by technical boards after the 
war would enable foreign interests to obtain an 
undesirably strong foothold in the Sudanese market;
1. Editorials, Al-Nil, 15 April and 24 April 1944.
2. Ibrahim Ahmad, H,The President of the Congress Speaks", 
Al-Sudan al-Jadid. 26 May 1944*
3. Editorial, Sawt al-Sudan* 23 April 1944.1 ' 1 1
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committees must be set up to study the Beveridge plan and 
other similar social schemes, and to find out which of 
these suited the Sudanese life-style; and finally, 
irritating, labour problems and the growing migrations to 
urban areas must be dealt with effectively if social 
disharmony was to be checked.''* All these were important 
tasks for the Congress, the fulfilment of which was 
considered to be vital to a sound political development 
of the Sudan.
These were indeed praiseworthy sentiments and a 
restatement of one of the Congress’s main objectives but, 
in the conditions of 1944, they fell mostly on deaf ears. 
Opposing schools of thought discarded them as measures 
which, though important, nonetheless needed a long time 
to be realised and, as such, would therefore have to take 
second place to the more urgent matter of national 
independence. To reverse the priorities, they felt, meant 
that the progress towards self-government and independence 
would inevitably continue at an unsatisfactory pace, a 
course which, wittingly or unwittingly, would have suited 
perfectly British designs on the Sudan. On the contrary, 
they argued, the desired developments could not take 
place unless Sudanese nationalists had a decisive say in
1. Ahmad Yusif Hashim, "To where is our Country Drifting; 
Internal Developments", Al-Sudan al-Jadid, 4 August 1944*
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formulating the policies of the country —  until, 
that is, they had gained first "the political 
kingdom".
C H A P T E R  F I V E
THE EORMATIQN OE POLITICAL PARTIES
The Sectarian Involvement in Rationalist Politics.
The Sudan Question and the accompanying polarization 
of nationalist sentiment had profound repercussions on 
subsequent developments in the country. Not only had these 
issues undermined the solidarity of the Congress and sowed 
the seeds of mutual distrust among the nationalists 
themselves; worse still, they accentuated sectarian 
rivalry and involvement in the nationalist struggle. When, 
early in March 1944, rumours about the names of likely 
candidates for the Governor-General *s eight nominations 
to the Advisory Council began to circulate, Sayyid ^ ALi 
al-Mirghani became extremely alarmed at what he considered 
to be a preponderance of Mahdists among them. He had 
already been seriously shaken by the provincial results 
which, apart from four Mirghanists and a few neutrals, 
were seen as definitely favourable to Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman. 
These members were, if not adherents, at least personal 
friends of the latter and had no relations with Sayyid
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tfAlip'L Mustafa Abu’l-Ila's^ election by the Chamber of • •
Commerce was another disappointment to Sayyid cAli for
the same reason, his own candidate for that seat being
- 3the octogenarian Sid Ahmad Suwar al-Dhahab. ^
Having no legitimate grounds, however, for protesting 
against the results, Sayyid cAli concentrated his attack 
on the Governor-General*s nominees* In an interview with 
the Governor of Khartoum Province, he protested against the 
preponderance of Mahdists among them and he put forward the 
names of some of his friends and adherents for 
consideration as alternative candidates. He remained 
impervious to subsequent Government arguments that the 
selection had been made oh the sole basis of individual 
qualifications and without any regard to sectarian leanings, 
and he consequently sent a letter to Newbold excusing 
himself from accepting honorary membership on the Advisory 
Council, on the grounds "that the majority of the country 
(was) not represented” on it.
The Government moved swiftly to neutralize the implied 
threat of Sayyid 6Ali's boycott of the Advisory Council.
1. SPIS, No. 36, March 1944, loc. cit.
2. Mustafa Abu'l-Ila; Prominent Mahdist merchant and 
trader in Khartoum, with branch offices in Egypt.
3. Sid Ahmad Suwar al-Dhahab: Promient Mirghanist 
merchant and trader-in Omdurman.
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In. a letter to him, followed hy an interview with the 
Governor-General, Newbold assured him first that the 
Advisory Council had neither been formed as a partisan 
body nor that it would be allowed to behave as such; and 
secondly, that the Government was neither committed to 
any sectarian leader nor that it had any ulterior policy 
which it wished to carry out through the Council. In an 
effort to dissuade him from further arm-twisting, Newbold 
impressed on him that a refusal to co-operate with the 
Government in such an important matter would be interpreted 
as an extremely unfriendly act.'*' Sayyid ^li reluctantly 
conceded. But, at the same time, he decided to make the 
most out of Newbold*s assurances, and he flashed the 
letter about with a view to countering, any impression that 
the Government contemplated a change in the status of his 
arch-rival.
Sayyid cAli’s passivity did not last long, however.
If he had any doubts left about the prospects of a Mahdist 
control of the Advisory Gouncil, these were soon dispelled 
by a number of other events, firstly, in preparation for 
the first session of the Council, the local members held 
meetings in the house of Yaftqub al-Hilu and discussed the
1. SPIS, No. 37, April 1944, loo, cit.
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1various items on the agenda. This initative by the 
Mahdists naturally angered Sayyid 6Ali and increased his 
hostility to the Council. Secondly, in the inaugural 
address, the Governor-General described the Advisory 
Council as the first concrete manifestation of Sudanese 
nation and clearly implied that the aim of the Government 
was to create such a self-governing. Sudanese nation. 
Whatever impressions the speech had in other quarters, 
Sayyid cALi did not relish it much for, given his 
apprehensions about an autonomous Sudan, he interpreted 
this statement as a negation of the assurances previously 
given to him. Finally, contrary to the initially expressed 
scepticism about the role and the performance of the 
Council, the first session turned out to be a notable 
success, and the belief widely spread that the Council 
would prove to be a truly valuable institution in the 
political life of the country. Some observers went even 
further and expressed the view that, if things developed 
normally, the Council would push the Congress completely 
into the background for at least the next few years.
Under these circumstances, Sayyid cAli became extremely 
alarmed when, in June 1944, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman toured
1. SPIS, Mo. 38, Hay 1944, PRO, EO.371/41348
(J58/58/16). Only Mirghani Hamza (a Khatmi) refused 
to attend.
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hitherto reputedly Mirghanist spheres of influence. On 
his way back from a vacation in Arkawit, Sayyid 6Abd 
al-Rahman broke his journey at Atbara for a one-day visit 
to Berber, Abadiya and Damer. In all of these places, 
he was met by large crowds and feted at parties given in 
his honour by the local notables, parties which were 
noticeably attended by most of the local Mirghanists.
At Damer, the capital of the Province, he dined with the 
Acting Governor just before he boarded his train to resume 
the journey, a courtesy inevitably loaded with serious 
implications.
The tour alarmed Mirghanist quarters in two respects
Firstly, it had demonstrated, as Sayyid Abd al-Rahman
no doubt intended, his high standing and increasing
prestige in a part of the country which had previously been
q
regarded as Sayyid cAli's preserve. Secondly, Mirghanist
1- SPIS. No. 39, June 1944, PRO, FO.371/41348
(J58/58/16). Organised Mahdist incursions into 
Mirghanist preserves started in the_early 1940’s.
In June 1942, Sayyid ^ Abdullahi al-Fadil, under the 
pretext of purely private motives, visited the 
Northern Province with the general object, and 
cumulative effect, of boosting Mahdist influence and 
linking up various Mahdist pockets in the area. But 
the Mirghanists' initial apprehensions were later 
compensated for by the split in the Mahdist camp 
initiated by °Abdullahi and the consequent loss of 
Mahdist control of the Congress. For details of 
Sayyid 6Abdullahi's tour and initial Mirghanist reactions, 
cf. SPIS, No. 17, IB & 19 (April-September 1942),
CRO, PORT SUDAN 2/19/133-
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khulafa*. and particularly Sayyid °Ali, were enraged that
the Government had even allowed the trip to take place
at all. In the atmosphere prevailing at the time, they
saw in the Government's acquiescence to Sayyid cAbd
al-Rafcman1 s tour one more indication of a covertly-
orchestrated campaign to make him Sultan of the Sudan.
They had warned Sayyid ^ .bd al—Rahman off such a dreaded
course earlier when, in their reply to his article in
Al-Nll on. the future of the Sudan, they had expressed a
veiled preference to a union with Egypt. They had then
argued that there were some definite benefits to be
derived from the formation of ties between Arab countries'
which could not, for one reason or another, survive as
1separate independent entities. Their growing suspicions 
that the Government supported Sayyid °Abd al-Rahman*s 
ambitions increasingly motivated them to come out 
unequivocally against the policy of an independent 
Sudan under Mahdist control.
In August 1944, the occasion presented itself to
1. Editorial, Sawt al-Sudan. 9 January 1944. In its
original form, the_article contained a veiled attack on 
Sayyid °Abd al-Rahman in a paragraph expressing the hope 
that the victorious democracies would not try to 
create in the Sudan "the hated and obsolete system of 
the sultans". Although the sentence was deleted by 
the censor from the published form, it nonetheless 
indirectly served to drive the point home to the 
Government.
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Sayyid 6Ali to make his feelings known both to the 
Government and to the public at large. Egyptian papers 
reported then that he had proposed to visit Egypt to 
express his loyalty to King Faruq and his solid support 
for the unity of the Nile Valley, but that the visit had 
unexpectedly been postponed. Sayyid cAli did not circulate 
or publish a dementi on these reports in order to show 
quite forcefully what his attitude would be if the possible 
constitution, of a separate kingdom in the Sudan under 
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman were to materialize.1 He wished to 
remind the British that, unlike his rival, he did not 
entertain any dynastic or national aspirations that would 
be definitely opposed to Egyptian sovereignty; and that 
consequently, if the choice between Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman 
and King Paruq was forced on him he would naturally 
choose the latter.
Eor the time being, the primary concern of the 
Mirghanists was to defeat a renewed Mahdist endeavour to 
reassert their influence in the Congress, the only political 
institution which the Mirghanists felt was capable of 
putting up an organized resistance to Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman's ambitions. In an effort to counter the
1. SPIS, No. 41, August 1944, PRO, FQ.371/41348 
(J58/58/16).
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Egyptian attacks on him as the patron of a separationist
movement, Sayyid 6Abd al-Rahman had taken the initiative
and had proposed a reconciliation with Sayyid eAli as a
step toward the formation of a united front which would
1speak with authority in the name of the whole country* 
Sayyid °Ali, however, sensed quite clearly that such a move 
would inevitably strengthen his rival's position, and he 
was definitely not prepared to do so, particularly with the 
Congress elections only a few weeks away. In 1943, he 
reasoned, the Mahdists had managed to heal the split among 
their ranks and to impose their control on the Executive 
Committee; if, in the forthcoming elections, the Mahdists 
appeared to have healed the rift with the Mirghanists, they 
would probably extend their influence in the Committee of 
Sixty as well. With the war coming to an end, and with the
prospect of both the Advisory Council and the Congress
Committees under Mahdist domination, Sayyid cAli shuddered 
at the sinister likelihood that any British consultation 
of Sudanese "responsible" opinion on the future of the 
country might, under such conditions, well result in the 
setting up of an independent Sudan under Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman. He therefore rejected these conciliatory 
initiatives and instructed his lieutenants instead to rally
1- SPIS, No. 41, August 1944, loc. cit.
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Mirghanist support behind Azhari, and to thus return a 
predominantly anti-Mahdist majority to the Congress 
Committees.
In the meantime, the main Congress factions had geared 
up for the 1944 elections. But, on this occasion, a new 
element had been added to the political equation: Whereas
the previous two elections were fought on mainly personal 
alliances, this time the issue of union versus independence 
affected considerably factional re-alignment within the 
Congress. Azhari*s group, henceforth officially adopting 
the name of al-Ashiqqa*, adopted a new political programme.1 
They had previously pursued a policy of rigid adherence to 
the demands of the 1942 Congress Memorandum but, under the 
influence of the Sudan Question debates, they now advocated 
a policy of complete political amalgamation of the Sudan
1. The name, al-Ashiqqa*, originated as an innocent jest, 
first put out by cAbd al-Raziq al-6Atabani in referring 
to the Azhari and Radii brothers who formed the nucleus 
of the faction in 1942. Subsequently, under the 
intensification of personal animosities, Badri al-Rayih 
gave the term a more sarcastic connotation, using it to 
ridicule the Azhari-Radii caucus. In a more neutral 
sense of reference, the term gradually gained widespread 
use among the graduates in Khartoum and in 1944, 
seeking to connote a special relationship with their 
Egyptian nationalist brethren, the Azhari faction 
adopted it as their official name. Apart from Ismacil 
al-Azhari, the leading members of_the group included 
Xahya al-Radli, Muhammad Nur al-Din, Ahmad Muhammad 
Xasln, Mahmud al-Eaclli, 6Ali Hamid, Babikr al-Qabani, 
Badawi Mustafa, and Hasan cAwadallah. Cf. Al-Sudan 
al-Jadid.* i7 November 1944.
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1
with Egypt under one Grown. Despite this significant 
change in political objectives, the Ashiqqa’ programme 
proved to be quite popular with a large number of Congress 
supporters, particularly among the ranks of the junior 
officials and commercial employees, who nurtured strong 
anti-Government feelings.
To meet the election challenge of the Ashiqqa*, 
the other Congress factions modified their own platforms 
accordingly. Like the Ashi-qqa*, they too shared, to some 
degree, the growing feeling among the graduates that, if 
the Sudan were to be completely separated from Egypt, it 
might be cut off altogether from the caravan of the Arab 
world. Unlike the Ashiqqa*, however, they were 
apprehensive, also to varying degrees, that too close a 
tie would ultimately lead to Egyptian domination and the 
subjugation of progress in the Sudan to Egypt's 
insurmountable needs. The Abu Ruf group, joined by other 
graduates and re-naming itself al-Ittihadiyyin, advocated 
a dominion status for the Sudan under Egypt, "similar to 
the union of Australia and Canada, for instance, with
1. SPIS, No. 42, September 1944, loc. cit.
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Great Britain." The Ahrar, on the other hand, sought
nothing more than a federation between two self-governing
2and equal nations*
The Hashmab, who had earlier advocated that the Sudan 
should be placed under an Anglo-Egyptian mandate with 
independence to follow by 1956, found themselves practically 
isolated* They basically repudiated Egyptian claims to the 
Sudan and they strongly opposed the programme of the 
Ashiqqa*, Accordingly, the would have preferred to confine 
their political platform only to a call for the granting 
of national independence at the end of the mandate and to 
refrain from any reference to relations with Egypt, thereby 
reserving for the Sudanese the sole right to determine, 
freely at a later stage, the question of a political 
connection with Egypt. But the paramount need of the 
moment to defeat the Ashiqqa* "fusionists" dictated a 
tactical change in their campaign, a change calculated to 
secure as large a body of supporters as possible for the
1. Programme of al-Ittihadiyyin in SPIS, No. 45, October
1944, PRO, E®.371/41348 (J58/58/16). Leading members
of the group were Ismafiil al-^ Atabani, ^Abdallah _
Mirghani^ Ibrahim Yusif Sulayman,cUthman Ibrahim Ishaq,
and Mahmud al-Eaki.•
2. Leading members of the_Ahrar included cAbd al-Rahim 
Shaddad, Ahmad al-Bashlr’ al-cAbadi, Muhammad al-Dib,
Muhi al-Din al-Birayr and Al-Tayyib Shibayka.
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ideal of autonomy. They decided, therefore, to include 
in their programme an article calling for the formation of 
a union with Egypt following the expiration of the 
mandatory period. They purposely left undefined the nature 
of such a union believing, like their Ittihadiyyln and 
Ahrar colleagues, that a loose "union" formula would 
provide a wide basis of agreement against the Ashiqqa*. 
Furthermore, they believed that such a loose formula had 
a propitiatory element: Given the strong feelings of
Egyptian nationalists on the status of the Sudan, such a 
formula conceivably helped to preserve friendly relations 
with Egypt and to avert an otherwise sharp conflict which 
might ultimately prove embarrassing to the Sudanese, if 
not detrimental to the realisation of their national 
aspirations. With their platform thus redefined, and with 
new recruits joining their ranks, the Hashmab group
_ i
renamed itself al-Qawmiyyin.
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman had spent most of October 1944 
at his home in Aba island, quietly supervising his cotton 
plantations. On his return to Khartoum, he was dismayed
1. The group set up a "Secretariat^ of 12 members, under 
the direction of Al-Sayyid al-Fil (the ex-Mufti1s son, 
then a clerk in the Finance Department), to co-ordinate 
their activities, OtherJLeading members were Ahmad 
Yusif Hashim, cAbd al—Halim Muhammad, Yusif Mustafa 
al—Tinay, Muhammad Hamad al-NIl, Amin Babikr^and 
Ja^afar Babikr Jacafar. Cf, Al-Sudan al-Jadid,
20 October 1944,
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to learn of the new positions adopted by the various
factions, and he became extremely angry with the Qawmiyyin
for having adopted the "union” formula in their published
declarations. Ahmad Yusif attempted to justify his change
of tactics but Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman remained
uncompromising on this point. He objected unequivacally
to any suggestion of ultimate union, however vague and
conditional, and he told the Qawmiyyin that he would not
support them in the elections, unless they pledged to
pursue a policy of full independence in the Congress
Committees and cut out all talk of an ultimate union 
1with Egypt. Several meetings were held between him and 
the Qawmiyyin but. no compromise formula was found that 
would satisfy both sides.
While these meetings were still going on, Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman learned of the Mirghanist commitment to the 
Ashiqqa*. He realised immediately that, without the counter 
support of his Ansar followers, the elections would most 
probably result in a decisive defeat of the other (anti- 
Ashiqqa*) factions in the Congress. He hesitated at first 
on whether to intervene or not, for fear of incurring 
Government dlsapproval, but he finally decided to do so. 
Accordingly, he instructed both Sayyid 6Abdullahi al-Eadil
SPIS. No. 43, October 1944, loc. cit.
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and Muhammad al-Khalifa Sharif to mobilize all the 
Mahdist elements in the capital in support of his 
nominees.
By election day, on 27 November 1944, the whole
campaign had clearly resolved itself into a struggle on
the old sectarian basis between the Mahdists and the
Mirghanists, and practically all the groups that had
formed themselves as professedly independent bodies were
definitely ranged under the Ansar or Khatmi banner,'*'*
The result had become inevitable from the moment that 
the two sects decided to throw their numerical weight 
into the elections. Under such circumstances, no 
independent group could hope for any success if it did 
not enjoy the backing of one side or the other. The 
Mirghanist support for the Ashiqqa* left the rival factions 
(Qawmiyyin, Ahrar and a section of the Ittihadiyyin) 
with no other choice but to silly themselves openly
1. In 1944, the number of registered Congress members stood 
at 9400. Admission cards had been issued to 5864 of 
them, but the number who actually attended and voted 
was 4667. They were mostly sectarian adherents, 
workers, small tradesmen and cultivators from Khartoum 
North rural areas. In order to "qualify” as voters 
under the rules of the Congress,-illiterate sectarian 
followers were required only to demonstrate an ability 
to write their own names. Consequently, potential 
voters were seen practicing, under the direction of 
their convassers, writing their names on the soles of 
their marqubs outside the balloting booth. Cf.
Khartoum Province Monthly Diary, November 1944, para 
3(a), CEO, CIVSEC 57/21781.
b)
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with the Ansar and depend on the Mahdist block vote.'*'
The prevailing conditions, however, strongly favoured
the Ashiqqa'-Mirghanist alliance,' Firstly, the year 1944
saw the increased migration into Khartoum of people from 
2
rural areas. The Government*s system of ration cards, 
which had been imposed on grain, sugar and textile goods 
on the basis of specific amounts per person, had acted as 
an attractive stimulus to such migrations. Under the 
ration card system, people felt secure that they were 
guaranteed the supply of their personal requirements and, 
by bringing in their relatives, those already resident in 
Khartoum were able to actually increase their family quotas. 
Coming from neighbouring villages around Khartoum, the 
greater number of those involved in such migrations were 
Mirghanist adherents, and they thereby augmented the 
traditionally-existing Mirghanist majority in the population 
of the Three Towns. The sectarian dice was thus heavily 
loaded in favour of the Ashiqqa*. Secondly, the Ansar 
did not enter the field in earnest until a short time before 
the elections. Until the very end, they were in a divided 
state of mind as to whether they should ally themselves
X. SPIS, Ho. 44, Hovember 1944, PRO, ED.371/45872 
'(.J97/97/16).
2. Khartoum Province Monthly Diary. December 1944,
CHO, CIVSEC 57/21/81.
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with any of the existing groups or not, whereas the 
Mirghanists had committed themselves solidly behind the 
Ashiqqa’. Finally, quite apart from their sectarian 
support, the Ashiqqa* were a far better organised and a 
more united party than any of their opponents, and they 
enjoyed the support of the bulk of the younger graduates 
in canvassing for votes.
The election results were consequently a sweeping 
victory for the Ashiqqa*-Mirghanist alliance. This 
outcome was largely due to the success of their propaganda, 
which threatened the voters with the return of the 
Mahdiyya, and with Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman as King of the 
Sudan, if they failed to support the Ashiqqa* party. The 
folly of some of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman1s own followers, who 
had themselves been propagating the kingship idea, 
contributed considerably to the Mahdist defeat. The 
failure of the Sayyid himself to make any attempt to 
refute the idea inevitably lent support to the Ashiqqa* 
propaganda. In the event, the Ashiqqa* won 36 seats on 
the Council of Sixty and on the following day, with the 
Mahdist and Ahrar members abstaining, this majority 
voted into office an all-Ashiqqa* Executive Committee 
under the presidency of Ismacil al-Azhari.'*'
1. SPIS, No. 44, November 1944, Appendix "A**, loc. cit.
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The Formation of the Umma Party.
The result of the 1944 Congress elections was a
decisive stage in a series of events that eventually led
to the formation of the Umma party. Newbold had believed
that the majority of the intelligentsia, as well as
Sayyid tfAli and provincial tribal notables, were inclined
to favour the continuation of the Condominium for a
further period of 10 to 15 years# By August 1944, however,
he had become apprehensive that Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman* s
political ambitions would drive the Mirghanists and other
non-sectarian elements into the Egyptian camp; that Sayyid
cAli would go to any length to counter his rival’s campaign
to cash in on Sudanese self-government; and that the result
of all this would be the inevitable emergence of a definite
"union with Egypt" movement. He sought to persuade the
more moderate graduates to damp down the Sayyids* rivalries,
and to form some sort of a united front which would
devote its immediate energies to the practical realisation
of his internal self-government programme, without
2
prejudice to the eventual political issue.
In a characteristic stroke, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman
1. Report by the Political Intelligence Centre of the 
Middle East. Paper No 66-(1944)7 loc. cit.
2. Robertson to Sudan Agent (Cairo), 8.4.1945, PRO, 
FO.371/45984 (J1457/165/16).
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began to steal the show from Newbold. He had himself
become extremely concerned with the renewed Egyptian press
campaign for unity of the Nile Valley, a campaign in which
Sudanese students in Egypt, and especially cAli al-Birayr,
had taken a very active part. In dune 1944, 6Ali al-Birayr
had commenced publication of a weekly magazine in Egypt,
called Al-Sudan, which was strongly anti-British and which
continually urged the Egyptian Parliament to tackle
immediately the settlement of the Sudan Question. In July,
Al-Sudan declared that its aim was to propagate the policy
of unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian Crown.
This pro-Egyptian commitment by Al-Sudan induced Sayyid
cAbd al-Rahman to consider with interest the proposal put
forward by some senior nationalist to set up the publication
of a new independent daily, quite separate from him and
Al-Nil. which would be unequivocally dedicated to the cause
1of "the Sudan for the Sudanese". He felt that the scheme, 
while not satisfactorily amenable to his control, nonetheless 
promised to mibilize the widest support possible against . 
Egyptian claims on the Sudan and that, coming at a time 
when Newbold was making parallel initiatives, it would
1. SPIS, No. 41, August 1944, loc. cit. Some of the
nationalists who had discussed this subject with Sayyid 
°Abd al-Rahman included cAbdallah Khalil, *Abd al-Karim 
Muhammad,*Shaykh Ahmad cUthman al-Qadi and Muhammad
*Ali Shawqi.
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expectedly gain the approval and support of the 
1
Government.
Newbold*s hopes subsequently foundered, and Sayyid 
6Abd al-Rahman*s expectations of hammering out a united 
front collapsed with Sayyid 6Ali*s rejection of his proposal 
of reconciliation. By the time the Congress elections were 
held, graduate attitudes to a union with Egypt had evolved 
in exactly the opposite direction to that anticipated by 
Sayyid cAbd al-Ra^man. Even the Hashmab, his long-standing 
allies in the Congress, had deserted the fold. Sayyid fiAbd 
al-Rahman, therefore, realized that he could no longer 
safely sit on the sidelines and depend on others to preserve 
the sovereignty of the Sudan. He had already seriously 
contemplated, even before the elections were held, that if
1. In fact, the idea was basically attractive to Newbold.
In December 1944, the promoters of the scheme seized the 
opportunity of the presence in Khartoum of the provincial 
members of the Advisory Council to broach to them the 
idea of the proposed newspaper, to be called Al-Umma, 
which was to serve as the organ of the "Sudan for the 
Sudanese" movement. Some of these provincial notables 
did not wish to commit themselves to the scheme until 
they had consulted their Governors. The attitude of the 
Government, expressed to them informally, was that, 
although there was no likelihood of concrete results 
from this idea, "a new paper, representing rural as 
well as urban interests and not completely under the 
control of either the Mahdist or Mirghanist party, would 
be welcomed." /Cf. SPIS, No. 45, December 1944, PRO,
FO.371/45972 (J97/97/16}7- This earlier approval of 
the newspaper scheme subsequently led to the suspicion 
that the Umma party was a creation of the British 
Administration.
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the Ashiqqa* won decisively he would instruct his supporters
to secede from the Congress and form themselves into a new
party, opposed to the Congress and pledged to work for
1
self-government and independence.
Apart from interpreting the election result as a slap
in his face, Sayyid tfAbd al-Ra£unan regarded it as posing a
more immediate and specific danger* He suspected that the
Ashiqqa* had been pressured by their Egyptian connections
to produce, in return for material and moral support, a
Congress resolution calling for a union with Egypt —  a
measure ostensibly intended to counter in advance any
unsound expression of Sudanese national aspirations that
might come from the Advisory Council, but which could be
used ultimately by Egypt to settle the Sudan Question in
her favour. The Ashiqqa* had already contemplated such a
move in April 1944, when they made an unsuccessful manoeuvre
to table a motion in the Congress Committee of Sixty
deprecating any Government policy or action that would be
2
calculated to sever the Sudan from Egypt. Unlike then, 
Sayyid tfAbd al-Rahman was alarmed that this time, with a 
clear majority in both Congress Committees, there was 
virtually nothing to block the Ashiqqa* from passing
1. SPIS, Ho. 43, October 1944, loc. cit.
2. SPIS. No. 37, April 1944, loc. cit.
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such a resolution.
To meet this threat, the Mahdist camp rejected the
interpretation of the Ashiqqa* that the election result
constituted a vote of confidence in the "unionist" platform,
and they also sought to deprive the Congress of undisputed
authority to speak on behalf of all the nationalist factions.
Taking their cue from the general criticism voiced by
graduates on the indiscriminate canvassing of voters in the
elections,1 leading Mahdist members of the Committee of
Sixty manoeuvred to convince all opposition members to table
a motion demanding the strictest enforcement of membership
qualification requirements at every election and if
defeated, as they expected to be, to resign and repudiate
2
the Congress in its then existing form.
The manoeuvre failed, however, for a number of reasons. 
In the first place, some opposition members regarded it as 
motivated primarily by sectarian considerations and they 
were not prepared to be dragged into the sectarial feud.
In the second place, the attitude of the Ashiqqa* themselves 
began to change in December 1944. Sayyid fAli, comfortably 
confident as a result of his victory over his rival,
1. Editorials, Sawt al-Sudan. 2 December 1944; and 
Al-Kll. 3 December 1944.
2. SPIS. No. 44, November 1944, loc. cit.
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became noticeably reluctant to sanction any move by the
Ashiqqa* to produce a formal resolution in the Congress on
union with Egypt. He realized very well that such a step
would not only alienate the Government but would also most
probably push it into Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman*s arms. Without
Mirghanist support, the Ashiqqa* dared not make any
adventurous moves. This factor, together with the growing
criticism, even within his own party, of Egyptian attacks
on the idea of Sudanese nationality, induced Azhari to
declare that the aim of the Ashiqqa* was not actually
fusion with Egypt, but a dominion status under the
1
Egyptian crown and flag.
A third factor which defeated the Mahdist manoeuvre 
was a growing attitude among opposition members to accept
1. SPIS. No. 45, December 1944, loc. cit. In September 
1944, six members_of the^Advisory Council tincluding 
Shaykh Ahmad4Uthman al-Qadi, cAbdallah Khalil, and 
Muhammad *cAli Shawqi) officially requested that the 
subject of Sudanese nationality should be included in 
the agenda of the next session. This subject had 
constantly been looked upon as a very effective means 
of asserting Sudanese national identity. It formed one 
of the demands in the 1942 Congress Memorandum and, 
since late 1943, it became a vital objective of those 
seeking complete independence. However, as it was a 
sensitive issue for the Egyptians, the Government 
simply made a factual statement on the legal and 
constitutional difficulties of establishing Sudanese 
nationality, and did not allow any debate on the 
subject. Egyptian reactions to the raising of the 
subject itself were noticeably hostile and this in 
turn caused considerable resentment among Sudanese 
nationalists. Cf. Editorial, Al-Nil. 50 December 1944.
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the election results. In presenting the Congress 
programme of action to a meeting of the Committee of Sixty 
in January 1945, Azhari affirmed that the Executive 
Committee would first make a careful study of the aspects 
regarding the future status of the Sudan before arriving 
at "a resolution suitably expressing the hopes and 
aspirations of the country.1,1 The opposition members 
were not satisfied with such assurances and they sought to 
amend the programme by including the Congress Memorandum 
of 1942 as an item of priority for implementation by the 
new Executive. The Memorandum contained a demand for the 
legalization of Sudanese nationality, and the object of 
the opposition in pressing for its inclusion in the 
programme was to tie down the Ashiqqa* to this demand, 
making it virtually impossible for them to pursue a policy 
of fusion with Egypt. Azhari resisted the amendment on 
the grounds that, since the substance of the Memorandum 
was contained in the various items of the programme, its 
inclusion as an item by itself would be superfluous. The 
opposition, however, supported by a significant number of 
the Ashiqqa’, succeeded in carrying the motion for its 
inclusion. The outcome of the debate encouraged
1. SPIS. Bo. 46, January 1945, PRO, EO.371/45972 
(J97/97/16).
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opposition members to believe that they could play an
effective role in the Congress and consequently increased
the already evident willingness of most moderates to
acquiesce .for the moment to the election results. Thus,
the earlier tendency to condemn and challenge the new
Executive Committee died down considerably.
Pro-independence nationalists, however, did not
feel secure any more in the wake of these developments in
the Congress movement, and they persisted in the task of
organising themselves to meet effectively any determined
move by Egypt to reassert her claims to the Sudan.
In early January 1945, some thirty graduates held a
meeting in Omdurman to frame the rules and programme of a
new political organisation.1 Proposals were put
forward and a committee, consisting of Shaykh Ahmad^thman
al-Qadi, Muhammad 6Ali Shawqi and Muhammad cUthman Mirghani,
was appointed to study them and to draw up the necessary
rules and a relative programme. On 18 February, with all
- 2
preparations completed, cAbdallah Khalil submitted 
the constitution of the newly-formed Umma party to the
1. These graduates, mostly Mahdists and Qawmiyyin, included 
cAbdallah Khalil, Ibrahim Ahmad, Muhammad al-Khallfa 
Sharif, Ahmad Yusif Hashim* and 6Abd* al-Karlm Muhammad.
2. cAbdallah Khalil: Born 1888; served in Egyptian army 1910-
1924; continued in Sudan Defence Force 1926—44,when he
retired as brigadier; member of Advisory Council 1944-47;
Secretary General of Umma party 1945-58; Leader of
Legislative Assembly 1948-52; Prime Minister 1956-58.
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Government for approval*
The proposed constitution was an innovation in many
respects* Adopting the motto of "The Sudan for the
Sudanese”, the Umma party committed itself quite clearly
to a definite political objective —  namely, "to work for
the realization of the independence of the Sudan within its
present geographic boundaries, and for the maintenance of
2
friendly relations with Egypt and Great Britain." Unlike 
the Congress, the party did not restrict its membership 
to the graduate class only but left it "open to every 
Sudanese, over eighteen years of age, who embraces the 
principle of the party and works for its realization".
In this regard, it was surely the first political 
organisation based on mass membership, at least in the 
letter of its constitution*
1. SPIS. Ho. 47, February 1945A PRO, FO.371/45972
(J97/97/16). aAbdallah Khalil was elected Secretary 
of the Umma party. The rules provided for the founders 
to elect a permanent Administrative Committee of 50, 
who would then elect an Executive Committee of 12 
members to serve for a period of 2 years, after which 
another election for the Executive Committee would be 
held* This Executive Committee was headed by a 
Secretary General and each of its members had specifically 
defined duties to perform. It was more like a shadow 
Cabinet, with members individually responsible for 
Agriculture, Finance, Education and so forth*
2* Dastur Hizb al-Umma« Al-Tamadun Press, Khartoum, 1945*
An English translation of this constitution is 
available in PRO, FO.371/45984 (J1457/165/16).
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By the time the Umma party was formed, Newbold had 
already become sceptical of the British Governments 
practice of not disclosing its aims and intentions on 
the Sudan. He felt that, unless this silence was broken, 
pro-Egyptian propaganda would gradually erode Sudanese 
loyalty and eventually render it extremely difficult for 
the British to retain the support of such Sudanese opinion 
as was at that time disposed to align itself behind them.
He thought it desirable to encourage the growth of an 
active pro-British sentiment that would be founded firmly 
on self-interest and mutual understanding. Accordingly, 
he advised the Governor of Khartoum to approve the Umma 
constitution and to recognize the party as a club under 
Section 165 of the standard Local Government 
(Municipalities) Regulations of 1938 —  the same 
legislation under which the Congress was formed.
Some of the founders were initially disappointed 
with the wording of the reply, regarding the term "club" 
as an inadequate and false description of the party and 
suspecting an unwillingness on the part of the Government 
to approve the political aims set out in their 
constitution. They also interpreted the fact that the 
reply had come from the Governor of Khartoum, instead of 
the Civil Secretary ( to whom the application was originally 
addressed), to mean that the Government intended the party
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to confine its activities to Khartoum Province. It was, 
however, privately explained to them that there was no 
provision in the law for approving "parties" as such, 
and that the only approval they could obtain was one to 
set up a "club" which, as defined by the law, fully 
covered the purposes of such an association as their own.*** 
After this assurance, the party proceeded to register 
itself as a private company with the purpose of publishing 
a new daily paper, called Al-Umma, which was intended to 
serve as the party's mouthpiece.
The Formation of Other Political Parties and the 
Eclipse of the Graduates* Congress.
Hews of the formation of the Umma party caused a 
great deal of perturbation among the Ashiqqa’ and 
Mirghanist circles. There were two features which, from 
the start, placed the Umma party in a disreputable position. 
In the first place, there was its close association with 
prominent Mahdists. The party promoters held their 
meetings in, and were largely financed by, the Mahdist 
daira, and they had selected as their main propagandists 
persons like Muhammad al-Khalifa Sharif and Muhammad Ali 
Shawqi, both of whom were widely known as doctrinaire
1. SBTS. No. 47, February 1945, loc. cit.
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Mahdists. Rumours inevitably spread to the effect that
the new party was formed to impose a Mahdist monarchy on
an independent Sudan. When these were not immediately
refuted by either the Government or the party, they had
the double effect of driving many moderates into the
Ashiqqa’ camp and ensuring whole-hearted Mirghanist support
for the Ashiqqa*. The Umma party was thus branded as
merely an instrument designed to secure a crown for Sayyid
cAbd al-Rafcman as a puppet king under the British and,
within this perspective, its adopted slogan ("The Sudan for
the Sudanese") assumed quite a different meaning from that
1which it was originally intended to convey.
In the second place, the programme adopted by the 
party was essentially similar to the Government's long­
term policy of eventually transfering the administration of 
the country to the Sudanese themselves. This feature, 
together with exaggerated claims by Umma party members 
themselves that they had Government support, inevitably
1. Yahya al-Fadli, "In Whose Name are These Men Working?", 
Sawt al SudSn. 15 February 1945? also, °Ali Hamid,
"The Sudan for the Sudanese", Sawt al-Sudan. 19 February 
1945* From early February 1945, cAli gamid (Ashiqqa>) 
acted as editor in the place of Ismacil al-^Atabani who 
had resigned to run his own newly-established 
independent daily, Al-Ra.v al-lmm. making its first 
appearance on 15 March. The "neutrality" of the 
newspaper did not_last long and it soon became the organ 
of the Ittihadiyyln.
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laid the party open to the obvious charge that it. was
created by the Government with a view to opposing the
Ashiqqa* and the Congress. Reports that Newbold had
encouraged, before the Umma party was constituted, the
formation of a new independent daily paper of the same
name with a non-sectarian rural bias, appeared to confirm
the alleged Government connection with the party.
In an effort to neutralize this criticism, cAbdallah
Khalil and Shaykh Surur Muhammad Ramli1 called on Sayyid
cAli al-Mirghani and invited him to join the Umma party.
They explained to him the objectives of the party and
assured him that it was a bona fide association which was
formed to serve the cause of the country as a whole and not
to be subservient to any special quarter or sectional
interests. Sayyid cAli received them well, expressed in
the usual platitudes his sympathy with the project and
said that he would reserve his judgement until their words
2and intentions had been translated into action.
The formation of the Umma party came at a time when 
relations between the Government and the Congress underwent 
further deterioration. On 26 December 1944, the Governor
1. Shaykh Surur Muhammad Ramli; Local Government 
administrator and Vice-President of Khartoum North 
Rural District Court; member of the Advisory 
Council 1944-47; founding member of the Umma party.
2. SPIS. No. 47, February 1945, loc. cit.
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of Khartoum had addressed a letter to Azhari, calling his 
attention to the fact that the clause defining the 
educational qualifications for membership in the Congress 
was disregarded in the 1944 elections, and that such 
departure from the rules, without their previous amendment 
with the Government's consent, was an infringement of the 
relative 1938 Regulations and should be set right by the 
submission of amended rules to cover this change in the 
constitution, Azhari apparently was mainly concerned with 
confirming the validity of the elections and, on 29 December 
1944, he replied to the effect that the Congress rules had 
not been changed, Azhari*s affirmations provided a 
justification for further Government action and, on 7 
February 1945, the Governor of Khartoum addressed a second 
letter to him, pointing out that the rule defining the 
educational qualification for membership was violated at 
the elections and that, owing to the unconstitutional 
manner in which these elections were conducted, "the nature 
and character of the Graduates1 Congress have in fact 
undergone a radical change, and any claim by it to speak 
for, or to represent, the educated classes of the Sudan 
bears no relation to the true facts of the situation.1,1
1. E.H. Macintosh to Isma^Il al-Azhari, 7.2.1945, PRO, 
FO.371/45984 (J992/165/16).
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In these circumstances, the Government's approval 
of the Umma constitution naturally suggested that the 
party would enjoy a special status vis-a-vis the Congress 
and other political factions. The Ashiqqa* leaders were 
extremely annoyed at this and they were initially prompted 
to apply for a similar recognition as a political body.1 
On second thought, however, they decided against making 
such a move. They probably realized that, if it was granted, 
such a recognition would only serve to endorse the 
Government's assertions that the Congress was no longer 
representative of the graduate class, and also confer on 
the Umma party the authority of a representative 
organisation equal to, and working outside, the Congress. 
Besides, the Ashiqqa* were unwilling to undermine 
their own credentials as the spokesmen of the Congress, 
which a recognition of them as a separate club with
1. SPIS. Ho. 48, March-April 1945, PRO, FO.371/45972 
(J97/97/16).
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1
open membership would have inevitably brought about.
While all parties were contemplating what their next 
step would be, external events began once again to 
influence politics in the Sudan. The Yalta Conference 
had decided that only those states which had declared war 
on the Axis powers by 1 March 1945 would have the right to 
take part in the San Francisco Conference and become 
founding members of the United Nations. On 24 February, 
therefore, in order to ensure that Egypt would not be
1. This painful dilemma was to plague the Ashiqqa’ for 
some years to come. Their obsession to identify 
themselves with the Graduates1 Congress, and their 
insistence that this Congress represented the educated 
class, posed serious obstacles in turning the Ashiqqa* 
into a mass party without undermining the special status 
they claimed for the Congress. They were thus compelled 
to depend heavily on the sectarian organisation-of the 
Khatmiyya for popular mobilization. In December 1945> 
a suggestion was floated that amendments should be made 
to the Congress constitution allowing for two types of 
membershipi Firstly, an "open membership”, comprising 
Sudanese whose educational standard was below elementary 
(or, if conditions permitted, all Sudanese) and who 
would neither be eligible for election to the Committee 
of Sixty nor allowed to vote for its members; secondly, 
a "special membership", restricted to those whose 
educational standard was above the elementary, and who 
would be eligible hoth^to vote for, and be elected to, 
Congress Committees. /Cf. Al-Hav al~Amm, 15 December 
19457* Dy late 194&, when the political eclipse of the 
Graduates^Congress had been virtually completed and 
the Ashiqqa* decided to set up their own "clubs", these 
two types of membership crept into their constitution 
—  being then defined as "ordinary" and "working" 
members respectively. Cf. MM;13Sl«^lik--£2Ilst^uuy :on 
(1949), CRQ, Lands Office File Km.P/lO.D.42.
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excluded from the peace conference as it had been from
the Versailles, Ahmad Mahir declared war on Germany*1
The entry of Egypt into the war alarmed the Umma party
and its supporters. Like most other nationalists, they had
misread or misinterpreted various articles which had
appeared in Egyptian and British papers, and they had
formed the wrong impression that the San Francisco
Conference would also settle the future of the Sudan. They
became apprehensive that, with Egypt thus securing a seat
at the Conference, she would be in a better position to
press for the realization of her national demands, which
included her claim to the Sudan. But what about the Sudan
itself? Who would press for its national aspirations at 
2the Conference? The Umma resented the fact that this 
belated and nominal declaration of war was to give Egypt 
an advantage otherwise denied to the Sudan which, though 
not a recognized state, had nonetheless been officially at 
war with the Axis powers since 1940 and whose sons had 
participated in the actual fighting. They argued that the 
Sudan was entitled to have its aspirations represented to
1. Ahmad Mahir was assassinated as he left the Chamber of 
Deputies to put the case to the Senate. He was 
succeeded as Premier by Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi.
2. Editorial, Al-Sudan al-Jadid* 2 March 1945; and, 
Editorial, Al-Rllf 4 March 1945*
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the makers of the new world, and that some means of doing 
this had to be found. The Sudan Question, they pointedly 
emphasized, could not be solved without the Sudanese.
Spurred by the desire to preserve the interests of
the Sudan, the Umma party despatched a letter to the
Governor-General, requesting in effect that steps be taken
to ensure direct Sudanese representation at the
Conference.1 The Civil Secretary eventually replied that
the Sudan would be represented at San Francisco by the
delegates of the two Condominium powers, and that the
2
future of the Sudan would not be decided there.
The Umma party initiative, however, started a new 
series of events rolling. In the absence of a formal 
publication of the Umma letter, rumours began to spread 
that the party had submitted a memorandum to the 
Government, in which it had demanded complete independence 
for the Sudan. The Ashiqqa* and the Mirghanists became 
alarmed and they condemned the Umma for allegedly acting as 
if they alone were the arbiters of the Sudan's destiny.J
1. cAbdallah Khalil to Governor-General, 19*3*1945, FRO,
FO.371/45984 (J1457/165/16).
2. Robertson to cAbdallah Khalil, 9*4*1945, Ibid. Sir 
James W. Robertson had succeeded Douglas Newbold as 
Civil Secretary, after the latter died on 23 March 1945* 
Re joined the Sudan Political Service in 1922 and left in 
1953; was Deputy Civil Secretary 1941-45; Civil Secretary 
1945-53; Governor-General of Nigeria 1955-60.
3. Editorial by cAli ^amid, Sawt al-Sudan. 28 March 1945.
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They felt compelled to respond effectively and to formally
declare their position that the Sudan's future lay through
some close ties with Egypt,'*'
In the circumstances, Azhari supnoned the Committee
of Sixty to an emergency session on 2 April to discuss the
future of the Sudan and the correspondence exchanged
between him and the Governor of Khartoum on the subject of
the Congress constitution. Remembering the opposition's
success in January 1945, Azhari adroitly combined the
discussion of these two issues in order to generate
opposition to the Government and thus whip up support for
his proposed resolution. The manoeuvre succeeded in
holding most of the Ashiqqa* in line and in forcing a
significant number of the opposition (particularly among the
Xttihadiyyin and Ahrar) to abstain in the vote. With a
handsome majority, the Ashiqqa* adopted a resolution, calling
for the Sudan to "be ruled by a Sudanese Democratic Govern-
2
ment within a union with Egypt under the Egyptian crown."
1. Editorial by cAli Hamid, Sawt al-Sudan. 29 March 1945.
2. SPIS, Mo. 48, March-April 1945, loc. cit. The vote on 
the resolution was 32 in favour, 17 against and 11 
abstentions. In response to the Governor's letters, the 
Congress insisted that the constitution remained 
unaltered; that the Committee of Sixty were responsible 
for its interpretation; and that the 1944 elections had 
been conducted in strict accordance with the approved 
rules. On 16 May 1945, the Governor affirmed that, as 
the Congress had allowed large numbers of uneducated 
persons to vote in the elections, the Government no longer 
"recognized the Graduates' Congress, as at present consti­
tuted, as representative of the educated classes.”
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The resolution was published in the loeal press on 
5 April and copies of the Congress manifesto containing it 
were published in the Egyptian press about a week later.
In nationalist circles, the resolution had a mixed 
reception. Some of the provincial Congress committees sent 
congratulatory telegrams; others, unsure or dissatisfied 
with the implications, simply took no action. The Kassala 
and Gedaref committees were initially unsympathetic but, 
after visits by Ashiqqa* leaders from Khartoum, they were 
brought round to support the resolution. Some of the 
senior graduates, like Hasan Zahir and Nasr al-Haj *Ali, 
publicly criticised the resolution as having gone too far. 
The Sudan, they insisted must reserve its right to self- 
determination.1 Other senior graduates, drawn from the 
various parties, called for further negotiations for a 
revised, and more acceptable, formula in order to prevent 
an irreparable split in the nationalist ranks.
In Government circles, the general verdict on this 
bold dictum was that the Congress should be reminded once 
again to confine itself to activities concerning education
p
and social services* On 14 April, Robertson directed
1. "The Present Political Situation", Al-Ray al-cAmm.
25 April 1945.
2* Khartoum Province Monthly Diary. April 1945, para 3(b), 
CRO, CIVSEC 57/21/83.
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all Governors and Heads of Department to remind Sudanese 
officials of their obligations under the Administrative 
Regulations, the gross abuse of which he was not prepared
to tolerate. In this connection, he referred both to the
Congress's boycott of the Advisory Council and to their 
resolution, which evidently demanded the removal of the 
British from the Condominium partnership, as examples of
such abuses* He then warned that
"if Government officials, as members of a 
political party or body, take part in 
any further incident which, in the opinion 
of the Government, is subversive of its 
authority, or make an attack on any 
general policy of the Government, or on 
the Condominium status of the Government, 
or on the British or Egyptian Governments,
(the Sudan Government) will be compelled 
without further warning to forbid its 
officials from serving on any committee 
or taking any other active or prominent ^
part in the political party or body concerned."
The circular caused considerable, and mostly 
unfavourable, comment in the press and in political circles. 
It was criticized as essentially regressive. In addition 
to the fact that it ostensibly refused to allow the free 
expression of nationalist opinion as to the shape of self- 
government suitable for the Sudan, the circular was also 
seen as an unjustified obstacle to Mewbold's declared
1. Robertson to All Governors and Heads of Department, 
14.4.1945, CRO, DAKHLIA (I) l/lg/30.
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policy of increasingly associating the Sudanese with
1
the government of their country. Moreover, the circular's 
references to specific acts of the Congress strongly 
implied that the Government's objections were aimed at the 
former and, in this respect, it confirmed, even more 
emphatically, suspicions that the Government discriminated 
unfairly between the two main parties. If the Umma were 
allowed to canvass support for their platform, why should 
the Congress not also be allowed to do likewise? The 
implications were too strong to refute.
Coming at a time when the war in Europe was swiftly
ending and when Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman publicly committed
2his support behind the Umma party, the circular had the 
added effect of intensifying sectarian involvement in 
nationalist politics. Sayyid cAli disliked intensely any 
prospect of being forced into active participation in 
any political movement. He generally preferred to live in 
the obscurity of his favourite religious background, where he 
could merely let things slide, leaving himself free to deny 
complicity if they slid too fast. But rumours about the 
Umma letter of 19 March, and the active canvassing
1. Editorial by cAli Hamid, Sawt al-Sudan. 18 April 1945.
2. Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman1s Statement in Al-Nll,
17 April 1945.
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undertaken by Mahdist khulafa* in the provinces, finally 
forced him to take to the field once again. For him, the 
triflings in intelligentsia circles with pro or anti- 
Egyptian political formulae were of negligible importance, 
the real issue being the threat posed to the country by 
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman*s ambitions. Re considered it his 
duty, as well as the duty of all non-Mahdists to whatever 
religious order they belonged, to resist actively and 
unitedly a movement which under the cover of a political 
label had "as its primary objective the restoration of
1
the old dictatorship in the person of the Mahdi's son".
The Mirghanist sectarian organisation was placed at the 
disposal of Ashiqqa' emissaries in the provinces and the 
stage was thus set for a two-party contest on a 
national scale.
The Government became alarmed at these developments. 
They had believed that, if the various parties were left 
to themselves, they would sooner or later founder on the 
shoals of personalities. The active involvement of the 
two Sayyids, however, transformed the situation. The 
rival political mobilization of thousands of illiterate 
and semi-literate tribesmen and provincials foreshadowed 
the dreaded prospect of sectarian strife. To these
1. SPIS, Mo. 48, March-April 1945, loc. cit.
3 09
masses politics were meaningless and the jargon of the 
party canvasser would most probably have been interpreted 
as a "call" to support their own particular Holy Man.
The activities of the two sectarian headquarters grew 
mutually more provocative and the Government felt that, 
if these were left unchecked, public order would inevitably 
be disturbed and old sores reopened —  events which, with 
post-war problems coming to the front and the grain 
situation unpleasantly tight, could cause unnecessary 
strains within the community. Under these circumstances, 
the Government concluded that the best thing to do was to 
confine, as far as possible, the political clamour to the 
capital and the major towns; to keep a close watch on 
attempts by party emissaries to exploit administrative 
or economic grievances (real or imaginary) in rural areas; 
to discourage Mahdist or Mirghanist attempts to beat up 
sectarian feeling; and to keep local tribal authorities 
out of the political game.
Accordingly, on 26 May 1945, Robertson wrote officially 
to both Sayyids, calling on them to do all that was in their 
power to maintain public tranquility and, in particular, to 
abstain from participation in politics. He also requested 
them to instruct their agents in the provinces to cease 
canvassing for the rival parties. Directing himself to 
both Sayyids, Robertson affirmed quite clearly that the
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rumours, claiming that the Government hacked the Umma 
party and contemplated the institution of a monarchy in 
the Sudan, were completely untrue, and he called on both of 
them to denounce these rumours as lies. The Government's 
policy, he reminded them, had been frequently defined and 
was not to be diverted by tendentious agitations.1 The 
letter, of which each Sayyid received a copy, was 
delivered by hand, and the various points were emphatically 
driven home in the accompanying conversations.
At the same time, Robertson requested province 
Governors to advise all local authorities to keep out of 
politics. Although they were not government officials 
within the meaning of the Administrative Regulations, these 
authorities were nevertheless salaried public servants and, 
as such, they were required to observe certain standards 
of conduct. He reminded them that only local and tribal 
politics were their legitimate sphere of activity and he 
warned that, while it was natural that they should take an 
interest in the development and future of their country, 
their active participation in party or sectarian politics, 
and the use of their position to influence or canvass their 
people for the benefit of central political parties, would
1. 3PI3. Ho. 49, May 1945, PRO,. SO.571/45972 . 
(J97/97/16).
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not be tolerated. Pinally, he pointed out that Al-Umma
newspaper had, contrary to initial expectations, turned out
to be a party organ, and he advised all local authorities
1
to steer clear of it.
Robertson*s assault did not stop there. An additional 
opportunity presented itself on 12 June, when he held a 
press conference with Sudanese journalists. He had tried 
earlier to counter allegations of a connection between the 
Umma and the Government. On 9 April he had sent a circular 
to all the Governors, giving them a brief background to the 
formation of the Umma party, and instructed them to "make 
it clear to the public at large that this claim (of Govern- 
ment support) is quite untrue". He even warned off the 
promoters of the party themselves, notably Shaykh Ahmad 
cUthman al-Qadi and Muhammad al-Khallfa Sharif, from 
spreading such claims, and he subsequently compelled Sayyid 
cAbd al-Rahman to transfer the latter to his agricultural 
scheme in the White Hile Province. This faint-hearted 
approach was not followed up by stronger measures at the 
time, probably because Robertson believed that, although 
the Umma’s tactical errors should be genuinely deprecated,
1. Robertson to All Northern Governors, 24*5*1945* CRO, 
HALEA 56/2/8; also, DAKHLIA (I) 1/12/30.
2. Robertson to All Governors, 9*4*1945, CRO,
DAKH1IA (I) 1/12/30.
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the party itself should not be totally discouraged.
uIf we so neglect or mishandle it as to lose its support,"
he wrote, "we may find ourselves a trifle friendless when
1
the inevitable showdown occurs." As these earlier 
indirect measures proved ineffective to dispel Mirghanist 
suspicions, and as the desired unequivocal renunciation 
of monarchy was not forthcoming from Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, 
Robertson felt compelled to take a clearly defined stand. 
He officially refuted at the press conference the rumours 
about the establishment of a monarchy and confirmed that 
the Government did not back the Umma party but rather took 
a neutral stand towards all political groups.
This explicit declaration by Robertson had a markedly 
moderating effect on the ardour of sectarian politics. 
Sayyid cAli and the Mirghanists welcomed it as an outright 
rebuff to Mahdist ambitions. Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman and 
some Ansar, realizing that the threat of a monarchy 
had undesirably served as a potent recruiting slogan for 
their opponents, were not altogether unhappy to see it 
refuted. Indeed, although beset by mixed feelings,
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman politely sent his son, Siddiq, to 
compliment Robertson on the wisdom of his "well-timed
1. Ibid.
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frankness"-1
Robertson*s measures succeeded in partly damping down 
sectarian agitation, at least temporarily, but they did 
not muffle nationalist preoccupation with politics in the 
Sudan. On the contrary, some of the statements in the 
press conference actually augmented nationalist apprehen­
sions about the Government's intentions for the future of 
the country. Robertson had stated that there was usually 
no reward after a war, and that the Sudanese had already 
received "some notable gain from their association with 
the British in this war, in that their country was 
protected by the British army, navy and air force from 
fascist aggression, and as a result of the Allied victory 
they were now able to continue their social, economic
and political development in peace under sympathetic 
2
guidance." The statement came as an insult to Sudanese 
participation in the war and as a shocking disappointment 
to their nationalist aspirations. How could it be that 
there was no reward? Were the principles of freedom, they 
asked, declared by the leaders of Allied democracies 
merely intended to act as propaganda weapons, or were they
X. SPIS, Mo. 50, June 1945, PRO, FO.371/45972 
(J97/97/16}.
2. Full text of the press conference in Sawt al-Sudan#
13 June 1945*
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intended to form the basis of a new world order? If the 
former was the case, they argued, then there was no 
meaningful benefit in having defended the Sudan against 
fascist aggression for tyranny, whatever its form, could 
not be worse than denying people their right to freedom, 
national pride and independence. If, however, the latter 
supposition was true, then there must be a reward for 
all those nations who stood by the side of the Allies, 
and this reward should be nothing less than granting them 
the right of self-determination.1 Robertson's pointer that 
the Sudanese had already obtained "some notable gain" was 
therefore universally rejected as an unsatisfactory reward 
for the Sudanese contribution to the war effort.
Another statement which irritated the nationalists was 
Robertson's declaration that the Government regarded the 
various parties as representatives of small groups, not of 
public opinion generally, and that "/the Government/ will 
continue to develop the Advisory Council for the Northern 
Sudan and Province Councils as the constitutional channels 
whereby it may be advised of the opinions of the people
p
as a whole." This statement was challenged both for
1. Editorials in Sawt al-Sudan. 16 June 1945; Al-Ray al-Amm, 
15 June 1945; and Al-NTl. 17 June 1945*
2. Full text of the press conference, loc. cit*
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underestimating the status of political parties and for 
overestimating the role of the Advisory Council, particularly 
in regard to determining Sudanese aspirations. It was 
true, argued the nationalists, that these political parties 
did not count on large membership; but it was equally true 
that they commanded the political sympathy of significant 
sections of the community, including members of the Advisory 
Council. In this respect, they were political instruments 
for expressing public opinion and, without them, all
X
councils were basically incomplete political bodies.
This was particularly so in regard to the Advisory Council,
firstly because it was restricted to the northern Sudan,
and secondly because its jurisdiction did not extend to 
2politics.
Apart from these theoretical considerations,
Robertson's statement had ominous implications for the 
nationalists. The Government's programme of achieving 
complete Sudanization within 20 years had generated grave 
suspicions that British official policy aimed at the 
perpetuation of Condominium rule in the Sudan after
1. Editorial by cAbdallah Mirghani, Sawt al-Sudan.
17 June 1945. From May 1945 onwards, cAbdallah 
Mirghani (Ittihadiyyln) took over the editorship of 
this newspaper.
2. IsmacIl al-^ Atabani, Al-Rav al-°Amm. 16 June 1945.
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the war.1 Leading nationalists had already criticized
this Sudanization schedule as carrying too far Newbold’s
reference to the “long and arduous" road to self-
government. A period of 20 years, they had argued, was
enough to create a new Russia; it should be more than
2
enough to realize full independence for the Sudan.
Besides, it was inconsistent with the context of the 1936 
Treaty which was due to expire in 1956 at the latest, 
while Sudanization was to be completed ten years thereafter. 
In the light of these implications, nationalists suspected 
that the Government’s build-up of the Advisory Council as 
the only constitutional channel of public opinion 
ultimately aimed at the prolongation of Condominium rule 
to 1966. This interpretation, together with the 
realization that the status of the Sudan could best be
1. On 17 March 1945, the Governor-General*s Council had 
decided to accelerate the pace of Sudanization and, in 
his statement to the Advisory Council in May, Robertson 
indicated that the review extended over a 20-year 
period. Cf. "Statement by the Civil Secretary of 
Government Policy on Substitution for non-Sudanese in 
Government Service," 9.5*1945, Proceedings of the 
Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan. Session XXI, 
Part II of the Agenda, Item No. 7, CRO, NORTHERN 2/1/15*
2. Editorial, Al-Sudan al-Jadld, 25 May 1945; and 
"Long and Arduous", Al-Umma, 6 June 1945*
3. Editorial, Al-Umma, 20 June 1945* _Al-Umma commenced 
publication on 16 May 1945, with Yusif Mustafa al-Tinay 
as its editor.
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changed by a direct approach to the Condominium powers 
themselves, finally alienated even the hard core of 
Newbold’s "moderates", who had been originally prepared to 
accede to a continuation of the Condominium after the war 
on the condition of achieving substantial economic and 
political progress towards independence.
The cumulative effect of Robertson’s measures was 
to drive all the political parties, including the Umma, 
into a common opposition to the Government. The 
termination of the war in Europe, in early May, had 
generated an urgent need among leading nationalists to 
heal the split in the Congress and to form a united front 
in pursuit of a common objective. A start along these 
lines had already been made in January 1945 when the 
Ashiqqa* initiated talks with the Ittihadiyyin and the 
Ahrar in an effort to arrive at a formula, concerning 
relations with Egypt, that would be acceptable to all of 
them.1 These efforts bore fruit in April and the Ashiqqa*, 
together with the Ittihadiyyin and a small section of the 
Ahrar, formed a coalition in support of the Congress
1. SPIS, No. 46, January 1945, loc. cit.
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resolution,Appeals to heal the resulting split with 
the Umma grew in intensity as the war came to an end, and 
in mid-May 1945 a United Parties* Committee, composed of 
three representatives from each party, was set up to work 
out a formula that would accommodate the various principles 
on the political future of the Sudan.
Under the chairmanship of ^ Ibd al-Majid Ahmad, the
Committee held several meetings between May and August,
and managed finally to arrive at some basis of reconciling
2the various viewpoints. Two general premises formed that 
basis: Firstly, all the parties agreed to work for the
formation of a free democratic Sudanese Government; and 
secondly, all the parties admitted the principle of "union" 
with Egypt, a union dictated by historic, cultural and 
economic relations between the two countries. The 
coalition front. (Ashiqqa*, Ittihadiyyin and Ahrar-
1. SPIS, Ho. 48, March-April 1945, loc. cit. This small 
section of the Ahrar was led by 6Abd al-Rahim Shaddad 
and subsequently*called itself the Ahrar-Ittihadiyyln. 
Thus, the original objective of establishing a party 
independent of sectarian influences was finally abandoned 
under the pressure of sectarian rivalry.
2. °Abd al-Majid Ahmad, "Report to be submitted to the 
Congress Executive Committee by the United Parties1 
Committee representing the Ashiggas, the Ittihadiyeen, 
the Qawmiyeen, the two groups o£ Ahrar, and the Umma 
Party", n.d. (1945), PRO, PO.371/45985 (J2977/165/16).
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Ittihadiyyin) initially insisted on defining this union 
as one under the Egyptian crown, but the Umma party 
representatives opposed such a definition even as a tactical 
measure towards ultimate independence. They had been 
particularly sceptical of their opponents1 argument that, 
by limiting their demands in regard to the Sudan's future 
political status, they would thereby be enhancing the 
chances for Egyptian acceptance of Sudanese aspirations.
If Egypt, they reasoned, was not prepared then to recognize 
the independence and sovereignty of the Sudan, she would 
definitely not be so prepared in the future when the 
British presence had been removed.3* With the two positions 
proving irreconcilable, the Committee members unanimously 
agreed not to define the nature of such a union or the time 
within which it should take place. Instead, they simply 
admitted the principle that a reference to a union with 
Egypt -was inevitable when submitting a demand regarding the 
sort of Sudanese Government that would be acceptable, 
provided that the said union did not in any way affect the 
"autonomy" of the Government or limit its powers to act in 
the interests of the country. Within this context, the 
Umma party finally accepted to form a united front with 
the other parties in the Congress, and to refrain from
1. Editorial, Al-Umma, 20 May 1945*
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publicly opposing the principle of a union with Egypt.
The Umma, however, made one important reservation: While
they would not oppose the other parties* call for a union
with Egypt, they themselves would neither endorse nor
promote such a policy but would rather work separately,
and independently of the Congress, for the formation of a
free democratic Sudanese Government only —  that is,
1
independence from both Britain and Egypt.
On 25 August 1945, therefore, in compliance with these 
shaky definitions and reservations, the United Parties'
1. The apparent contradiction in the Umma compromise
might be explained by reference to the impact which the 
Arab Union movement had on Sudanese nationalists. Under 
the impression that a post-war settlement would divide 
the African continent into Arab and African blocs, the 
intelligentsia had grown increasingly interested in the 
movement and universally sought to identify the Sudan 
with the Arab world. By early 1945> they began to 
relate the movement to their respective aspirations of 
independence. While the "unionists" argued that Egypt 
was the Sudan's natural link with the Arab world and 
that only through a union with her could the Sudan 
become a part of the Arab world, the "separationists" 
saw in the prospect of an independent participation in 
the Arab Union a satisfactory alternative to the Sudan's 
individual connection with Egypt. By July 1945» when 
the San Francisco Conference had recommended that 
mandates be given independence, Sudanese nationalists 
affirmed that the Sudan was, on the basis of the 
"welfare" clause of the 1936 Treaty, a mandate, and they 
anxiously sought to disassociate their country from 
colonies in the African world. In the light of this 
prevailing mood, the Umma compromise was subtly 
coherent; They would not oppose the principle of ultimate 
Arab union, but they would reject the subjugation of 
the Sudan to Egypt.
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Committee submitted its report officially to the Congress 
Executive Committee, and recommended that the latter should 
approach the British Administration with the following 
demands:'*'
"(a) The issue of a joint declaration by the 
two Condominium Bowers, stating that 
their aim is to work for the formation 
as soon as possible of a free democratic 
Sudanese Government, with a union with 
Egypt and an alliance with Great Britain,
(b) To ask for the formation of a joint 
Committee, composed of an equal number of 
representatives of the Sudan Government 
and of the Sudanese educated class - the 
latter to be nominated by the Congress - 
with a view to laying down a scheme for 
the Sudanization of the administration
in the shortest possible period, provided 
the Government gives this Committee all 
necessary facilities to carry out its 
mission and undertakes to execute its 
recommendations.
(c) To ask for the lifting of restrictions 
on public freedoms such as the freedom 
of the press, of gathering, of movement, 
within the frame of the law; to ask for an 
amendment to the existing special 2 
ordinances restricting these liberties,1
This precarious, and laboriously-worked out, United 
Parties1 wathiqa (charter) was primarily designed to confer
1, SPISt No. 52, August 19459 3PR0, EO.371/45972 
(J97/97/16).
2, ’Report to be submitted to the Congress Executive 
Committee by the United Parties* Committee", loc. cit.
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on the Executive Committee an undisputed status as the 
representative of the Congress movement as a whole, and 
thus enable it to press quickly and effectively for the 
realization of the commonly-shared objectives. The war 
in the Pacific had come to an end, a prospectively more 
sympathetic Labour Government had won the general 
elections in England and the Egyptians were already 
stirring to have the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty revised. In 
the light of these developments, the nationalists prepared 
themselves for a post-war Peace Conference, like that at 
Versailles, which they erroneously expected to take place, 
and they were anxious to ensure that, unlike 1956, their 
aspirations regarding the future of the Sudan would be 
given due recognition at such a Conference.
The charter, however, was short lived. Although the 
Executive Committee agreed to adopt it as the statement of 
the official Congress policy and to transmit it to the 
respective Governments, Azhari had in fact already jumped 
the gun. In late May 1945, Azhari had gone to Egypt for 
his usual summer vacation, and he took advantage of the 
occasion to monitor reactions in Egyptian political circles 
to the Congress's resolution of April. Like most of the 
Ashiqqa*, he had been considerably disappointed that such 
a call for union with Egypt had manifestly received very
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1
little support in the Egyptian press. He sought to
arrange an interview with Huqrashi Pasha but he failed,
the latter excusing himself on the plea of being too busy
2
with important international and Arab affairs.
Receiving little response from the Egyptian Government
and the Palace, Azhari courted the Wafd instead. At the
coaching of Ali al-Birayr and Muhammad al-Amin Husayn ,
Azhari became convinced that only Nahhas could do anything
for the Sudan since, as the latter had already shown before,
he did not hesitate to take a firm stand against the
4British on this issue. On 6 June, therefore, Azhari
1. Sudan Agent (Cairo) to Civil Secretary, 13.6.1945,
PRO, PO.371/45984 (J2171/165/16).
2. Sudan Agent (Cairo) to Civil Secretary, 4.6.1945,
PRO, PO.371/45984 (J2076/165/16).
3. Muhammad Al-Amin Husayn: Graduated from the American 
Mission School in*Khartoum; worked for some time at the 
Agricultural Research Parm in Wad Medani; in late 1950'a 
he left for Egypt where he studied law, subsidized by the 
generosity of PrincecUmar lusun. He was prominent in 
Sudanese Qlub (Cairo) politics, and in 1944-45 he became 
editor of Al-Umdurman magazine, an organ of early 
Sudanese communists. He returned to the Sudan in the 
summer of 1945 and, failing to obtain a permit to practice 
law, he became a journalist. He was among the first 
persons to secede from the young Sudanese Communist Party, 
joined the "unionists" bloc and later became a very 
prominent figure in the Mirghanist-inspired Peoples1 
Democratic Party (Hizb al-Shacab al-Dimuqrati).
4. Sudan Agent (Cairo) to Civil Secretary, 26.6.1945,
PRO, PO.371/45984 (J2412/165/16).
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called on Hahhas at his home and sought both material and
moral support for the Ashiqqa/ party. He described at
length the objectives of the Congress, which he summed up
as aiming at a future unity with Egypt, with a common
foreign policy and army under one crown, and with internal
administration only being reserved for the Sudanese.^
He asked Hahhas to induce the Wafdist papers to support
the Congress, intimating his genuine apprehension that,
although the Mirghanists at that time supported the
Ashiqqa’, Sayyid cAli might alter his policy in the future,
or withdraw from political involvement, if he found it
2 -convenient or necessary to do so. Hahhas assured Azhari
1. Sudan Agent (Cairo) to Civil Secretary, 8.6.1945,
PRO, PO.371/45984 (J2171/165/16); also, in PRO,
EO.141/1013 (file 41/71/45).
2. Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman's indirect refutations of dynastic 
ambitions, and Robertson's subsequent dementi, had 
apparently generated strains between the Ashiqqa* and 
Sayyid 5ALi al-Mirghani. The latter, continuing to 
suspect the ulterior aims of his rival, wanted to 
organize anti-Mahdist forces into a new party (comprising 
also the Ashiqqa*) in opposition to the Umma, and he 
suggested the adoption of the political motto "Ho royalty 
in the Sudan". Azhari, however, was reluctant to accept 
such a motto, manifestly because he felt that it was _ 
anachronistically ineffective, since Sayyid 6Abd al-RaJpunan’s 
dementi had already neutralized much of the anti-Umma 
opposition; but also because he realized that, by 
rejecting all royalty (and by inference that of King 
Paruq as well), such a motto would basically undermine
the platform of union with Egypt. Cf. Translation of 
Interview given by Azhari to Al-Sudan magazine, in 
PRO, PO.371/45984 (J2412/165/16).
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that the Sudan Question was the primary subject on the 
Wafdist programme for discussion at any revision of the 
Treaty and that, since the Wafd was the majority party 
in Egypt, no future settlement of this question could be 
concluded unless it participated in the negotiations.
But then, under the form of an additional assurance, Hahhas 
gave Azhari a diplomatic twisting of the arm; He confirmed 
unequivocally that he would never agree to a separation of 
the Sudan from Egypt. The implication, which Azhari 
probably well noted, was that if the Congress intended to 
pursue a policy of union with Egypt as a tactical measure 
in gaining independence first from the British before 
ultimately turning on the Egyptians, then they had better 
think twice.
When he therefore returned to Khartoum around mid- 
August, Azhari was considerably predisposed to underline 
the option of a union with Egypt.3, The United Parties’
1. Some evidence suggests that an additional element
exerted pressure on Azhari, Apparently, a committee had 
been newly formed in Egypt with the object of supporting 
the Congress policies against those of the Umma party. 
Azhari and cAli al-Birayr had allegedly become members of 
this committee, which also included eAbd al-Majid Salih,
cAbd al-Qawi Ahmad, Eikri Abaza. and Sulayman Ghannam. 
Reportedly, these Egyptian personalities had earlier 
been disturbed about the formation of the Umma party, and 
they had raised some 14,000 Egyptian pounds to finance 
a counter movement in the Sudan. With Mirghanist support 
wavering, Azhari might have felt a sense of dependence, 
and possibly relief, on this alternative source of 
support. Cf. Sudan Agent (Cairo) to Civil Secretary, 
26.3.1945, PRO, EO.141/1013 (file 41/41/45).
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charter had been hammered out and only awaited the formal 
submission of the report to the Congress Executive 
Committee for further action. But then an unfortunate 
incident happened. Probably due to his absence in Egypt, 
Azhari lacked a comprehensive appreciation of the subtleties 
of the agreement and, misinterpreting the recommendations 
unofficially conveyed to him, he despatched prematurely 
a letter to the Acting Governor-General, enclosing a 
memorandum that was addressed to the British and Egyptian 
Governments. In this memorandum, Azhari censured the 
slow pace at which the country had progressed and affirmed 
Congress's desire to put an end to such a policy which was 
in some ways also attributed to the Sudan's abnormal 
political status. To this end, he argued, Congress had 
determined to seek "the formation of a democratic Sudanese 
Government in a union with Egypt, under the Egyptian Crown", 
and he called upon the Condominium powers to issue forthwith 
a joint declaration approving this aspiration. With an 
evident sense of confidence, Azhari emphasized that the 
memorandum was presented by the Congress on behalf of all 
the political parties who had now agreed to unite under 
its banner.1
1. President of the Craduates* General Congress to H.E. 
the British Prime Minister and H.E. the Egyptian Prime 
Minister, 23.8.1945, PRO, EO.371/45986 (J3152/165/16); 
also, PRO, FO.141/1013 (file 41/108/45).
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The memorandum had been discussed and approved by 
the Executive Committee at an extraordinary and secret 
session which was held on the morning of 25 August, only a 
few hours before the United Parties' Committee submitted 
officially its report to the Congress. When news of the 
Azhari memorandum broke out, the delicate alliance 
established by the United Parties1 wathiqa inevitably 
collapsed. The other parties denounced the Ashiqqa* for 
their deceitful breach of faith, published a summary of 
the charter in the local press, and called on the United 
Parties' Committee to submit their demands directly to 
the Government.
One of Azharirs main ambitions was to maintain the 
Congress's claim to be the channel of communication with 
the Government, and this threat of the United Parties* 
Committee to submit their demands directly imposed a 
change in his attitude. In his desire to avoid being 
thus by-passed, he began to hedge without knowing what to 
do next. His dependence on Egyptian support precluded 
a retraction of his earlier declarations, and he was faced 
with the painful problem of reconciling the irreconcilable 
—  of having to present the Condominium partners with the 
United Parties' declaration on the one hand and the 
completely contradictory Ashiqqa' union with Egypt formula 
on the other. Eventually, forced by the pressure of
328
opposing opinion and alarmed at the possible loss of 
Mirghanist support, Azhari decided to forward the full text 
of the United Parties' declaration to the Government under 
a covering letter in which, "after considering all aspects 
of the matter", he defined the word "union" in that text 
to mean "a union with Egypt and under the Egyptian Crown.1,1
The move did not improve the situation. The August
incident had again set into motion the divisive forces
within the nationalist movement, and in effect split the
Ashiqqa* camp itself. Sayyid cAli had become increasingly
aware that, owing to the extreme pro-Egyptian attitude of
the. Ashiqqa', his association with this party adversely
affected his own reputation in the country and threatened
to lead to an unwelcome embarrassment in his relations
with the Government. By August 1945, he sought to
disassociate himself of their alliance and he began to
consider the formation of a new political party, whose
outlook would be in conformity with that of the Government
2
on matters of general policy. A group of graduates, 
among whom Dardlri MuhammadcUthman played the leading role, 
was assigned the task of working out a formula that would
1. Azhari to Governor-General, 15*10.1945, SBIS. Ho 54, 
October-November 1945, Appendix, PRO, BO.371/53328 
U54/54/16).
2. SBIS, No. 52, August 1945, loc. cit.
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satisfactorily express Mirghanist political aims. The
task, however, proved extremely difficult, for the Umma
party had already overrun the field which Sayyid tfAli
normally occupied.'1' The group was thus forced to restrict
their immediate aim to simply asserting their independence
from Ashiqqa* control, while at the same time offering their
political co-operation to the latter as a weapon with
which to counter effectively Sayyid °Abd al-Rahman and the
2
Umma party, both within and outside the Congress. 
Notwithstanding such co-operation, Azharirs monopoly of 
Mirghanist support had been severely shaken.
At the same time, Azhari’s hedging caused a serious
split in the Ashiqqa' party itself. A small extremist
_  -  3
pro-Egyptian wing, led by Dardiri Ahmad Isma6il , had from
1* SPIS, No.53, September 1945, PRO, PO.371/45972 
197797/16).
2. Such a co-operation subsequently proved imperative until 
the Sudan Question was finally settled and, as a result, 
the proposed party did not effectively emerge until 
June 1956^ when it assumed the name of Hizb al-Shacab 
al-Dimuqrati.
3. Dardiri Ahmad Ismasll: A lawyer, educated at Leeds
University with the generosity of PrincecUmar Tusun.
In. 1924, he supported the White Elag League, and he 
evidently never wavered from the conviction that the 
Sudan and Egypt formed one political kingdom. In 1936,
when al-Ea.ir called for the Sudanese voice to be heard 
in the negotiations, Dardiri assured his compatriots (in 
an article in al-Shabab on 27 April 1936) that Egypt’s 
intention was that the two countries should enjoy 
complete equality of rights when they were united.
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the start disapproved of the United Parties* charter and, 
as Azhari moderated his tone in order to preserve 
Mirghanist support, they broke away and formed the 
Wadi al-Nll party, with a programme calling for the complete 
political fusion of the Sudan with Egypt.1
For the parties on the other side of the political 
spectrum, the Ashiqqa’ memorandum to the Condominium powers 
confirmed their long-standing doubts about the wisdom of 
pursuing the realization of Sudanese national aspirations 
through a Congress dominated by Azhari. The situation 
became more insufferable when the Egyptians officially 
demanded, on 23 September 1945, the return of the Sudan to 
Egyptian sovereignty. Sayyid cAbd al-Ha£man, who had been 
profoundly discouraged by the attitude of the Government 
toward the Umma party, was now even more disturbed by the 
apparent silence of the British in the face of this renewed 
Egyptian drive. He decided to commit the Mahdist camp 
behind the Umma party in a determined drive to oust the 
Ashiqqa> from the control of Congress and reverse the 
pro-Egyptian tide; but it soon became evident that, with 
the Mirghanist khulafa* again mobilizing sectarian support 
in the rural districts around Khartoum, the election
1* SBIS. Bto. 53, September 1945, loc. cit. The leadership 
of the Wadi al-Nil party also included the famous 
cAli al-Birayr and Khidir Hamad.
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- 1results were a foregone victory for the Ashiqqa*.
At first, some faint-hearted attempts were made by Umma 
leaders to bargain with the Ashiqqa* for an agreed number 
of seats in both Committees of the Congress for 1946, but 
these initiatives met with no success. The Umma party 
then, with their Qawmiyyln and Ahrar supporters, demanded 
the setting up of a neutral committee, composed of 
representatives from all the parties, to ensure that the 
elections were regularly carried out. This demand was 
also refused.
At about the same time in early November, Robertson 
announced in the Advisory Council that, should the question 
of the future of the Sudan be raised by the Condominium 
powers in any revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the 
Government intended to consult the Advisory Council and 
transmit their views to these powers. He subsequently 
added that the Government would also give due consideration 
to the opinions expressed by other representative bodies. 
These declarations impressed on the pro-independence parties
1. SPIS. No. 53t September 1945# loc. cit. This early
inter-dependence between party and sect was to influence 
considerably the later development of the respective 
party structures. In the case of the Ashiqqa*, the 
zawaya ("cells") of the Khatmiyya sect tended to take 
over the functions of branches of the party. The Umma, 
on the other hand, adopted the cellular structure of 
the Ansar sect: Every group of eight had an overseer, 
and every group of thirty-two *a supervisor.
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the advisability of disassociating themselves from an
Ashiqqa'-dominated Congress, and they decided therefore
to boycott the elections. In this way, they spared
themselves the humiliation of an inevitable defeat and they
deprived the Congress itself of any claim to pose as the
accredited representative of the nationalist movement.’1'
The outcome of the Congress elections on 16 November,
which inevitably led to the formation of a predominantly
Ashiqqa' Committee of Sixty and an all-Ashiqqa* Executive,
provided the occasion and justification for Robertsonls
2
belated reply to Azhari*s letter of 15 October, Apart 
from a non-committal acknowledgement, this letter had 
remained unaswered because Robertson feared that, if a 
reply had been sent before the elections were held, the 
Ashiqqa* might have made use of it as an electioneering 
instrument. If the tenor of the reply was conciliatory, 
it could have been waived at the face of voters as 
indicating the Governments support or sympathy; if the 
tenor was unfavourable, it could have helped Azhari to 
boost himself as a political martyr and to rally votes
SP1S, No. 54, October-November 1945, para 434, 
loc. cit.
2. In 1945, there were some 10,000 registered members of 
the Congress, of whom only 3512 voted in the elections. 
Azhari, topping the poll with over 3000 votes, 
naturally became President.
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against an arbitrary alien Government."** With the
elections over, Robertson replied to Azhari that the
Government did "not recognize the Congress as entitled
to speak for the people of the Sudan as a whole" and that
the "claim of your committee to represent the educated
classes, and in particular to interpret the All Party
Declaration enclosed with your letter under reply, has
according to my information been challenged recently by
2
elements of the educated classes themselves." After 
a faintly-sarcastic assurance that the Government intended 
to consult all sections of the community on the future of 
the country, Robertson informed Azhari that his letter and 
the enclosed declaration had "been filed for future 
reference."
By the end of 1945, therefore, the Graduates1 General 
Congress had virtually ceased to be what it was when first
1, JVC. Penney to Sudan Agent (Cairo), 26.11.1945, PRO,
FO.371/45986 (J4163/165/16).
2. J. Robertson to Isma&Il al-Azhari, 23-12.1945,
SPIS, No. 55, December 1945, Appendix, PRO, PO.371/53328 
(J336/24/16). On 19 November, Penney held a meeting
with the signatories to the United Parties1 charter and
solicited their reaction to Azhari*s definition of 
"union". They generally confirmed that they did not 
subscribe to his interpretation, and had not approved
of his covering letter, which they had not seen until 
it was published in the local press. Cf. Huddleston 
to Killeam, 8.12.1945, PRO, FO.141/1013 (file 41/134/45).
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formed in 1938 —  namely, the sole political organization 
representative of the nationalist intelligentsia.
Instead, the political parties that rose from its ashes 
were to dominate Sudanese politics in the years to come.
C H A P T E R  S I X  
THE BETRAYAL OF INDEPENDENCE AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
The period between 1946 and 1952 was very crucial 
for the evolution of nationalist party politics in the 
Sudan. The Anglo-Egypt!an dispute over the status of the 
Sudan, and the trend of constitutional developments in the 
country, inevitably affected deeply the relations between 
the political parties and the Sudan Government. But what 
is more significant is that these two factors exacerbated 
intensely the relations between the parties themselves in 
such a manner that it eventually became impractical to 
build up a sound political foundation for democratic 
government in the Sudan.
The Mission of the Sudan Delegation to Cairo*
As expected, in the closing weeks of 1945, the Egyptian 
Government submitted a formal note to the British Government, 
requesting that negotiations be initiated with a view to 
revising the Treaty of 1936. At the same time, Egyptian 
nationalists launched an extensive propaganda campaign, 
both in the Sudan and in Egypt, to convince all Sudanese 
parties to join them in terminating once and for all the
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British occupation of the Nile Valley. The Egyptian
demand for unity, it was then argued, was not actuated by
any imperialistic designs, but was rather a natural
aspiration resulting from the common bonds of race,
language and tradition. The form of such a union was not
an insurmountable issue. If the Sudanese wanted a sort of
union similar to that existing between England and Scotland,
the Egyptians were prepared to reach an understanding on 
1that basis. The more essential and crucial issue, as
they saw it, was that both Sudanese and Egyptian
nationalists should adopt a common stand to end British
domination of the two countries. In this regard,
therefore, Sudanese political parties were urged to define
their aspirations in such terms as would be acceptable
to the Egyptian negotiators. The whole question of the
Sudan*s political status, it was emphasized, depended on
the ability of the latter to obtain the best results
2possible for the whole Nile valley. Unity with Egypt 
was thus implicitly bound to British evacuation and 
independence.
1. "An Interview with Husayn Pasha Haykal,f, Al-Sudan 
al-Jadid. 11 January*1946. Husayn Pasha was the 
President of the Egyptian Senate.
2. "An Interview with Nahhas Pasha", Al-Sudan al-Jadld 
4 January 1946.
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This line of Egyptian propaganda was to influence 
the attitude of Sudanese political parties in the light 
of subsequent developments. The British reply to the 
Egyptian note was disappointing to Sudanese nationalists, 
for it contained nothing more than a mere acknowledgement 
of the Egyptian desire that the negotiations should 
include the Sudan Question. This vague reference to the 
Sudan inevitably raised grave fears that official British 
policy was to perpetuate the existing condominium status, 
a prospect that was to the Sudanese definitely unacceptable. 
The nationalists were convinced that both the British and 
Egyptian Governments had for long been well acquainted 
with Sudanese aspirations, and they were distressed to 
observe that none of the announcements issued by these 
Governments conveyed a satisfactory solution to the 
Sudanese national problem. They grew increasingly more 
determined to take part in the intended negotiations by 
any means whatsoever, lest another Anglo-Egyptian 
agreement be concluded at the expense of Sudanese 
interests.1
The obsession to be party to such negotiations had
1. Yahya cAbd al-Qadir, "The Sudan should be party to the 
negotiations", Al-Nxl, 4 February 1946; also, IsmacIl 
al-cAtabani, "The British reply has disappointed the 
Sudanese”, Al-Ray al-Amm, 4 February 1946.
338
haunted Sudanese nationalists since 1936 and had been 
one of the primary motives in forming the Graduates* 
Congress. But, in February 1946, the Congress's ruling 
bodies were no longer representative of political party 
sentiment in the country. Since the election in November 
1945, Azhari and his Executive Committee had pursued a 
strongly pro-unionist line and the opposition were not 
prepared to entrust a purely Congress delegation with the 
role of representing the Sudan in the treaty negotiations. 
Alternative forms of representation had thus to be found.
A suggestion was made that the Congress Executive should 
form a special body which would only be concerned with the 
liberation of the country and which would include in its 
membership representatives from the various parties.1 
Ahmad Yusif Hashim recommended instead that the existing
2
United Parties' Committee should be used for this purpose. 
The call thus went out for a meeting of party 
representatives with a view to arriving at an agreed
1. Ahmad Mukhtar, "The Sudan_and the forthcoming 
negotiations", Al-Ray al-Amm, 5 February 1946.
2. Ahmad Yusif Hashim, "The duty of the Coalition Parties", 
Al-Sudan al-Jadxd. 8 February 1946; also,
"A Question", Al-Umma. 8 February 1946.
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formula and course of action. ^
For the rest of February, the political parties were 
involved in extensive discussions designed to narrow down 
the gap of disagreement that existed between them. The 
Ashiqqa' proposed that the Congress resolution of April 
1945 should form the basis of the intended formula, 
whereas the Umma and other opposition parties insisted
that the United Parties* declaration of August 1945 should
2be used as such a basis instead. In the light of the 
Egyptian identification of unity with evacuation and 
independence, the matter of which came first began to play 
a very crucial role. °Abdallah Mirghani subtly pointed out 
to his colleagues that complete evacuation could only be 
achieved in successive stages over a period of time. To 
bind independence to evacuation meant that the question of 
Sudanese sovereignty would be subjected to a solution 
inevitably involving successive stages as well. In view 
of this, he considered it imperative for his fellow- 
nationalists to set aside for the moment the question of
1. Khartoum Province Monthly Diary. February 1946,
Section 5a, para 4, University of Khartoum, Sudan 
Library (ref. 87-BGD).
2. Editorial, ’The Sudan in the forthcoming negotiations", 
Al~Umma. 4 February 1946; and editorial, flThe
Anglo-Egypt!an Negotiations", Al-M*utamar. 9 February 
1946.
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evacuation and to concentrate instead on demanding the 
recognition of the Sudanese right to sovereignty*1 
Ismacil al-cAtabani was further concerned with Egyptian 
misinterpretations of Sudanese aspirations, and he 
counselled his colleagues to make it quite clear from the
start that when the Sudanese spoke of a union with Egypt
2 -
they did not mean amalgamation* Ahmad Yusif Hashim
argued very much along similar lines, pointing out that 
the Egyptians should have been guided by the Syrian- 
Lebanese experience* In view of a mutual desire to shake 
off the French yoke, Syria had agreed to Lebanon becoming 
an independent entity, provided that the latter would not 
continue to be subjugated to foreign domination* Egypt, 
he emphasized, should be induced to act like Syria and to 
agree to the Sudan forming a separate entity with a 
political status like that of Lebanon* It was generally 
felt, therefore, that the basic principle of the proposed
1* ’'The Sudan’s national aspirations and evacuation”,
Sawt al-Sudan, 12 February 1946*
*  " -inT'
2* "The Sudanese aspirations and the Egyptian 
negotiators", Al-Ray al-Amm, 9 February 1946.
3* "The Similarity between the Sudanese-Egyptian^case 
and the Syrian-Lebanese one", Al-Sudan al-Jadid.
25 January 1946; also, "Sovereignty over the Sudan 
belongs to the Sudanese", Al-Sudan al-Jadid,
15 February 1946.
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formula should be to secure independence prior to
any union with Egypt.
The wording of the formula, however, proved to be
extremely controversial. The Umma objected categorically
to any mention being made of the Egyptian crown. The
Ashiqqa* offered to cut it out, if the Umma would leave out
the reference to an alliance with Great Britain. The Umma
in their turn were prepared to do so, if the Ashiqqa* left
out the "union with Egypt". The Ashiqqa* suggested the
inclusion of a demand for evacuation of the British from
the Sudan; the Umma agreed provided it covered also the
1
removal of all Egyptians. And so it went on.
Azhari grew impatient and, following an upsurge of
anti-British feeling in Khartoum as a result of bloody
Cairo riots in late February, he decided to end all
attempts at a compromise with the other parties. On 11
March, he announced that he would be heading an Ashiqqa*
delegation to Cairo to represent his party's "union under
the Egyptian crown" policy, and he invited the other
2
parties to join him. The latter refused the invitation 
out of hand. They were, however, anxious to prevent
1. Civil Secretary to All Governors, 3-4.1946, CRO, 
DAKHLIA CD 1/12/31-
2. E.C. Haselden to C.H. Johnson, 4*4.1946, PRO,
FO.371/53252 (J1671/24/16).
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Azhari going to Cairo on his own, and before they could 
themselves organize a rival delegation. At this point too, 
cAli al-Birayr and Egyptian nationalists contacted Azhari 
and pressed him to broaden the basis of his delegation, 
otherwise it could not fairly claim to represent the united 
political parties of the Sudan and would thus fail to 
carry much weight in Egyptian political circles. It was 
extremely important, the Egyptians emphasized, to avoid 
disagreement between two delegations in Cairo.
When discussions between the parties resumed, therefore, 
both sides were ready to make concessions in order to 
secure an acceptable political formula.1 On 21 March, and 
with the mediation of the Students' Union of Gordon 
College, the parties finally agreed to a common programme. 
According to it, Sudanese nationalists would request the 
Condominium partners to issue a joint statement, accepting 
the formation of a free Sudanese government in a union 
with Egypt; this free Sudanese government would then decide 
what form the union with Egypt should take; and against the 
background of that union enter into an alliance with Great 
Britain. It was further agreed that the delegation to 
Cairo should be composed of representatives from all the
1. SBIS, No. 56, January-April 1946, para 454> PRO, 
FQ.371/53328 (J2622/54/16).
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parties and. that a United Pront Committee he set up in 
Khartoum to ensure that no decisions were taken in Cairo 
which might prejudice the realization of the agreed 
programme.
The course of the negotiations, however, eventually
created a schism within the Sudan delegation. On 7 April,
Azhari addressed a note to the condominium governments,
demanding sovereignty for the Sudan and full participation
of the delegation in the impending negotiations.1 This
note aroused fierce criticism among Egyptians who had hoped
to use the Sudan delegation for their own purposes. A rift
appeared between the Sudanese programme and Egyptian aims,
and the British exploited it for their own interests.
Public and official attention had been focussed on the
demand for the evacuation of British troops from Egypt, and
the British delegates accordingly decided to disregard the
question of the Sudan until this matter of evacuation was
settled. In addition, they informally advised Azhari and
his colleagues that the Sudan delegation could not be party
to the negotiations and that it should submit its
2proposals to the Sudan Government.
1. Azhari to Bevin, 7.4.1946, PRO, K>.371/53251 
(J1596/24/16).
2. Campbell to Bevin, 18.4.1946, PRO, EO.371/53252 
(J1816/24/16).
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This state of affairs reversed the political 
priorities set down by Sudanese nationalists and 
threatened to undermine completely the purpose of their 
mission to Egypt. They became apprehensive that, if 
evacuation and the Sudan Question were separated, there 
would be nothing to compel Egypt to continue with the 
negotiations on the latter once evacuation had been agreed 
to. In such circumstances, there was a genuine fear that 
the lifetime of Condominium rule in the Sudan would be 
indefinitely extended. Accordingly, the Sudan delegation 
thought it advisable to strike some deal with Egyptian 
politicians in order to ensure that the Sudan Question 
would be fully covered in the negotiations.
Sensing the anxiety of the Sudanese, U^.i Mahir Pasha 
and others pressured them to withdraw their declaration of 
Sudanese aims and to reinforce the Egyptian negotiators by 
throwing in the Sudan*s lot with Egypt. But the Sudanese 
would not do this unconditionally and the Umma members in 
particular held out for a written undertaking from the 
Egyptians to the effect that, if the Egyptians got 
evacuation, the Sudanese should have independence.1 
The Egyptians understandably did not accept such a
1. Sir R. Campbell to Foreign Office, 12.5.1946, PRO, 
EO.371/53252 (J2176/24/16).
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condition. Azhari tried feverishly to work out a formula
which would satisfy the demands of Egyptian nationalists
and which at the same time would prove acceptable to his
colleagues. In the end, the Egyptians submitted to him
a "final” offer. They would consider the aspirations of
the Sudanese with sympathy, if the Sudan delegation would
accept, as a preliminary to any further discussion, the
Egyptian demands for evacuation and the unity of the
Kile Valley. On 20 April, a party of four delegates
( Ahmad Yusif Hashim, cAbd ai-Rahman Nuqdallah, Yahya
al~Fadli and cAbdallah Mirghani) returned to Khartoum to *
discuss this final proposition with their parent parties 
and the United Front Committee.1
By this time, however, the inevitable split in the 
Sudan delegation could no longer be avoided. Umma party 
opinion in the Sudan had already begun to harden as a 
result of Huddleston's statement to the Advisory Council 
on 17 April. He had then confirmed that the fundamental 
aim of the Sudan Government was "a free independent Sudan 
which will be able as soon as that independence has been 
achieved to define for itself its relations with Great 
Britain and Egypt". In pursuance of this objective,
1. SEIS. Ko. 56, January-April 1946, para 455, loc. cit*
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Huddleston proposed "to build up the organs of self-
government .•. and to accelerate the transfer of
responsible posts to Sudanese in consultation with Sudanese
1
representatives". In this connection, on 21 April,
Robertson announced to the Advisory Council the
constitution of an Administrative Conference to study
methods of associating the Sudanese more closely with the
government of their country, and he invited the political
2parties to send representatives to this Conference.
The Government's measures were regarded by the Umma party 
as basically an acceptance of some demands contained in 
both the United Parties' declaration of August 1945 and 
the all-party programme of March 1946. It may have been 
a case of "too little offered too late", but it was 
certainly more than what the Egyptians were then prepared 
to grant. When the Egyptian proposal was presented, 
therefore, the Umma leadership rejected it and instructed 
their representatives to adhere adamantly to the 
originally agreed all-party programme. The four visiting
1. Speech delivered by the Governor-General at the 
opening Session of the Advisory Council for the 
Northern Sudan, Proceedings of the Fifth Session. 
17-21 April 1946, pp. 1-2; alsoj in PRO, EO.371/53252 
(J1743/24/16).
2. Sudan Monthly Record. No. 193> March-April 1946, 
para 6569, CRO, PORT SUDAN 1/10/47.
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delegates thus returned to Cairo on 26 April with no real 
decision taken on the Egyptian proposition.
In the meantime, in Cairo, Azhari had been enraged by 
Huddleston's statement which he clearly recognized as a 
measure primarily aimed at sabotaging the delegations's 
unity and mission to Egypt. In response to it, and 
prematurely anticipating an acceptance of the Egyptian 
proposal by the United Front, he began to advocate more 
vigorously the policy of "unity under the Egyptian crown".
By the time the mission returned from Khartoum, he had 
already committed himself firmly to a line of "one crown, 
one army and one system of representation". The Umma 
representatives, however, refused to go beyond the 
delegation's original mandate from the United Front and 
on 3 May, finally disillusioned, they withdrew and 
returned to Khartoum. A few days later, they were 
similarly followed by the representatives of the 
Qawmiyyin and the Ahrar.
The Effect of the Sidqi-Bevin Protocol.
In the months that followed, the nationalist struggle 
became once again increasingly resolved into the old 
straight rivalry between the Umma and Ashiqqa* parties with, 
inevitably, Mahdist and Mirghanist connotations. Unlike 
the unionists, the pro-independence parties accepted
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Robertson's invitation and nominated representatives to 
attend the Administrative Conference. After the split in 
the Sudan delegation, the Umma decided to transform the 
Conference into a "home" opposition to Azhari in Cairo. 
They discreetly suggested to the Government that 
particular Khatmiyya individuals be nominated to fill the 
seats left unoccupied by the unionist parties, not in a 
sectarian capacity but as prominent citizens or civil 
servants. Their inclusion, they argued, would broaden the 
basis of the Conference and secure for it, and any 
subsequent recommendations it might make, the support of a 
large section of the public which was then hostile on 
purely sectarian grounds. Such an enlarged Conference, 
moreover, would be in a position to challenge effectively 
any claims that might be put forward by the remnants of 
the delegation in Cairo to represent the Sudan.'1'
The Umma proposal, though seriously explored by the 
Government, failed to gain the desired Mirghanist 
concurrence. The composition of the Conference itself, 
the latter feared, would have reduced the Mirghanist bloc 
to an insignificant minority, unable thus to block 
effectively any proposals that favoured, directly or 
indirectly, their Mahdist opponents. At the same time,
1, SPXS, No. 56, January-April 1946, para 461, loc. cit.
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the decision of the Government to allow the rebuilding of 
the Mahdi's qubba irritated Mirghanist circles even further. 
In the light of the resulting Mahdist propaganda, this 
decision was seen as a rather sinister indication of a 
premeditated build-up of Mahdist influence and the 
precursor of a corresponding fall in the Mirghanist holding. 
Since they genuinely believed that the Anglo-Egypt!an 
negotiations would actually result in defining the future 
status of the Sudan, the Mirghanist felt more secure in 
rejecting the Government's overtures and continuing their 
support of the unionist cause.
In fact, the outcome of the negotiations eventually 
accentuated the polarization of political relationships 
in the Sudan. The British and Egyptian delegations could 
not agree on the Sudan Question, and the negotiations were 
consequently broken off. In October 1946, however,
Isma6il Sidqi went to London in search of some sort of a 
compromise. In connection with his departure, Egyptian 
press reports emphasized that Sidqi had been bound by a 
resolution of the Egyptian Senate to secure, among other 
things, the unity of the Nile Valley. Furthermore, these 
reports alleged, Sidqi had promised to bring back to 
Egypt sovereignty over the Sudan. On 27 October, Sidqi 
returned to Cairo with a draft treaty in his pocket which, 
he claimed, recognized Egyptian sovereignty over the
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Sudan. The famous Sidqi-Bevin protocol, as it came to he
known, read as follows:
"The policy which the High Contracting Parties 
undertake to follow in the Sudan (within the 
framework of the Unity between the Sudan and 
Egypt under the common Crown of Egypt) will 
have for its essential objectives to assure 
the well-being of the Sudanese, the development 
of their interests and their active preparation 
for self-government and consequently the 
exercise of the right to choose the future 
status of the Sudan. Until the High 
Contracting Parties can in full common 
agreement realize this latter objective after 
consultation with the Sudanese, the Agreement 
of 1899 will continue and Article 11 of the 
Treaty of 1936, together with the ^
Annexes ... will remain in force ..."
The British Government placed a different 
interpretation on the protocol than the Egyptians did. In 
a speech to the Commons, Prime Minister Attlee argued that 
the exchange of views between Bevin and Sidqi were merely 
exploratory conversations on a personal level and not 
formal negotiations, and that they did not commit either 
Government. Furthermore, he affirmed that the draft 
treaty did not change the existing status and administration 
of the Sudan nor impair the right of the Sudanese people 
to ultimately decide their own future.
It had been mutually agreed by Bevin and Sidqi that 
the details of the draft treaty would not be officially
1. Muddathir cAbd al-Rahim, on. cit.t p. 154
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published until they had been approved by the negotiating 
governments. With the text of the protocol thus 
unpublished, Sudanese nationalists became not only confused 
but increasingly apprehensive by the circulation of 
conflicting interpretations. The British and Egyptian 
exchanges were analysed in conjunction with Bevin*s 
assurances, in March 1946, that the Sudanese would be 
consulted on any change in the status of their country. 
Sudanese nationalists felt that Sidqi*s claim about 
sovereignty would not have been made unless they had some 
foundation; that the recognition of the sovereignty of 
either co-dominus separately meant a change in status; 
and that hence Bevin's pledge of consulting the Sudanese 
before such a change was made had been broken.'1'
However erroneous or premature these conclusions 
might have been, they stirred very deep feelings in 
political circles. The party most deeply affected were 
the Umma and their Mahdist supporters. Since withdrawing 
from the Sudan delegation in early May, the Umma had 
sought to achieve their objective by speeding up the pace 
of constitutional development in the country. They had 
placed a somewhat different interpretation on Huddleston's
Sudan Monthly Record. No. 197, October-November 1946, 
para 6853, CRO, PORT SUDAN 1/10/47.
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statement of 17 April and they saw the objectives of the
Administrative Conference as being to lay "clear plans
1
leading to a fully independent Sudan". It was because of 
this prospect that they had accepted to participate in the 
Conference. In the light of the Sidqi-Bevin protocol, 
they felt that they had been betrayed and they consequently 
turned violently anti-British. They whipped up anti­
government feeling, mobilized all parties opposed to 
Egyptian sovereignty and formed the United Independent 
Eront to defeat the protocol. Mahdist adherents converged 
on the capital and the political atmosphere became 
extremely volatile.
At this point, Sayyid eAbd al-Rahman decided to appeal 
directly to the British Government and, in late November, 
he flew to London. In an interview with Bevin, however, 
he realized that if he persisted in pressing for immediate 
independence he ran the risk of confirming Egyptian 
sovereignty over the Sudan. Bevin had argued that the 
protocol did not make the slightest difference to the 
existing status of the Sudan or to its administration, 
and that it did not prejudice the right of the Sudanese 
to ultimately achieve their complete independence.
1. cAbdallah Khalil to Robertson, 9*5.1946, PRO, 
PO.371/53257 (J4075/24/16).
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On the other hand, if the Sudan question had been referred
to an international court or to the United Nations, as
Egypt was contemplating, these "bodies would surely "find
sovereignty in Egypt and administration in British hands”*1
In the days that followed, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman became
aware that a modification of his position might prove more
advantageous* Accordingly, at another interview a week
later, he advised the British Government that he would be
prepared to accept the prolongation of Condominium rule,
provided that the draft treaty included articles granting
the Sudan complete self-government forthwith and
2independence in 10 years.
In any event, the draft treaty did not survive. On 
7 December, Huddleston declared in Khartoum that Attlee had 
authorised him to re-affirm the British determination that 
nothing in the Sidqi-Bevin protocol would be allowed to 
deflect the Sudan Government from preparing the Sudanese 
for self-government and for the task of choosing freely 
their future political status. Sidqi resigned in protest
1. Record of Interview of Saved Abdul Rahman el Mahdi 
with the Prime Minister at No. 10 Downing Street on 
November 28th. 1946. PRO, BO.371/53262 (J5130/24/16).
2. Record of a Conversation between Minister of State 
and Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi. held at the foreign 
on December 5th. 1946, PRO, FQ.371/53262
(J5303/24/16).
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and was succeeded by Nuqrashi Pasha, who announced that the 
aims of his Government included the realization of a 
permanent unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian 
crown. As opinion in both Britain and Egypt hardened, 
further attempts to negotiate a revised treaty broke down 
in January 1947 and the dispute was referred to the United 
Nations. There, after a prolonged debate in August, it 
was shelved indefinitely.
Political Repercussions.
The deadlock in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations ended 
the attempts of Sudanese nationalists to obtain immediate 
independence for the Sudan. The period that followed was 
inevitably accompanied by bitter mutual recrimination and 
accusations of betrayal of the nationalist cause. Political 
activity was henceforth dictated not by a common desire to 
liberate the Sudan from both Britain and Egypt, but by the 
primary concern to defeat the oppositions measures which 
were inevitably seen as favouring one or the other 
condominium partner. In such circumstances, constitutional 
developments in the country failed to gain the widespread 
popular support that would have formed a sound political 
foundation for the independent Sudan.
The feverish events and repetitive arguments of this 
period may be summarised briefly. The Administrative
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Conference, held in 1946, proposed the formation of a 
Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council. When these 
constitutional proposals were submitted to the condominium 
partners, Britain accepted them but Egypt criticized them 
as not going far enough and as excluding her from 
participating in the new regime. Meanwhile, the Advisory 
Council for the Northern Sudan debated and approved a 
draft ordinance implementing these constitutional proposals. 
When it became clear that an agreement with Egypt on the 
points at issue would not be possible, the British 
Government in June 1948 unilaterally authorized the new 
Governor-General (Sir Robert Howe) to promulgate the 
ordinance. Elections to the Legislative Assembly were 
held in November, but they were boycotted by the unionist 
parties and the Khatmiyya.
The Umma party, who had been deeply shocked by the 
Sidqi-Bevin protocol, were determined to prevent a 
repetition of such a sell-out in the future. They had 
concluded that the best way to do so was to speed up the 
pace of the Sudan Government*s programme of establishing 
effective organs of self-government, and then use these 
organs to declare the Sudan independent when Anglb- 
Egyptian negotiations were resumed. Unlike their unionist 
opponents, therefore, they took part in the elections for 
the Legislative Assembly and inevitably gained the greater
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majority of seats. They subsequently tried to broaden 
the basis of the Assembly by including Khatmiyya 
representatives, but they failed again to secure 
Mirghanist concurrence. Early attempts to get the Assembly 
to assert full self-government proved unrewarding and it 
was not until December 1951, after Nahhas Pasha abrogated 
the 1936 Treaty and the 1899 Condominium Agreement, that 
the Umma finally succeeded in convincing the majority of 
members to approve such a motion.
Throughout this period, the opposition parties 
understandably sought to obstruct Umma efforts. The 
Khatmiyya had been gradually alienated from the unionist 
cause by Egyptian refusals to agree to ultimate self- 
determination for the Sudan. In August 1949> they 
withdrew their support from Azhari and formed a new party, 
Al-Jabha al-Wataniyya, which sought for the Sudan only 
a dominion status under the Egyptian crown rather than 
incorporation with Egypt. Despite such disagreement with 
their other unionist colleagues, however, the Khatmiyya 
continued to mistrust Mahdist predominance in the Assembly, 
and they refused to support the Governments programme 
of constitutional developments until the ordinance had 
been satisfactorily amended and new elections had been held. 
Following the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in 1953? the 
Khatmiyya, still suspicious that the Umma aimed at putting
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Sayyid Abd al-Rahman on a throne, rejoined forces with 
Azhari to defeat their opponents in the country's first 
parliamentary elections.
The political bickerings of the late 1940's had two 
very significant and far-reaching repercussions on the 
political development of the Sudan. As it has already 
been noted, the unionist parties had boycotted the 
Administrative Conference primarily for partisan reasons. 
However, with the breakdown of the Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations and the shelving of the Sudan question in the 
United Nations, another element was added to unionist 
opposition to constitutional developments. As a result 
of a well-organized Ashiqqa* campaign in 1946 that the 
Sudan question was inseparable from the whole problem of 
the Nile Valley, popular opinion in the Sudan increasingly 
identified "self-government" with the perpetuation of 
Condominium (i.e. British) rule, and "unity" with 
"independence". Co-operation with the Sudan Government 
in "further associating the Sudanese more closely with the 
government of their country" had thus come to be regarded 
basically as a betrayal of the cause of independence. 
Ironically, therefore, the Umma party, who had adamantly 
advocated the complete independence of the Sudan, now found 
itself portrayed as collaborators of imperialism. As 
a consequence of this, the Umma party was increasingly
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isolated from the mainstream of the nationalist movement. 
The unionists, communists and other independent 
nationalists began to share one common objective: To
destroy the Umma party and eliminate the foreign rule that 
sustained it. Coupled with lingering sectarian fears of 
Mahdist domination, these alliances made it virtually 
impossible for the Umma to win parliamentary elections 
decisively or to form a viable majority government. The 
politics of coalition after independence eventually 
discredited parliamentary democracy and ushered in an era 
of military rule.
In another respect, the pre-occupation with sectarian 
rivalry distracted the political parties from the task of 
dealing effectively with social and economic problems in 
the country. As a result, political parties failed to 
evolve practical programmes of national development, and 
the independent Sudan of the 1950*s was accordingly marked 
by a period of ideological bankruptcy. This vacuum was 
subsequently filled by the Communists and the Ikhwan 
al-Muslimmln, two radical parties with diametrically 
opposed ideologies that were to plunge the Sudan into 
political instability in the 1960*8.
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